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Abstract
Security and privacy concerns in computer systems have grown in importance with the ubiquity of con-
nected devices. Additionally, cloud computing boosts such distress as private data is stored and processed
in multi-tenant infrastructure providers. In recent years, trusted execution environments (TEEs) have
caught the attention of scientific and industry communities as they became largely available in user- and
server-class machines.
TEEs provide security guarantees based on cryptographic constructs built in hardware. Since silicon
chips are difficult to probe or reverse engineer, they can offer stronger protection against remote or even
physical attacks when compared to their software counterparts. Intel software guard extensions (SGX),
in particular, implements powerful mechanisms that can shield sensitive data even from privileged users
with full control of system software.
Designing secure distributed systems is a notably daunting task, since they involve many coordinated
processes running in geographically-distant nodes, therefore having numerous points of attack. In this
work, we essentially explore some of these challenges by using Intel SGX as a crucial tool. We do so by
designing and experimentally evaluating several elementary systems ranging from communication and
processing middleware to a peer-to-peer privacy-preserving solution.
We start with support systems that naturally fit cloud deployment scenarios, namely content-based routing,
batching and stream processing frameworks. Our communication middleware protects the most critical
stage of matching subscriptions against publications inside secure enclaves and achieves substantial per-
formance gains in comparison to traditional software-based equivalents. The processing platforms, in
turn, receive encrypted data and code to be executed within the trusted environment. Our prototypes are
then used to analyse the manifested memory usage issues intrinsic to SGX.
Next, we aim at protecting very sensitive data: cryptographic keys. By leveraging TEEs, we design proto-
cols for group data sharing that have lower computational complexity than legacy methods. As a bonus,
our proposals allow large savings on metadata volume and processing time of cryptographic operations,
all with equivalent security guarantees.
Finally, we focus our attention on privacy-preserving systems. After all, users cannot modify some ex-
isting systems like web-search engines, and the providers of these services may keep individual profiles
containing sensitive private information about them. We aim at achieving indistinguishability and un-
linkability properties by employing techniques like sensitivity analysis, query obfuscation and leveraging
relay nodes. Our evaluation shows that we propose the most robust system in comparison to existing
solutions with regard to user re-identification rates and results’ accuracy in a scalable way.
All in all, this thesis proposes new mechanisms that take advantage of TEEs for distributed system archi-
tectures. We show through an empirical approach on top of Intel SGX what are the trade-offs of distinct
designs applied to distributed communication and processing, cryptographic protocols and private web
search.
Keywords: security, privacy, TEE, SGX, distributed systems, communication, processing, cryptographic
protocols, web search.
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Résumé
Les problèmes de sécurité et de confidentialité des systèmes informatiques ont pris de l’importance avec
l’omniprésence des périphériques connectés. En outre, l’informatique en nuage accroît cette détresse,
car les données privées sont stockées et traitées par des fournisseurs d’infrastructure hébergeant de
multiples locataires. Ces dernières années, les environnements d’exécution de confiance, ou TEE (« trusted
execution environments ») ont attiré l’attention des communautés scientifiques et industrielles, car ils sont
devenus largement disponibles sur des machines de type utilisateur et serveur.
Les TEE fournissent des garanties de sécurité basées sur des constructions cryptographiques intégrées
au matériel. Les puces de silicium étant difficiles à sonder ou étudier par ingénierie inverse, elles offrent
une protection renforcée contre les attaques distantes, voire physiques, par rapport à leurs homologues
logicielles. En particulier, les extensions de protection logicielle Intel SGX (« software guard extensions »)
implémentent de puissants mécanismes qui peuvent protéger les données sensibles même contre les utili-
sateurs privilégiés disposant du contrôle total du logiciel de système.
La conception de systèmes repartis sécurisés est une tâche particulièrement ardue, car ils impliquent de
nombreux processus coordonnés exécutés dans des nœuds géographiquement distants, ce qui entraîne
de nombreux points d’attaque. Dans ce travail, nous explorons essentiellement certains de ces défis en
utilisant Intel SGX comme pierre angulaire. Nous le faisons en concevant et en évaluant de manière expé-
rimentale plusieurs systèmes élémentaires allant du logiciel médiateur de communication et de traitement
à une solution de protection de la confidentialité pair-à-pair.
Nous commençons par des systèmes de support qui s’adaptent naturellement aux scénarios de déploie-
ment dans le cloud, à savoir : des infrastructures de routage en fonction du contenu, de traitement par
lots et de traitement de flux. Notre logiciel médiateur de communication protège la phase de mise en
correspondance d’abonnements avec des publications, qui est la plus critique, en l’effectuant à l’inté-
rieur d’enclaves sécurisées. Il permet des gains substantiels en performance par rapport aux équivalents
traditionnels basés sur des logiciels. Les plates-formes de traitement reçoivent à leur tour des données
chiffrées et du code à exécuter dans l’environnement sécurisé. Nos prototypes sont ensuite utilisés pour
analyser les problèmes d’utilisation de mémoire qui sont inhérents à SGX.
Nous visons ensuite à protéger des données très sensibles : les clés cryptographiques. En utilisant les
TEE, nous concevons des protocoles pour le partage de données de groupe présentant une complexité
de calcul inférieure à celle des méthodes traditionnelles. De plus, nos propositions permettent d’impor-
tantes économies quant au volume de méta-données produites et au temps de traitement des opérations
cryptographiques, le tout avec des garanties de sécurité équivalentes.
Enfin, nous concentrons notre attention sur les systèmes préservant la confidentialité. Après tout, les
utilisateurs ne peuvent pas modifier certains systèmes existants, tels que les moteurs de recherche Web.
Les fournisseurs de ces services peuvent conserver des profils individuels contenant des informations
confidentielles les concernant. Nous visons à obtenir des propriétés d’indiscernabilité et indissociabilité
en utilisant des techniques telles que l’analyse de sensibilité, l’obscurcissement de requêtes et l’utilisation
de nœuds relais. Notre évaluation montre que nous proposons le système le plus robuste par rapport aux
solutions existantes en ce qui concerne les taux de ré-identification des utilisateurs et la précision des
résultats de manière évolutive.
Dans sa globalité, cette thèse propose de nouveaux mécanismes tirant parti des TEE pour les architec-
tures de systèmes repartis. Nous montrons par approche empirique au-dessus de Intel SGX quels sont les
compromis entre plusieurs modèles de conception distincts appliqués à la communication et au traitement
répartis, aux protocoles cryptographiques et à la recherche privée sur le Web.
vii
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cryptographiques, recherche sur le Web.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work explores design strategies for distributed systems that leverage trusted execution environ-
ments (TEEs). We aim at achieving better security and privacy guarantees while maintaining or improving
performance in comparison to existing equivalent approaches.
1.1 Context and motivation
Legacy systems perform access control by separating software roles into privileged and user modes. While
privileged system software like hypervisors and operating systems (OSes) control machine resources, user-
mode applications must rely on system software correctness, i.e., that they are free of exploitable bugs,
and honesty, i.e., that they are not malicious.
The correctness aspect is already hard to verify. After all, system software is very complex and comprises
millions of lines of code (LoC). To illustrate, more than 10 000 computer systems’ vulnerabilities are being
discovered each year [1] and the number of software bugs is proportional to its size. Presuming that an
adversary would be able to exploit one of them is not a far-fetched assumption.
When it comes to honesty though, confidence may be even lower. With the raise of cloud computing, many
computer systems are deployed on third-party infrastructure providers. The reasons for doing so are
mostly related to the large costs of acquiring and maintaining private data centres. In such shared envir-
onments, at least the hypervisors [2] are under the provider’s control. Even if one trusts the infrastructure
provider and all of its employees with physical access or administrative credentials to the machines, still
they would have to hope that other tenants running on the same platforms are not malicious.
A large code-base consisting of system software on which user applications must trust is therefore not
the best approach from a security standpoint. TEEs, in turn, invert this logic. They make it possible for
only a small piece of code to be considered safe, i.e., belonging to the trusted computing base (TCB).
This dramatically reduces the trust surface, as in this case it suffices to believe that the TEE hardware
implementation is correct and has no backdoors, apart from having confidence on the reduced piece of
software that runs in isolation, i.e., within an enclave.
In the last quarter of 2015, a few months before this work started, Intel released the first commercially
available machines with software guard extensions (SGX) [3]. It was the first TEE accessible in consumer-
grade computers that offered out-of-the-box attestation mechanisms in conjunction with memory encryp-
tion, integrity and freshness guarantees. These assurances were attainable by user applications that could
then be protected from higher privileged entities like the hypervisor or the operating system. Up to this
date, it is still unmatched by alternatives (see Section 2.1).
With processes that coordinate over multiple interconnected machines, distributed systems face attacks
on all fronts of their deployment. Reaching dependability [4] in such systems is not a trivial task. How-
ever, TEEs provide an opportunity to achieve this goal. This thesis explores these possibilities through
the design and evaluation of experimental prototypes representative of fundamental distributed systems
relying on TEEs—materialised with Intel SGX—to offer security and privacy. Doing so, we wish to answer
the following questions:
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• How can TEEs help to achieve security and privacy in distributed systems?
• What are the drawbacks?
• What benefits may come from using TEEs?
Assumptions
We assume that Intel SGX behaves correctly, i.e., there are no bugs or backdoors. Additionally, we do not
deal with side-channel attacks against SGX. We consider such attacks outside the scope of this disserta-
tion and that the research community provides some solutions that could possibly be incorporated (see
Section 2.2.6). Furthermore, we are also aware that denial of service (DoS) attacks cannot be prevented,
e.g., malicious agents might drop requests or refuse to initialise enclaves. Besides, we do not handle roll-
back attacks of persistent data. Standard solutions with monotonic counters could be used, although we
are aware that they might be ineffective (see Section 2.2.5). Finally, we assume that all the cryptographic
primitives and libraries used in enclaves are trusted and cannot be forged.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this work are as follows.
• Design, implementation and evaluation of secure content-based routing (SCBR), the first system
that demonstrates the practical benefits of SGX for privacy-preserving content-based routing (CBR).
We protect compute-intensive matching operations in the trusted environment, so that efficient al-
gorithms that operate on plaintext data can be used. As a consequence, we reach performance gains
of one order of magnitude in comparison to a software-only solution with analogous guarantees. We
also analyse SGX overheads when surpassing its memory limits. This work was done in collaboration
with Christof Fetzer, from the Technical University of Dresden, Germany.
• Proposal of Lightweight MapReduce, a processing framework based on a programming model ex-
tensively used for parallel data processing in distributed environments. We ported a Lua interpreter
engine to run inside secure enclaves and leverage it as execution unit that operates on code and
data provisioned in encrypted form. From the usability perspective, a user can just write MapRe-
duce scripts and let the framework handle data encryption and dissemination. Besides, we observe
the performance influence of going beyond the last level cache (LLC) in enclave executions. Daniel
Gravril and Emanuel Onica, from the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Ias¸i, Romania, collaborated
with this work.
• SecureStreams: a reactive middleware built on top of Lua libraries. Its architecture relies on Lua
virtual machine (VM) pairs on each node, i.e., one running inside enclaves and another outside.
This way, only sensitive data processing is relayed to trusted environments, while message queuing
and the pipeline management is kept outside. We analyse performance losses when compared to
unsafe executions in terms of throughput and scalability. This was joint work with Aurélien Havet
and Valerio Schiavoni, from our Institute, and Romain Rouvoy, from the University of Lille, France.
• Introduction of IBBE-SGX, a new cryptographic access control extension for collaborative editing of
shared data. Thanks to TEEs, we are able to cut part of the computational complexity of an identity-
based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme. Shielding a master key inside the trusted environment
allows us to spare considerable computation time by avoiding the usage of an IBBE public-key during
encryption. Because of this, we improve performance by orders of magnitude in comparison to hybrid
encryption (HE), both in terms of membership changes and produced metadata, consequently also
profiting in storage and network usage.
• To handle anonymity among group members, A-Sky is presented. Instead of relying on costly asym-
metric cryptography like pretty good privacy (PGP), secure enclaves allow A-Sky to create key envel-
opes using efficient symmetric operations hence achieving faster execution times and shorter cipher-
texts. In addition, we only require the usage of a TEE proxy for writing to the shared storage and
leave the dominant data consumption operations directly in charge of rightful readers. We propose
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Table 1.1: Papers related to this dissertation.
Chapter Keyword Section Publication Source code Venue
2
SEV vs. SGX 2.1.3 [5] SRDS’18
Malware 2.2.6 [6] SRDS’19
SecureCloud 2.3 [7] DATE’17
Scheduling 2.3 [8] [9] ICDCS’18
3
SCBR 3.1.1 [10] [11] Middleware’16
MapReduce 3.2.2 [12] [13] CCGRID’17
SecureStreams 3.2.3 [14] [15] DEBS’17
4
IBBE-SGX 4.1.1 [16] [17] DSN’18
A-Sky 4.2.1 [18] [19] SRDS’19
5
X-Search 5.1.1 [20] Middleware’17
Cyclosa 5.2.1 [21] ICDCS’18
an end-to-end system based on micro-services and a representational state transfer (REST) inter-
face before evaluating its performance and scalability. Both IBBE-SGX and A-Sky resulted from our
collaboration with Stefan Contiu and Laurent Réveillère, from the University of Bordeaux, France.
Additionally, Sébastien Vaucher, from our Institute, contributed in both.
• X-Search, in turn, leverages TEEs for providing a privacy-preserving solution for Web search. In
order to prevent service providers from keeping accurate user profiles and therefore obstruct privacy
breaches, we propose a SGX proxy between users and search engines. From the service provider’s
perspective, queries originate from another source, thus becoming more difficult to link them back
to their issuing users. Since the proxy operates in the trusted environment, we can safely store past
user queries and use them to obfuscate requests, so that the search engine cannot distinguish real
from fake queries. These strategies combined offer stronger privacy guarantees and outperform
previous approaches in latency and throughput. Our conjoint efforts with Sonia Ben Mokhtar and
Antoine Boutet, from the University of Lyon, France, led to this work.
• Finally, we contribute with the proposal of Cyclosa. Instead of a centralised proxy, we now spread
the load across a peer-to-peer (P2P) network of SGX relay nodes. Each one may issue their own quer-
ies through the decentralised network and also forward requests to the search engine on behalf of
others, always having enclaves as intermediaries. Obfuscation is done through different paths, thus
facilitating the delivery of results by simply discarding those that handle fake queries and there-
fore achieving perfect results’ accuracy. Additionally, we propose an adaptive privacy protection
solution based on sensitivity analysis that reduces the risk of user re-identification. With that, we
solve the issue of possibly being blacklisted by search engines because of centralised proxies while
meeting scalability and accuracy. In addition to Ben Mokhtar and Boutet, Sara Bouchenak—also
from Lyon—contributed in Cyclosa. Likewise, David Goltzsche and Rüdiger Kapitza, from the Tech-
nical University of Braunschweig, Germany, joined the team. Valerio Schiavoni, from our Institute,
contributed in both X-Search and Cyclosa.
These contributions were previously published in conference proceedings in papers co-authored by Pascal
Felber and Marcelo Pasin, my supervisors, and me. Table 1.1 establishes the relation between publications
and the corresponding section in this document where they are mentioned. Additionally, we indicate the
publication venue and a reference to the corresponding source code, when available.
1.3 Outline
This manuscript is organised in six chapters, the first being this introduction. The remaining chapters are
arranged as follows.
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Chapter 2 presents the background on TEEs and particularly on Intel SGX. We focus on their main
features and peculiarities, which finally endorse our choice for SGX. The SecureCloud project is briefly
described before we present the state-of-the-art by mentioning related work specific to each of our contri-
butions.
In Chapter 3, we explore the cloud scenario depicted in Section 1.1 by designing and evaluating systems
supposed to be deployed in such unreliable environments. A communication middleware (Section 3.1) and
two distributed processing frameworks are presented (Section 3.2). Section 3.1.1 presents SCBR, where
we essentially put a publish/subscribe (pub/sub) matcher unit inside an enclave, i.e., the component that
handles sensitive data. The processing frameworks, one for batch execution (Section 3.2.2) and another
for processing stream of events (Section 3.2.3), used a Lua script interpreter within enclaves, so that code
and data can come on demand. The goal in this chapter is to quantify the SGX performance implications
in the context of practical systems, besides learning about the main design concerns involved in building
these secure applications. Our results show that whenever cache and enclave page cache (EPC) limits
are surpassed, there are performance penalties. Although not surprising, these results—along with the
designs—contribute towards sensitive data processing in untrusted public clouds.
TEEs are not only useful for shielding legacy artefacts like script processors. In fact, simply porting
memory-eager systems may not be a good idea as they suffer considerable overheads in the current version
of SGX. Instead, in Chapter 4, we capitalise on a trusted environment for protecting cryptographic
keys. Particularly, for group communication and data sharing. In Section 4.1.1, we generate a master
secret within an enclave, from where it never leaves in unencrypted form. Since this key can only be
used in protected execution, we can cut some computational cost of an IBBE scheme by using simpler
cryptographic primitives. That brings significant advantages when compared to HE in terms of metadata
size and performance. At the same time, it obviates the need for relying on a public key infrastructure
(PKI). Apart from that, we also design in Section 4.2.1 a distributed system that offers anonymity among
group members. For that, we use enclaves to harbour keys and group membership data while attaching
some metadata to encrypted files that can then be stored in untrusted clouds. A user who is member of the
group for a given file will be able to retrieve the key from the attached metadata. The take-away message
is that TEEs, apart from shielding traditional applications, can also have an essential role in the design of
efficient cryptographic protocols.
Until this point, we covered the design of distinct server-side systems. Nevertheless, often times users
must rely on established services which are unlikely to change. That is the case for web search engines,
which are able to quietly track user activities in spite of correctly answering their queries. Because of this,
Chapter 5 handles privacy-preserving solutions from the user perspective. Our first approach, described
in Section 5.1.1, adds a centralised proxy to hide user identities from search engines. At the same time,
we obfuscate requests using past queries that are securely kept within enclaves, so that the introduced
noise hinders the service provider’s ability to keep meaningful profiles. But a toll must be paid: the
introduced fake queries have consequences in the quality of results, which need to be filtered. Moreover,
its centralised nature allows search engines to easily block the SGX proxies, as the proxies potentially issue
considerable amounts of traffic. Besides, with a growing number of users they would become performance
bottlenecks. To counter these disadvantages, we propose in Section 5.2.1 a fully decentralised approach.
It consists in a user-side peer-to-peer solution that combines performance, scalability, fault tolerance and
accuracy of results, since in this case no result filtering is needed.
Finally, Chapter 6 revisits our achievements on the three parts: cloud deployment systems, crypto
schemes and client-side privacy protection. Before concluding, we discuss some avenues for further re-
search.
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Background and related work
Integrity and confidentiality of applications are enforced by means of logical isolation. Virtual address
spaces and privileged instructions, for instance, are hardware mechanisms used by operating systems
(OSes) to prevent unauthorized processes from getting access to potentially sensitive pieces of memory
(e.g., belonging to other users) or operations (e.g., interacting with input and output peripherals). Like-
wise, hardware virtualisation extensions [22, 23] are used by hypervisors to isolate multiple OSes running
on the same physical host. Such a model requires that both the OS and the hypervisor be trusted by a user
application, since it uses their services.
In multi-tenant setups, as in cloud environments, at least the hypervisor is under the provider’s control.
Despite the legal protection assured by possible contractual agreements between applications and infra-
structure providers, security concerns may arise from this separation of administrative domains. The
potential threats are numerous: distinct law jurisdictions, corrupt employees with privileged access, mali-
cious co-located tenants etc.
From a technical perspective, OSes and hypervisors are composed of millions of lines of source code,
resulting in bloated trusted computing bases (TCBs). The number of bugs, which may be reduced by
means of OS formal proofs [24], is proportional to software size [25]. Other tenants running on the same
computers can profit from them to gain access to sensitive data. Moreover, system administrators of
the cloud provider have access to all application data. Hosted applications can further be compromised
either by privileged administrators acting maliciously or as a consequence of having their credentials
hijacked [26].
2.1 Trusted execution environments
Traditional hardware isolation mechanisms protect user applications from one another (memory control),
multiple OSes from one another (virtualisation), and the system software from user applications (privileged
instructions). However, none of them provide isolation to user applications from the system software.
Apart from logical isolation, other mechanisms must also be employed, for instance, when attackers get
physical access to platforms. In such cases, they could wiretap memory buses or read memory content
through cold boot attacks [27, 28].
Cryptography is widely used to protect data in transit, e.g., using transport layer security (TLS) [29],
or at rest, for storage. When data are processed though, ciphertexts must be deciphered before loaded
into system memory. During processing, data confidentiality is hence threatened by privileged users and
physical attackers. Cryptographic approaches like homomorphic encryption could be employed, although
they are not considered practical due to their prohibitive cost [5].
To solve issues like isolation of user applications from system software and providing cryptographic layers
of isolation against physical attacks, trusted execution environments (TEEs) were proposed. Different im-
plementations vary in terms of features, which we summarize in Table 2.1. In this overview, we leave aside
academic proposals (e.g., Sanctum [30], Bastion [31] and AEGIS [32]) and focus on popular commercial
solutions:
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Table 2.1: Comparison of TEEs.
TPM TrustZone AMD SEV Intel SGX
Released 2009 2005 2016 2015
Running mode coprocessor special mode hypervisor user-level
ISA n/a ARM x86_64 x86_64
Executes arbitrary code 7 3 3 3
Secret hardware key 3 7* 3 3
Attestation and Sealing 3 7* 3 3
Memory encryption n/a 7 3 3
Memory integrity n/a 7 7 3
Resilient to wiretap 7 7 3 3
I/O from TEE 3 3 3 7
TEE usable memory limit n/a system RAM system RAM 93.5MiB
TCB
Data and funcs
in the TPM chip
OS and apps in
the secure world
Entire VMs
Trusted
app partition
n/a: not applicable
*: possible with additional hardware
• Trusted platform modules (TPMs) are dedicated coprocessors, and therefore do not allow for the
execution of general purpose software. Their TCB boundary is the microcontroller package, which
contain the memories they need to operate. Memory integrity and confidentiality guarantees serve
hence no purpose, as memories are inside this package and cannot be tampered with or wiretapped
without physical violation. Wiretapping its input and output (I/O) bus, however, could reveal sens-
itive information, e.g., data unsealed by the TPM. Besides, the TPM state can only be reset by
physical presence, which makes it suitable for preventing remote attacks. The TPM specification
was standardised in 2009 through ISO/IEC 11889.
• TrustZone is a TEE for the advanced RISC machine (ARM) instruction set architecture (ISA) that
switches between secure and unsecure modes. It provides isolation by means of interrupts rout-
ing and restrictions on the memory bus and memory management unit (MMU). However, there
is no built-in cryptographic primitives that could provide a root of trust for persistent sealing and
attestation [33]. Since ARM is a intellectual property (IP) core provider and not a chip manufac-
turer, vendors might implement such additional security, although most often they are not publicly
disclosed. In 2018, ARM announced families of semiconductor IPs called CryptoIsland and Crypto-
Cell that can possibly be integrated to ARM central processing units (CPUs) in a single system on
chip (SoC). Conceptually, that would be like having a TPM inside the processor package, allowing
the usage of hardware keys as root of trust (like Intel software guard extensions (SGX)).
• AMD secure encrypted virtualisation (SEV) provides automatic inline encryption and decryption of
memory traffic, granting confidentiality for data in use by virtual machines (VMs). Cryptographic
operations are performed by hardware and are transparent to applications, which do not need to be
modified. Keys are generated at boot time and secured in a coprocessor integrated to the SoC. It was
conceived for cloud scenarios, where guest VMs might not trust the hypervisor. Apart from including
the whole guest OS in the TCB, it does not provide memory integrity and freshness guarantees.
Rowhammer attacks [34] might corrupt data and rollback attacks are not detected.
• Intel SGX is primarily conceived for shielding micro-services, so that the TCB would be minimised.
Automatic memory encryption and integrity protection are performed by hardware over a reserved
memory area fixed at booting time, defined in the basic input/output system (BIOS) and limited to
128MiB. Whatever is kept in this area is automatically encrypted and integrity checked by hardware.
The trust boundary is the CPU package, which holds hardware keys upon which attestation and seal-
ing services are built. Applications are partitioned into trusted (shielded in enclaves) and untrusted
parts. The OS is considered untrusted, which prevents enclaves from directly issuing system calls.
SGX enclaves are subject to side-channel attacks and denial of service.
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Trusted platform module (TPM)
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Execution 
engine
Opt-InKey generator
Non-volatile 
memory
EK SRK …
Cryptographic 
coprocessor
RSA AES …
Cryptographic 
hash engine
SHA HMAC …
Volatile 
memory
Figure 2.1: TPM components.
We further detail these technologies in the following sections.
2.1.1 Trusted platform modules
A TPM [35] is an independent and specialized tamper-resistant coprocessor. Its root of trust comes from an
integrated asymmetric pair of endorsement keys (EKs) physically burnt in the component. The private en-
dorsement key is never made available to users, irrespective of their system privileges. Rather than provid-
ing general purpose computations, TPMs perform a small set of security operations such as random num-
ber generation, cryptographic hash functions, e.g., secure hash algorithm (SHA), public- and symmetric-
key cryptographic algorithms, e.g., advanced encryption standard (AES) and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
(RSA). Some implementations also provide trusted time and monotonic counters (see Section 2.2.5). Typ-
ically, a TPM securely holds software measurements and cryptographic keys which may be used for trusted
boot, remote attestation and data sealing.
Access to TPMs is based on the ownership granted to whom first sets a shared secret. Access control is op-
erated by a component called Opt-In, which maintains flags associated to the TPM’s state. When someone
takes ownership, a storage root key (SRK) is created and can be used for sealing data in persistent storage.
Only the owner is able to remotely use the TPM in its full capabilities, although it may be factory reset
through the assertion of physical presence. Nevertheless, other users can perform operations allowed by
the owner, like querying software measurements, storing keys and using crypto primitives. Figure 2.1
illustrates internal components of a TPM.
Being a separate component, TPMs are detached from other isolation mechanisms such as memory page
tables and privileged instructions. Security is therefore highly dependant on how TPM chips are wired to
main processors, what are the privileges users must hold to get access to such chips and whether adversar-
ies might have physical access. Wiretapping the TPM’s I/O lines may compromise sensitive data.
2.1.2 ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone [36, 37] is a popular TEE, mostly used in low-energy or mobile devices. It provides
a protection domain called secure world that cannot be accessed by the normal world. Each physical
processor core is viewed as two virtual ones: secure and non-secure, which are used in a time-sliced
manner. The context switch is made through a monitor mode (ARMv8-A) accessed by a special instruction,
or through hardware exception mechanisms (ARMv8-M). At booting time, a secure firmware initialises the
platform and decides what is part of secure and non-secure worlds by configuring the interrupt controller
and setting up memory partitions and peripherals. Then, the processor switches to the normal world,
typically yielding control to the normal (or rich) OS bootloader.
In the system bus, a supplementary control signal (a 33rd bit) called Non-Secure bit (NS) is set by hardware
whenever a transaction (read or write) is made by components that belong to the normal world. Being so,
once addresses are decoded, they cannot match any component that is part of the secure world. Additional
mechanisms provide the means for securing memory regions and interrupts, which are also partitioned
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Figure 2.2: TrustZone scheme.
between the two worlds and can only be configured in secure mode. Such mechanisms provide security
building blocks such as trusted I/O paths and secure storage.
Remote attestation and sealing do not come out of the box, although some works simply assume the
availability of a secure hardware key in the secure world [38, 39], since ARM chip vendors are free to add
their own IPs to manufactured SoCs. In conjunction with a TPM that can solely communicate with the
secure world, one can envision a root of trust for providing these services [40].
TrustZone provides, however, only one secure world. As a consequence, multiple secure applications
need to share it, increasing the chances of dividing the protected environment with potential attackers.
Alternatively, a requirement of at most one application in the secure world can be enforced, although this
could be too restrictive in some scenarios. Moreover, the secure world is under the control of a separate
OS, which means that it can still be accessed by some (possibly compromised) system administrator.
2.1.3 AMD SEV
The advanced micro devices (AMD) SEV protects data in use by VMs. It relies on a hardware encryption
engine embedded in the memory controller (MC) which automatically performs cryptographic operations,
given that appropriate keys are provided to it, and adds minimum performance impact and no requirement
for application changes. Key generation and management are performed in the AMD secure processor, a
dedicated security subsystem based on an ARM Cortex-A5 coprocessor physically isolated from the rest of
the SoC. It contains a dedicated random-access memory (RAM), non-volatile storage in a serial peripheral
interface (SPI) flash and cryptographic engines. Figure 2.3 depicts the high level architecture.
While the secure memory encryption (SME) feature uses a single key for system-wide memory encryption,
SEV involves multiple encryption keys, one per VM. When using SME, ephemeral keys are randomly
generated at boot time by the secure processor and are used to encrypt memory pages that are marked
by system software within page tables through the C-bit. Alternatively, all pages may be encrypted if the
Transparent SME, or TSME, is activated during boot time. TSME does not require modifications in the OS
and prevents physical attacks like cold boot.
Unlike SME, SEV allows the association of one encryption key per hardware virtual machine in a way that
the hypervisor has no longer access to everything within guest VMs. The same cryptographic isolation is
present in the other direction, i.e., the hypervisor has a separate key that prevents the guest from reading
its assigned memory pages even in case of a malicious attack resulting in the break of memory logical
isolation. Despite that, guests and the hypervisor still communicate, i.e., the latter performs scheduling
and device emulation for VMs.
Apart from resources management, the hypervisor also manages keys, although it has no access to them.
This is done by the manipulation of address space identifiers (ASIDs), which are specified when VMs are
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launched and are used to determine the encryption key. Essentially, ASIDs are used as indexes into a key
table in the MC that determines the key in use by the AES engine. Besides, such identifier is also employed
to tag data in the cache, in a way that only their owner is able to hit on that cache line and get access to
the corresponding data.
Memory pages containing instructions and guest page tables are always private, so that attacks such
as code injection become more difficult. Data pages, on the other hand, may be shared by each guest
OS through the C-bit manipulation. In particular, this is used for direct memory access (DMA), which is
only allowed in shared memory pages. From the software perspective, this requires changes in the guest
OS and hypervisor, so that they can set memory pages access privileges. That is done through an open
source AMD secure processor driver, which communicates with the secure processor firmware. The AMD
secure processor only runs signed firmware, which is a closed source package that AMD provides to BIOS
vendors.
Key management allows for platform authentication, virtual machines start-up, migration and snapshot.
Chips are fused with unique keys, including the chip endorsement key (CEK) derived from chip-unique
values and an AMD signing key for authentication. Apart from that, platform owners may set a certification
authority (CA) key which may be used for allowing migration exclusively to other platforms that had been
signed by the same CA. Once combined, the CEK and the CA key produce the platform endorsement
key (PEK) which is encrypted and stored in the SPI flash. The PEK is finally used to derive the platform
Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) in conjunction with guest OSes every time the machine is powered on or reset.
That way, the hypervisor is not able to intercept communication between guest OSes and the AMD secure
processor.
Originally, the processor register state of VMs could be exploited by hypervisors running under AMD
SEV. For that reason, AMD released the SEV encrypted state (ES) that allows guests to restrict access
to the register state, albeit possibly sharing it with hypervisors. Although AMD SME/SEV/SEV-ES allow
memory and registers encryption and platform attestation to a finer granularity (VMs), these technologies
are vulnerable to memory integrity manipulation (e.g., rowhammer) and rollback attacks, i.e., when a
previous state (even if encrypted and signed) is replayed back and considered genuine.
2.2 Intel SGX
Intel SGX provides a TEE by employing distinguished approaches, particularly with respect to running
privileges (user-level) and security guarantees (memory integrity and freshness). Limiting the secure
execution to user-level processes allows to purge the OS out of the TCB, therefore dramatically reducing
the size of the latter. Memory integrity and freshness in conjunction with confidentiality guarantees, on the
other hand, make the secure environment robust against all kinds of memory tampering. These features,
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however, are not costless. A unit of code protected by SGX, or enclave, often needs to use OS services, and
such interactions become more expensive. Likewise, the bookkeeping that enables memory safety is made
by hardware, hence consuming silicon area and memory at runtime. Because of that, enclaves are limited
to use a small amount of protected memory. Whenever they need to use more than that, considerable
overheads arise.
SGX aims to shield code execution against inspection and tampering from privileged code (e.g., infected
OS) and certain physical attacks. It does so by offering an instruction set extension in x86_64 CPUs
manufactured by Intel. SGX seamlessly encrypts and tracks integrity tags of memory in use by enclaves.
In this way, it is guaranteed that at any time during enclave execution the most recent and untampered
plaintext data is present inside the CPU package. As a consequence, computations done in the enclave
cannot be seen from the outside and any modification attempts are detected, including replay of previously
authenticated values. The TCB of an SGX enclave is composed of the CPU itself, and the code running
within. The assumption is that opening the CPU package is difficult for an attacker, and leaves clear
evidence of the breach.
To enable an application to use enclaves, the developer must provide a signed shared library (.so or .dll)
that will execute inside an enclave. The library itself is not encrypted and can be inspected before being
started. Due to this, no secret should be stored inside the code. An enclave is provided with secrets,
like certificates and keys, with the help of a remote attestation protocol. This protocol can prove that
an enclave runs on a genuine Intel processor with SGX and can verify that its identity matches that of
the code that is expected to run [41]. As a result of the attestation, a shared secret that enables a secure
communication channel is established and permits the remote entity to provide the enclave with encrypted
secrets.
SGX applications are partitioned between trusted and untrusted segments. Typically, the trusted part is
supposed to handle sensitive data and computations, whereas the untrusted is responsible for performing
system calls and handling non-sensitive backing operations. While trusted code has access to the whole
process memory space, the untrusted code is limited to its own memory pages. Transferring the control
from one running mode to the other happens in a similar fashion to remote procedure calls (RPCs) in
the sense that arguments are serialised and replicated in another memory space before switching modes.
Calls made from the untrusted code to the trusted one are called enclave calls (ecalls), whereas the ones in
the opposite direction are called outside calls (ocalls). Figure 2.4 depicts the basic execution flow of SGX.
First, an enclave is created (Ê). As soon as a program needs to execute a trusted function (Ë), it performs
an ecall (Ì). The call goes through the SGX call gate to bring the execution flow inside the enclave (Í).
Once the trusted function is executed by one of the enclave’s threads (Î), its result is encrypted and sent
back (Ï) before giving the control to the main processing thread (Ð).
Intel provides a set of tools to aid the coding and fulfilment of SGX requirements. The SGX software
development kit (SDK) [42] comprises a generator for proxies and stubs written in C that are supposed
to be compiled and linked to both trusted and untrusted code. This generation is based on a text-based
configuration file that follows the syntax of the enclave definition language (EDL), which basically defines
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the interface of edge routines. Since system calls and I/O instructions are not allowed inside enclaves, Intel
also provides libraries that are guaranteed to comply with these limitations. It also contains wrappers for
specific functions, like accessing the true random number generator by the RDRAND instruction, which
uses hardware noise as source of entropy. Moreover, it provides functionalities to improve performance
like the switchless calls [43], which basically implement asynchronous handling of ocalls to reduce the
number of transitions between trusted and untrusted modes. The SDK also includes the enclave signing
tool responsible for measuring and signing the shared library to be loaded as an enclave. In the following
sections, we further detail some of the SGX features, their implications and limitations.
2.2.1 Memory protection
Encrypted memory is provided in a reserved memory area predefined at boot time. It is called process
reserved memory (PRM) and is limited to 128MiB in the first version of SGX, although future releases
might relax this limitation [44]. Within the PRM, an area of at most 93.5MiB [8] called enclave page
cache (EPC) can be used by application’s memory pages, while the remaining area is used to maintain SGX
metadata. If this limit is surpassed, enclave pages are subject to a swapping mechanism implemented in
the Intel SGX driver, resulting in severe performance penalties [10, 45, 46].
Normally, memory transactions that miss the cache are handled by the processor’s MC. If they correspond
to PRM addresses though, a component of the MC called memory encryption engine (MEE) takes over [41].
Figure 2.5 illustrates this mechanism. The MEE is responsible for providing cryptographic operations,
tamper-resistance and replay protection. It generates random keys at every boot, one for cryptographic
operations and another for message authentication codes (MACs). The safety guarantees are achieved
by (i) encrypting data before sending them to dynamic random-access memory (DRAM); (ii) updating an
integrity tree; (iii) decrypting data fetched from DRAM; and (iv) verifying the integrity tree.
An integrity tree is typically implemented as a Merkle tree [47], where each node holds a hash digest of
its children. The root is the digest of the entire data, and each leaf the hash of one data unit. Being so, an
update requires to re-compute only the implicated leaf and its ancestors. Instead of simple hashes, SGX
MEE uses stateful MACs. The state is a nonce (non repeating number, coined to be used only once) called
by Intel as the version of each data unit, which has the size of a cache line, i.e., 64B. The tree is stored
in untrusted memory, except for its root that is kept in an internal on-die static random-access memory
(SRAM) and inaccessible from outside. It reflects the integrity of the most recently written protected
area at any given time. Any mismatch during a verification causes a MC lock, which ultimately requires a
machine reboot, so that the MEE restarts with fresh keys [41].
Accesses to enclave pages that do not reside in the EPC trigger page faults. The SGX driver interacts
with the CPU to choose which pages to evict. Such pages of 4KiB are moved to main memory through
the privileged instruction EWB, which also computes a cryptographic MAC of the page and stores it in
SoC (trust boundary)
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unprotected memory. Additionally, EWB generates a nonce of 8B, or page version, that ensures the fresh-
ness of the evicted page once it is loaded back in. These nonces are stored in special EPC pages called
Version Arrays, which are not assigned to any enclave and therefore cannot be read by software. After a
page is evicted, the SGX driver loads the requested page, i.e., the one that triggered the fault, from main
memory through the instructions ELDB or ELDU. These, in turn, decrypt the page and perform integrity and
freshness checks. Figure 2.6 illustrates memory swaps.
Despite the close interaction between the SGX driver and the CPU for paging, one does not need to trust
the driver since it cannot violate the confidentiality nor the integrity of enclave pages, which are main-
tained and checked by hardware. External snooping, such as eavesdropping the bus or the EPC memory
content, will only reveal ciphertext undistinguishable from random data. Likewise, data modifications or
feeding integral old data will be detected through mismatching authentication codes.
2.2.2 Limitations and performance implications
The main performance bottlenecks when using Intel SGX appear during transitions between trusted and
untrusted modes (inside/outside the enclaves) and under intensive memory usage, notably in two stages:
(i) when exceeding the processor’s last level cache (LLC), which requires cache evictions and DRAM
fetches, along with cryptographic and integrity operations; and (ii) when exceeding the EPC size, which
triggers memory swaps serviced by the underlying OS.
Transitions are essential as enclaves cannot perform system calls. This is one of the main design concerns
when porting legacy applications to SGX enclaves. Every disk or network access, for instance, must be
handled by untrusted code. While switches between user and privileged modes when executing system
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calls are completed in 150 CPU cycles [48, 49], enclave transitions (EENTER, ERESUME or EEXIT instruc-
tions) take more than 3000 cycles each [50], i.e., an ocall, where the control leaves and enters back in
the enclave, is more than 40× slower in comparison to system call transitions. This does not take into
account the extra work performed in edge routines (e.g., checking memory bounds) and collateral costs
of enclave transitions like the ones caused by flushing the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) for security
reasons.
To mitigate this issue, several systems [46, 50, 49] proposed the asynchronous treatment of transitions,
which was later integrated to the Intel SGX SDK 2.2 as a feature named switchless calls [43]. This is
essentially done by (i) having at least one thread inside and another outside the enclave; (ii) establishing a
communication channel between them (shared memory in untrusted area); and (iii) using synchronisation
primitives to signal events (spin locks). If we take an ocall as an example, an enclave thread would enqueue
a request in a data structure residing in untrusted memory. The request is then acquired and processed
by an untrusted worker thread which puts the result back in the shared memory. At this point, an enclave
thread can collect and consume the result. This approach, although simple, brings along several practical
matters.
While considerable performance improvements of using switchless calls can be observed in heavy work-
loads, gains are diminished when asynchronous calls are sparse. In idle workloads, a lot of time and energy
is spent in busy waiting. These CPU cycles could instead be used by other threads or processes to perform
more useful tasks. Moreover, as the state of enclave threads are kept in protected memory, the amount
of active threads is limited. Besides, the optimal number of worker threads also depends on workloads,
which are not always easy to estimate. For these reasons, Intel SGX SDK leaves for the user to decide
whether edge routines are switchless by marking them with the keyword transition_using_threads in
EDL files.
Regarding memory usage, we performed an experiment to observe caching effects of employing en-
claves [5]. It consists of reading through a fixed amount of memory in sequential and random access
patterns within an enclave and natively. Both runs were done in the same machine, an Intel Xeon E3-1275
v6, with 16GiB of RAM. Figure 2.7 shows the observed throughput averaged over 10 runs. Within the
cache, performance in the trusted environment is strictly equivalent to native, particularly up to the L2
cache limit. When the amount of memory surpasses the LLC, throughput is greatly affected, with random
accesses incurring in bigger overheads than sequential reads.
In the first version of SGX, the whole memory reserved to an enclave must be allocated at the initialisation
of the trusted environment. This constraint imposes some issues, as some services react to instant loads
that vary over time. Having to set memory allocation beforehand may lead to exhaustion in case of under-
estimation or to underused pages otherwise. Besides, it also brings some start-up waiting time that would
be diluted across the process lifetime in case it supported dynamic allocation. This limitation, along with
the impossibility of changing page permissions (read, write and execute), guarantees that the initial state
that is certified by attestation (see Section 2.2.3) remains unchanged throughout the enclave’s execution.
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SGX2 extensions [44], on the other hand, support dynamic allocation. To this date, we had no access to
SGX2 hardware.
To quantify the described initial overhead, we conducted an experiment [8]. Apart from memory allocation,
we also consider the support service initialisation time. Intel SGX SDK provides the platform software
(PSW) that includes the application enclave service manager (AESM), which needs to be bootstrapped
before enclaves are deployed. It assists SGX processes in enclave initialisation, attestation and supporting
the access to platform services (see Section 2.2.5). Figure 2.8 shows the average results for 60 runs of
docker containers that first start AESM and launch enclaves that allocate different amounts of memory.
Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. As expected, the service startup time is virtually the
same in all runs, accounting for about 100ms. Memory allocation time, on the other hand, shows two
clear linear trends: before and after reaching the usable EPC memory limit. Until this limit, the time
increase rate is 1.6ms/MiB after which it jumps to 4.5ms/MiB, plus a fixed delay of about 200ms. Note
that these times are just for allocating memory, before any real use. Higher overheads are expected when
memory pages need to be swapped (see Section 2.2.1), and we evaluate this behaviour in a full-fledged
publish/subscribe (pub/sub) system in Section 3.1.1.
2.2.3 Enclave signing and attestation
The development of applications targeted to run within SGX enclaves, besides the usual iterations on
coding and compiling, also includes a mandatory signing step before the executables are able to be de-
ployed and used in production. This essentially serves two purposes: (i) the code is uniquely associated
to an independent software vendor (ISV), making it recognisable by customers and accountable for any
consequence originated from its product; and (ii) whoever communicates with the application can have
guarantees that the endpoint inside the enclave has loaded and is actually running the expected code
within a genuine SGX platform.
The signing material includes information about the vendor, the date, some attributes, a version number
and the enclave measurement, which corresponds to a digest (SHA-256) made upon the enclave’s initial
state, including data, code and metadata (security flags associated with memory pages) [51, 52]. When the
enclave is loaded, a hardware implementation of the same measurement operates on the actual content of
the running enclave (MRENCLAVE register), which has to precisely match the one that was computed during
the signing step. Upon measurements matching, a hash of the signer’s public key is computed and stored
in the MRSIGNER register. These two registers reflect the enclave code and its author.
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Later on, when interlocutors want to communicate with a running enclave, they should first attest it before
sharing sensitive data with it. Attestation is therefore an essential requirement for virtually any enclave
deployment. It can be performed locally or remotely, the latter being dependent on the former (Figure 2.9).
The local procedure is based on a symmetric key and starts when the attestor sends its identity (Ê) to the
enclave being attested (target). This, in turn, calls the instruction EREPORT (Ë), that cryptographically
binds its identity (MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER) and other attributes in a MAC tag that can only be locally
checked by the attestor. This guarantee comes from the fact that the key used for computing the MAC can
only be obtained by the EGETKEY (Ì) instruction issued by the attestor on the same SGX platform. Such
instruction retrieves keys that derive from the processor specific key hierarchy and can only be executed
inside an enclave.
In case of remote attestation, asymmetric keys are used. A quoting enclave (installed along with the PSW)
first performs a local attestation (Í) and creates another report called a quote. The quote, in turn, may be
checked by the remote party with the aid of an online service called Intel attestation service (IAS), which
checks the signature affixed to the quote (Î). The protocol also allows the enclave being attested to append
arbitrary additional data to the quote. As the establishment of a secure channel is often desirable once the
trust is settled, a sensible approach would consist of the following steps: (i) target enclave generates a pair
of asymmetric keys; (ii) the public part of such key is sent along with the quote; (iii) once the attestation
is successful, the key from the quote is used by the attestor to provide the enclave with any secrets,
possibly a symmetric communication key. As the corresponding private key is securely shielded within the
enclave, no third party would be able to inspect further interactions. Alternatively, Diffie-Hellman (DH)
could analogously be used for the same purpose.
2.2.4 Sealing
Confidentially and integrity guarantees are provided during execution. Once destroyed, enclave data
are lost. For this reason, SGX provides mechanisms for secure data persistence. Apart from storing
application data, the sealing feature typically aids on certificates’ storage, which obviates the need of
new remote attestations every time an enclave application restarts. Like the keys used for attestation,
sealing keys also depend on the platform hardware key derivation and are obtainable through the EGETKEY
instruction.
Sealing key derivation can either consider MRENCLAVE or MRSIGNER. This choice determines who is able to
decrypt the sealed data later on. If the enclave measurement is used, only the same enclave deployed on
the same platform will be able to perform the unsealing. Any code modification would render inaccessible
data sealed under this policy. This is useful when old data needs to be invalidated once new versions of the
enclave are released, e.g., due to a vulnerability mitigation. Instead, if the signer identity is used, every
other enclave in the platform which was also signed by the same ISV is allowed to access the data. In this
case, offline transfer of sealed data is possible as long as the same CPU performs the unsealing.
2.2.5 Platform services
Sealing preserves confidentiality of persistent data. It thus allows the storage of sensitive results and
loading sealed secrets or certificates across enclaves re-initialisations. However, an attacker could still try
to serve an enclave with previous versions of sealed data that are properly encrypted and authenticated.
That can have severe consequences as the enclave could be misled to reflect some past state. To illustrate,
imagine your bank account balance getting back to that of your pay day’s eve. To prevent such replay
attacks, an enclave can use monotonic counters provided by the platform. Each time an enclave writes
a new state on disk, it increments a monotonic counter and stores the new value inside the sealed state.
When the enclave restarts, it reads the monotonic counter and checks that it matches the value stored
after unsealing the persistent data.
Due to the SGX restriction of limiting enclave executions to user-mode, trusted time and persistent mono-
tonic counters are provided separately, as both require the usage of I/O either to access a clock or non-
volatile memory. Intel decided to implement these services in the management engine (ME), a subsystem
that allows remote system administration tasks like turning the machine on and off, regardless of having
a running operating system. It consists of a proprietary firmware1 running in a coprocessor in the chipset
1Minix OS, according to [53]
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that is always active as long as the machine is connected to a power source. Because of that, these services
may not be available in all platforms (particularly servers), as it depends on machine vendors.
To use such services, enclaves first need to open a session with a PSW enclave called platform services
enclave (PSE) and have access to Internet [42]. Most likely, such connection provides a key that allows
the PSE to communicate with the ME and then intermediate user enclave requests. Once the session is
established, trusted timer and monotonic counters may be used. The trusted timer has a resolution of
one second, which is substantial. It is mostly useful for determining the expiration of session keys or
certificates rather than being used for profiling or performance measurements, since these often require
finer grained timers.
Once an enclave requests the creation of a monotonic counter, it is given a universally unique identifier
(UUID) associated to the newly created counter. This id must be remembered, so that the counter value
may be incremented or queried. Similar to sealing, access control to counters may be associated to the
enclave measurement (MRENCLAVE) or its signer (MRSIGNER). Such control is performed by the PSE.
Intel platform counters are known to be very slow: between 60ms and 250ms per increment, which are
equivalent to alternative solutions such as TPMs [54]. Besides, since they are stored in flash memory
they suffer from wear-out. Due to this, they can possibly stop working after a few hundreds of thousands
write cycles [55]. Moreover, all counters are lost upon the re-installation of PSW [56] which can be done
by privileged users, who are not trusted in the SGX threat model. Altogether, these reasons make Intel
platform counters unsafe depending on security requirements. Distributed approaches are safer [56],
although they may render poor performances for demanding applications. On the performance front,
faster (and unsafe) layers backed by slower (and safer) ones may be used, although they are still vulnerable
to rollbacks during the so-called stability time [57].
2.2.6 Vulnerabilities
A number of attacks to SGX enclaves were proposed. One class of attacks exploits software vulnerabilities
like memory safety violations [58] (stack overflows or dangling pointers) to hijack the software control-
flow [59]. Once that is accomplished, the attacker may find gadgets consisting in benign pieces of code
(like the libc [60]) and reuse them to perform return-oriented programming (ROP) [61] in order to leak
data or change the enclave behaviour. Such approach succeeds even on top of encrypted code provisioned
to enclaves [62] or when countermeasure techniques like address space layout randomisation (ASLR) [63]
are employed [64].
This kind of attacks lay down strong arguments for having small TCBs, as software bugs are proportional
to code size. Nevertheless, several proposals provide complete runtimes in favour of usability, as they
require little or no modification of legacy applications. Notable examples are Haven [65], SCONE [46],
Graphene-SGX [66], Panoply [67] and SGX-LKL [68]. Indeed, software vulnerabilities fall out of the SGX
threat model, which assumes to shield bug-free applications.
Another class of attacks consists of using alternative sources of information like power, sound, electro-
magnetic or, most importantly, time analysis to infer behaviour of targets and finally reveal some sensitive
data that they handle. Processors nowadays are very complex machines and offer shared resources to
several logical entities like VMs, OSes and processes. Usage of such components may leave traces that
can be exploited by malicious agents [69]. One of these shared resources is the cache hierarchy, notably
the most targeted component by SGX side-channel attacks [70]. Since the MEE sits at the edge of the on-
chip memory hierarchy (see Section 2.2.1) and therefore inside the trust boundary, SGX cannot prevent
software side-channel attacks that exploit cache leaks. Like for software correctness, Intel claims that
“preventing side channel attacks is a matter for the enclave developer” [71] and, in fact, some solutions
for preventing them were proposed [72, 73].
Recently, micro-architectural implementation bugs were exploited for breaching privilege barriers and
getting access to the whole memory address space, including kernel pages. They are based on compon-
ents that are supposed to improve performance like speculative execution [74, 75, 76] and out-of-order
execution [77]. The biggest issue is that these attacks can leak sensitive data of perfectly secure bug-
free applications. Foreshadow [78], for instance, was ultimately able to retrieve the long-term attestation
signing keys from the SGX quoting enclave, making it possible to decipher all communication made by
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an attested enclave through a man-in-the-middle attack. Countermeasures were released both in system
software and microcode updates, although future microarchitecture versions are supposed to handle those
issues in the silicon.
We also proposed an attack [6]. Instead of targeting running enclaves, we exploit the separation between
building and signing stages of the supply chain. The attack is based on the assumption that a malicious
agent is able to infect the machine where the enclave binary is signed. Once there, it suspends the signer
process and diverts its input to a component that injects malicious code within the binary. The tampered
version is then given back to the signer, which continues to execute as if nothing had happened, therefore
giving authenticity to the infected binary. Every subsequent integrity and signature checks would then
succeed. We also proposed mitigation measures by atomically shielding compilation and signing stages
within enclaves.
Despite all the reported issues, throughout this work we explore Intel SGX in a range of distributed
systems. We consider these flaws to be orthogonal to our research, and hence do not consider them in
our evaluations. From an architectural vantage point, system designs that count on TEEs do not lose
their relevance due to occasional breaches. In principle, they could use different (even future) hardware
implementations that retain equivalent or comparable features to SGX.
2.3 SecureCloud project
A substantial part of this work was done in the context of the SecureCloud project [7] (2016-2018), whose
goal was to enable the deployment of sensitive applications in the cloud while having strong security and
privacy guarantees. That was built upon a layered architecture on top of SGX. Each layer provides a set
of micro-services which can be combined into full-fledged cloud systems. The platform was validated with
smart metering applications [79]. The consortium was composed by 14 partners in Europe, Israel and
Brazil, including universities, research institutes, industry and government agencies.
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Figure 2.10 shows the architecture of SecureCloud’s platform, including SCBR (Section 3.1.1), LMR (i.e.,
lightweight MapReduce—Section 3.2.2) and SecureStreams (Section 3.2.3). Besides, we also contributed
with SGX-K8S [8], a SGX-aware solution for orchestrating containers in Kubernetes clusters. That was
achieved by modifying the SGX driver to report the actual usage of EPC memory by each process to help
on scheduling placement decisions. Moreover, the protected memory report was used for preventing
containers from over-committing the EPC thus avoiding performance losses due to memory swaps (see
Section 2.2.1) in the benefit of all other users who share the same platform.
Apart from our work, SecureCloud project produced a number of other relevant scientific contributions.
The secure container environment (SCONE) [46], for instance, provides a complete runtime for deploying
SGX containers. Glamdring [80] aids on partitioning SGX applications through code annotations. Lib-
SEAL [81], in turn, allows auditing enclave operations and checking invariants to find integrity violations.
More information about the project, along with deliverables, demonstrators and list of publications can be
found in the official website [82].
2.4 Communication and data processing
This section provides background information concerning the Chapter 3. It describes system designs
that fit in cloud deployment scenarios and can take advantage of TEEs. Specifically, Section 2.4.1 cov-
ers secure pub/sub systems while Section 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.3 discuss about distributed processing
frameworks.
2.4.1 Secure publish/subscribe
Content-based routing (CBR) is a powerful communication model that supports scalable asynchronous
communication among large sets of geographically distributed nodes [83]. Yet, preserving privacy repres-
ents a major limitation for the wide adoption of content-based routing (CBR), notably when the routers are
located in public clouds. This represents a major deterrent for companies for which data is a key asset, as
for instance in the case of financial markets.
In the pub/sub model, publisher nodes submit data to a routing service as publications formed of a header
describing the data and a payload containing the effective data. The routing service matches the publica-
tions header with subscriptions previously registered by subscriber nodes and further routes the matching
publications towards their destinations. Content-based pub/sub appears to be incompatible with privacy
preservation, as messages must be filtered based on their content, i.e., the routing engine should be able
to see both the payload of publications and subscriptions. Additionally, by structuring the containment
relations between subscriptions, one can build efficient data structures to store subscriptions and match
publications. Containment allows for a significant reduction of the number of subscriptions stored as well
as the number of matching evaluations executed per publication. As a consequence, containment is used
in most CBR systems in use today [84, 85, 86], which makes them largely incompatible with classical
cryptographic techniques for privacy preservation.
There is vast amount of literature about secure content-based pub/sub, including major surveys [87, 88],
but no solution provides at the same time powerful filtering capabilities and high performance. While
there exist some techniques for privacy-preserving computation, they are either prohibitively slow or too
limited to be usable in real systems.
Specialised solutions, like asymmetric scalar-product preserving encryption (ASPE) [89], allow for a dir-
ect match of encrypted publications with encrypted subscriptions. Publication attributes and subscriptions
constraints are represented as coordinates of multidimensional points. ASPE is based on an exact rela-
tion preserving isomorphism and supports subscription containment, although it is vulnerable to known-
plaintext attacks. Given that ASPE’s matching complexity is prohibitively high when using a large number
of attributes, an alternative [90] was proposed to enhance it with a pre-filtering approach that expresses
equality constraints using Bloom filters [91]. This allows for quickly identifying subscriptions that do not
match the publication as their equality constraints cannot be satisfied.
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Solutions based on traditional techniques encrypt sensitive information that traverse untrusted domains,
hence basically preventing routers from filtering publications based on their content. They propose archi-
tectures designed to respond to specific security threats by combining access control and key management
mechanisms. Most of these solutions integrate elaborated access control models into existing event-based
middleware [92, 93, 94], organising routing brokers in sets that share keys to encrypt or decrypt data.
Different encryption granularities are used, ranging from individual attributes to entire messages.
In Section 3.1.1, we follow a different strategy by taking advantage of TEEs. We implement a CBR engine
in a secure enclave, so that its compute-intensive operations can work on decrypted data and leverage
efficient matching algorithms. Our experimental evaluation shows that SGX adds only limited overhead to
insecure plaintext matching outside secure enclaves while providing much better performance and more
powerful filtering capabilities than alternative software-only solutions. Since its publication [10], further
research explored our scheme [95] or proposed alternatives [96].
2.4.2 Batch processing
MapReduce is a programming model used extensively for parallel data processing in distributed environ-
ments. A wide range of algorithms were implemented using MapReduce, from simple tasks like sorting
and searching up to complex clustering and machine learning operations. Many of these implementations
are part of services externalized to cloud infrastructures, where concerns regarding security guarantees
are common. In Section 3.2.2, we explore the use of Intel SGX for providing privacy guarantees for
MapReduce operations, and based on our evaluation we conclude that it represents a viable alternative
to cryptographic mechanisms. We present results based on the widely used k-means clustering algorithm,
but our implementation can be generalized to other applications that can be expressed using the MapRe-
duce model.
A number of security schemes for MapReduce were proposed. SecureMR [97] focuses on data integrity,
verification of results and prevention of replay attacks, but it does not handle privacy of data and code.
Airavat [98] and Gupt [99] combine differential privacy [100] with access control policies and therefore
incur on the classical trade-off between utility and privacy, i.e., too much noise produces bad results
while no obfuscation renders no privacy. Through static code analysis, MrCrypt [101] selects distinct
homomorphic encryption schemes for every data column. As expected, it is very slow: some benchmarks
show performance penalties of one order of magnitude with respect to unencrypted execution. Sedic [102]
and Tagged MapReduce [103, 104] split tasks to be deployed on private and public clouds based on how
sensitive are the data they compute. Besides the requirement of partitioning applications and failing to
handle the case in which all computation happens in shared infrastructures, they impose higher latencies
due to data transfers between different clouds.
Closer to our approach, verifiable confidential cloud computing (VC3) [105] is a distributed, secure ex-
ecution environment extending the Apache Hadoop MapReduce framework, originally implemented and
evaluated in an SGX emulator. Each worker node hosts a trusted loader that runs a key exchange protocol
in the enclave before decrypting and executing map/reduce functions. VC3 guarantees global integrity
by generating verifiable work summaries within trusted workers. The user code is written in C++, which
can make the implementations prone to potential faults like illegal memory accesses. In this regard, au-
thors provide an optional compiler through which the programmers can enforce self-integrity invariants
for memory regions.
An extension of VC3 appears in [106], which focuses on security issues generated by traffic analysis attacks
on the exchanges between mapper and reducer nodes. We do not consider such attacks in our evaluation,
but we believe that the analysis and the solutions proposed are also applicable to our system. M2R [107]
also presents a secure framework for MapReduce, which takes a more general approach with a design that
can be implemented on any TEE. The authors refer to SGX-enabled processors as one potential target, but
like VC3, the evaluation is conducted on simulated TEEs. As in [106], M2R specifically focuses on attacks
exploiting the leakage between mappers and reducers.
The general idea behind the above frameworks is close to our proposal in the sense that users can write
their own map and reduce functions that execute in TEEs. However, we take a different approach with
respect to the processing mechanism of interpreted code and to the data dissemination on top of secure
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content-based routing (SCBR). Besides the fact that we evaluate on real SGX hardware, our approach
provides additional flexibility and ease-of-use through the high-level Lua-based programming environment
(see Section 3.2.2).
2.4.3 Stream processing
Stream processing represents another class of computations. It consists in the data treatment of continu-
ous events, such as sensor measurements, user activity in social networks or financial transactions. Like
batch processing, it is also subject to security and privacy concerns when deployed in hostile environments
such as multi-tenant clouds.
Several industrial players introduced their own stream processing solutions, e.g., Twitter’s Heron [108]
and Google’s Cloud DataFlow [109]. These systems are mainly used to ingest massive amounts of data
and efficiently perform real-time analytics. They are typically deployed on the provider’s premises and are
not offered as a service to end-users.
Some open-source middleware frameworks like Apache Spark [110], Apache Storm [111] and Infinis-
pan [112] introduced application programming interfaces (APIs) to allow developers to quickly set up and
deploy stream processing infrastructures. These systems rely on the Java virtual machine (JVM) [113],
whose memory requirements impose considerable challenges to achieve good performance in the face of
SGX constraints. Spark [114] is the most prominent solution. It leverages resilient distributed datasets
(RDDs) to provide a uniform view on processing data. Despite its popularity, vanilla Spark only handles
unencrypted data and hence does not offer security guarantees. Some proposals extend it to provide se-
curity for data at rest [115]. More recently, researchers ported it to run in SGX enclaves: Sgx-Spark [116]
which is based on SGX-LKL [68] and SGX-PySpark [117] based on SCONE [46].
Some proposals rely on a hybrid model with trusted and untrusted infrastructures, where critical pro-
cessing is done in private clouds. Under this model, Styx [118] uses partial homomorphic encryption and
show overheads of 25% in comparison to Apache Storm. However, they cannot guarantee data integrity.
A few dedicated solutions exist today for distributed stream processing using reactive programming. For
instance, Reactive Kafka [119] allows stream processing atop of Apache Kafka [120, 121]. Such solutions
do not support secure execution in TEEs.
Section 3.2.3 introduces SecureStreams, a reactive middleware framework to deploy and process secure
streams at scale by decrypting data inside enclaves and performing plaintext processing. Its design com-
bines the high-level reactive data-flow programming paradigm with TEEs in order to ensure privacy and
integrity of the processed data. The experimental results of SecureStreams are promising: while offer-
ing a fluent scripting language based on Lua, our middleware delivers high processing throughput, thus
enabling developers to implement secure processing pipelines in just few lines of code. To the best of
our knowledge, SecureStreams was the first lightweight and low-memory footprint stream processing
framework that can fully execute within SGX enclaves. Later on, StreamBox-TZ [122] was proposed for
stream processing at the edge with ARM TrustZone, which counts on weaker security guarantees (see
Section 2.1.2).
2.5 Data sharing
Using public cloud services for storing and sharing confidential data requires mechanisms to cryptograph-
ically protect the data and limit the access to them. We use TEEs to tackle this subject in Chapter 4.
In Section 4.1.1, we introduce IBBE-SGX, a new cryptographic access control extension that is efficient
both in terms of computation and storage even when processing large and dynamic workloads of mem-
bership operations. IBBE-SGX addresses the impracticality of identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE)
by exploiting Intel SGX to derive cuts in the computational complexity of encryption operations. We also
propose a group partitioning mechanism that attenuates the computational cost of decryption, so that it
becomes bound to a constant partition size rather than the entire group’s size. As a result, IBBE-SGX
performs membership changes much faster than the traditional approach of hybrid encryption (HE) while
producing less metadata.
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In some cases, the identity of end users needs to remain confidential against the cloud provider and
fellow users accessing the data. As such, the underlying cryptographic access control mechanism needs
to ensure the anonymity of both data producers and consumers. We introduce A-Sky in Section 4.2.1,
a cryptographic access control extension capable of providing confidentiality and anonymity guarantees.
Thanks to TEEs, we are able to handle the impracticality of anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE)
schemes with simple cryptographic constructs. We achieve faster execution times and shorter ciphertexts,
being hence able to efficiently scale to large organisations.
We split the related work on (i) cryptographic schemes for access control, (ii) cryptographic protection
for storage, and (iii) confidential messaging systems. We describe next what are the main features in each
class of solutions and how they relate to our proposals.
Cryptography and access control
Hybrid encryption (HE) consists of using a public key to cipher a symmetric key. Once the resulting
ciphertext is shared with an interlocutor who holds the corresponding private key, further communica-
tion is performed using symmetric encryption, which is faster and produces smaller ciphertexts. Such
approach combined with a public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based encryption (IBE) was used in
a role-based access control scheme. Its high overhead makes it unsuitable for reasonably dynamic cloud
storage scenarios [123]. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [124] is a cryptographic construction that al-
lows a fine-grained access control by matching labelled attributes to users and content. Depending on the
location of labels, one can distinguish between key-policy ABE [125] and ciphertext-policy ABE [126]. Even
when employed for simple access control policies, ABE costs are substantially greater than IBE.
Hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [127] and functional encryption (FE) [128] are two crypto-
graphic schemes offering functionalities for access control that rely on pairing-based cryptography, like
IBE and ABE. HIBE is designed to handle hierarchical setups where each node may issue private keys to
its descendants. FE is a powerful construct that can arbitrarily encapsulate programs as access control,
but is unsuitable for practical use. Iron [129], which handles FE, is the closest to our proposals in the
sense that it takes advantage of SGX to build a practical encryption scheme for an unpractical strategy
thus far. Like IBBE-SGX, they use an enclave that holds a master secret as root for later key derivations.
The enclave generates a key that is associated to a function, so that the computation can be performed
without revealing the data on top of which it is applied. However, results of applying such function are
presented in clear.
Proxy re-encryption [130] allows a data owner to delegate re-encryption to a proxy by sharing a transform-
ational key with it, with the intent of sharing these data with another user. It can possibly be combined
with IBE [131] or ABE [132, 133] and is suitable for cloud environments, as the re-encryption and data
storage can happen in the same premises. A-Sky (Section 4.2.1) uses a similar proxying approach for
writing operations, although we do not require users to share keys.
Multicast communication security [134, 135] defines efficient schemes that focus on revocation aspects.
Logical Key Hierarchy [136] is a re-keying approach in which communications costs for revocation opera-
tions are logarithmic. Other schemes [137, 138] exploit secret sharing mechanisms that tolerate up to a
maximum numbers of colluding revoked users.
Like HE, IBBE-SGX (Section 4.1.1) encrypts a shared key with a more complex cryptogrpahic scheme, i.e.,
IBBE, so that simpler and faster approaches like AES can further leverage that key. A-Sky (Section 4.2.1),
on the other hand, employs symmetric encryption to encapsulate the shared key. That is done, however,
once per group member. Composing the groups in both systems is responsibility of an administrator who
has no access to keys. We adopt a lazy revocation policy, i.e., revoked users lose access to future group
keys but keep being able to read old data. In our systems, collusion between any number of revoked users
cannot grant access to keys encapsulated after their revocations.
Cryptographic cloud storages
A number of storage and sharing system designs have been proposed for mitigating the lack of trust
in cloud providers. DepSKY [139] proposes a client-side object store that encrypts and redundantly
stores ciphertexts on multiple untrusted storages. Encryption keys are split by using a secret sharing
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Table 2.2: GPG latency in hidden recipient mode.
Group size Avg. encrypt [s] Avg. decrypt [s] Envelope size [kB]
10 0.1 0.6 5.3
102 0.7 5.8 16.5
103 12 60 129
scheme [140] and dispersed over multiple storage premises that are assumed to not collude with each
other. SCFS [141] extends DepSKY by using a trusted metadata coordination service that also encapsu-
lates access control, which, in turn, is not cryptographically protected. This coordinator service is trusted
and can be therefore compromised if an attacker breaches into it.
Other systems cryptographically enforce access control using key envelopes. CloudProof [142] is a cloud
storage system with client-side encryption that solves access control by using broadcast encryption [143]
to envelope two keys: one for encryption and another for signing. It offers confidentiality, integrity, fresh-
ness and write-serializability. CloudProof does not discuss how the authenticity of users’ identity is estab-
lished and checked. Hypothetically, PKI could be used, thus requiring a trusted entity in the system. To
avoid that, IBBE-SGX relies on the identity-based version of broadcast encryption.
Sieve [144], instead, uses ABE for access control and key homomorphism for providing a zero knowledge
guarantee against the storage provider. It allows users to store encrypted data in the cloud and to delegate
access to consuming web services. REED [145] also uses ABE [126] to envelope symmetric keys that
cipher deduplicated content. Performance overheads of rekeying operations drastically increase to several
seconds when the number of users is as low as 500. This reinforces the inability of ABE’s practicality for
large scale access control.
Our protocols are agnostic to the storage system. Both IBBE-SGX and A-Sky cryptographically protect a
key that can only be deciphered by rightful group members. To do that, these members need a ciphertext
and additional metadata that could possibly be disseminated through any channel. We leverage the envel-
ope idea in A-Sky, so that each encrypted file has corresponding metadata that are sufficient for retrieving
its plaintext content. IBBE-SGX, on the other hand, has both a global piece of information (the public
key) and individual pieces of metatada per group. In both systems, infrastructure providers learn nothing
about keys.
Confidential messaging systems
Encrypted messaging systems share a common initial phase with our file sharing model by requiring
the construction of a group key that shields group communication. Popular messaging systems (e.g.,
WhatsApp, Threema, Signal) use a DH group key agreement and derivation [146]. Such protocols require
all active participants to contribute to the creation of the group key, albeit with no anonymity guarantees.
Pung [147] uses private information retrieval (PIR) in conjunction to a group DH key derivation, thus
achieving anonymity. Such mechanisms are different from our target model, in which active users do not
need to participate in the group key’s creation.
Pretty good privacy (PGP) [148] is used for cryptographic protection of files or emails. It addresses an-
onymity (hidden recipient mode, in its nomenclature) by performing symmetric encryption of the content
and then several public key encryptions of the shared key, one per user in the sharing group. An outside
adversary only sees ciphertext and cannot infer who are the recipients. At decryption time, rightful recipi-
ents must try to decrypt each fragment until they succeed (n2 trials on average, where n is the group size).
We took a similar approach with A-Sky (Section 4.2.1), but using symmetric cryptography inside enclaves.
Table 2.2 shows the results of a simple benchmark of GNU privacy guard (GPG) v. 1.4.2 in hidden recipient
mode. Encryption and decryption have enormous latencies of 12 s and 60 s for groups of 1000 members,
respectively. Moreover, the inner implementation of PGP’s hidden recipient mode is reputed as insecure
against chosen ciphertext attacks [149].
The problem of devising a cryptographic scheme that can guarantee both confidentiality and anonymity
is referred to as anonymous (or private) broadcast encryption (ANOBE). A few of such schemes were
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proposed, however without assessing their practicality within real systems. Barth et al. [149] (BBW ,
per authors’ initials) achieves inner and outer anonymity, in addition to guaranteeing indistinguishability
under non-adaptive and adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA). It extends the public key enveloping
model of PGP by incorporating signatures [150] such that an attacker who is a group member cannot reuse
envelopes to broadcast arbitrary messages to the group. BBW can handle key enveloping throughputs of
only few hundreds of users per second.
Additionally, they propose the construction of publicly-known labels to decrease the number of decryption
trials. The ciphertext fragments in the envelope are sorted by labels and can therefore be located in
logarithmic time at decryption. This way, only one asymmetric deciphering operation is performed. The
scheme was further extended by Libert et al. [151] by suggesting the use of tag-based encryption [152] to
hint users about their ciphertext fragment.
A-Sky provides indexing mechanisms for achieving better performance at decryption time, so that the
specific ciphertext of a given user can be located inside the envelope in logarithmic time. Like in PGP,
A-Sky also encrypts the same data several times, once per group member. We use instead more efficient
symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Unlike the messaging systems mentioned above, key generation
in both IBBE-SGX and A-Sky is made inside enclaves and is simply based on random number generators.
Therefore, such procedure does not require that individual users be online to contribute in the constitution
of shared keys.
2.6 Privacy assurance
Not every system can be designed from scratch to properly ensure security and privacy. Sometimes users
must use established services that are unlikely to change, specially if monitoring user activity is at the
heart of the service provider’s economic model. That is the case of Web search engines whose business
depend on targeted advertisements. Chapter 5 discusses privacy-preserving systems that use TEEs as
building blocks.
By regularly querying Web search engines, users disclose large amounts of their personal data as part of
the queries, possibly unconsciously. Among these data, they may reveal sensitive information like health
issues, sexual, political or religious preferences. Nowadays, there is no satisfactory approach to enable
users to access search engines in a privacy-preserving way. Existing solutions are either subject to attacks,
too costly due to heavy use of cryptographic mechanisms, dependent on weak adversarial models or unable
to provide accurate results.
Privacy-preserving proposals can be classified in three main categories. One of them is composed of
alternative search engines which implement specific privacy-preserving protocols generally based on PIR,
thus enforcing privacy by design. In such systems, users access data stored on the remote server without
revealing what information they access. In general, PIR protocols consist of three algorithms: building
protected queries with encrypted keywords, performing the information retrieval in such a way that the
search engine has no access to the query and results, and finally reconstructing the result list on the client
side. They generally rely on heavy cryptographic protocols that are still unpractical [153], especially when
data stores contain millions of documents, which is the case of search engines.
The other two categories of privacy-preserving systems enable clients to use existing search engines while
offering them a set of privacy guarantees. In the text that follows, we describe related work in private
Web search and discuss the limitations of existing solutions.
Enforcing unlinkability
This category of solutions includes a set of protocols enabling users to anonymously send queries to a
search engine, thus enforcing unlinkability between queries and the identity of their issuing users (e.g., IP
address). The most popular protocol among these solutions is the onion router (Tor) [154], an implement-
ation of the onion routing protocol [155]. Tor (Figure 2.11) sends each query through randomly-selected
nodes using a cryptographic protocol where queries are encrypted using a public key of each node in the
chain. The ciphertext can hence be associated to an onion, i.e., with multiple layers. Each relay node
deciphers the outermost layer of the onion and further forwards the remaining blob until it reaches the
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Figure 2.11: Unlinkability: Tor.
exit node. The exit node, in turn, can finally send the query to the search engine on behalf of the original
user. One of the limitations of this protocol is that participating relays are assumed to faithfully execute
the forwarding of onions, which might not be true as some may behave selfishly, e.g., by dropping them,
or even maliciously, e.g., by injecting fake traffic to slow down the system.
To mitigate negative effects caused by selfish or malicious users, RAC [156] was proposed. In this protocol,
nodes are organised on several virtual rings in a way that for each ring a node has a predecessor and a
successor node. A node might be part of several rings and thus have multiple predecessors and successors.
To ensure that no message is dropped by a freerider, nodes have to broadcast all messages they relay. If
a node does not receive a message from a given predecessor, it is considered as a freerider. RAC suffers
from severe performance limitations, presenting throughputs that are orders of magnitude lower than
Tor. The dissent protocol [157, 158], in turn, enforces accountability in presence of malicious and selfish
participants. However, its performance is even worse than the one of RAC as it is a combination of two
heavy cryptographic protocols [159, 160].
In addition to the performance issue, protocols enforcing unlinkability have been shown not to resist to
re-identification attacks [161, 162]. Assuming a set of user profiles built from user past queries, user
re-identification attacks try to link anonymous queries to a profile corresponding to their originating user.
The issue comes from the fact that search queries themselves disclose enough information for breaking
the unlinkability property. The reason is that users tend to look for similar things even when they have
a different Internet protocol (IP) address. Besides, browser metadata included in the hypertext transfer
protocol (HTTP) headers can also help to identify users.
Unlikability is enforced in both systems we propose in Chapter 5. While X-Search (Section 5.1.1) hides the
identities of users from search engines by proxying their requests, Cyclosa (Section 5.2.1) creates a peer-
to-peer (P2P) network of users who also act as relays. Despite the flaws we listed above, service providers
cannot tell with certainty where requests come from if the endpoint is not really the issuer, unless they
have additional information. This is why we further try not to provide them with this supplementary data,
as we discuss in the next section.
Enforcing indistinguishability
Another class of solutions aim at making real user interests indistinguishable from fake ones. QueryScram-
bler [163] protects users by replacing their requests by semantically related queries. For each request, it
generates a set of related queries by generalizing the concepts used in the initial query. By merging and
filtering all the results obtained with these related queries, it retrieves the most plausible results for the
initial query. Unfortunately, results’ accuracy might be impaired.
Qk
Q2
Q1
(a) TrackMeNot
Q1 OR Q2 OR … OR QK
(b) GooPIR
Figure 2.12: Indistinguishability: (a) TrackMeNot and (b) GooPIR.
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Figure 2.13: Similarity between fake queries generated by TrackMeNot and PEAS with the AOL dataset.
TrackMeNot [164] (Figure 2.12a) is a browser extension which periodically sends fake queries to the
search engine on behalf of users, independently of their real queries. The intent is that the user profile
stored at the search engine will eventually get obfuscated by mixing the user’s real interests with fake
ones. Instead, GooPIR [165] (Figure 2.12b) obfuscates each user query by aggregating k − 1 fake queries
with the real one using the logical OR operator. As such, the search engine cannot distinguish the real
query from fake ones. However, these solutions suffer from two limitations:
(i) the user’s identity is still known to the search engine; and
(ii) they are subject to attacks as the fake queries they generate (based on RSS feeds in TrackMeNot
and dictionaries in GooPIR) are easily distinguishable from real ones.
To overcome these limitations a solution named PEAS [166] (Figure 2.14a), combining both unlinkability
and indistinguishability was proposed, based on two non-colluding servers. The first, called proxy, has
access to the requester’s identity but not to the query’s content since it is encrypted with the public key
of the second server. This server, in turn, is called issuer and has access to the query but does not know
the originating user. In addition to forwarding the query on behalf of the user, the issuer generates k − 1
fake queries and aggregates them with the original query to enforce indistinguishability. Differently from
GooPIR and TrackMeNot, PEAS’s fake queries are generated using a co-occurrence matrix of terms built
by the issuer from other users past queries. Hence, PEAS better resists re-identification attacks as its fake
queries are syntactically closer to real ones.
To highlight how challenging it is to generate efficient fake queries, we show in Figure 2.13 the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the maximum similarity between fake queries generated by PEAS (i.e., based
on the co-occurrence of terms in past queries) and TrackMeNot (i.e., based on RSS feeds) and past queries
on the America online (AOL) dataset [167] (the similarity metric is further detailed in Section 5.1.1). Even
though PEAS produces better fake queries (median similarity of 0.65 against 0.3 of TrackMeNot), most
of the fake queries are significantly different from real ones, i.e., they have never been requested to
AOL.
Section 5.1.1 introduces X-Search (Figure 2.14b), a novel private Web search mechanism that builds upon
SGX for proxying user requests. X-Search enforces both unlinkability and indistinguishability. It runs query
obfuscation based on past queries on untrusted proxy nodes within enclaves. Apart from improvements
on performance, it operates under a stronger adversarial model than its alternatives and better resists to
re-identification attacks.
One of the above solutions’ limitations is that all user queries get obfuscated with the same intensity,
i.e., by generating k − 1 fake queries in GooPIR, PEAS and X-Search regardless of their sensitivity. As a
consequence, a small value of k may lead to under protecting sensitive queries, which increases the risk
that they get linked back to the original user. Conversely, a large value of k may unnecessarily generate
large amounts of traffic. Cyclosa (Figure 2.14c), presented in Section 5.2.1, handles this issue while being
scalable and returning accurate results. It is fully decentralised, spreading the load for distributing fake
queries among other SGX peers. The number of fake queries used for obfuscation is dynamically adapted
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Figure 2.14: Indistinguishability and unlinkability: (a) PEAS, (b) X-Search and (c) Cyclosa.
to the user query’s sensitivity. As it handles the real and fake queries separately, it achieves perfect results’
accuracy.
Wrapping-up private web search
With regards to unlinkability, existing protocols are either efficient but assume honest but curious servers
or robust to malicious adversaries but have unpractical performance (e.g., Dissent, RAC). In terms of
indistinguishability, the challenge is to generate realistic fake queries that are as close as possible to real
ones.
Enforcing indistinguishability by aggregating the user query with fake queries (e.g., using the OR operator)
generates noise in the responses sent by the search engine as the results corresponding to fake queries
get merged with those related to the real one. This noise is generally filtered out at the client side (in
PEAS and GooPIR) or by the proxy (for X-Search) by removing the responses that do not contain words
composing the original query. Despite this, relevant responses of the original query may be lost while
noise may be returned to the user. Furthermore, the logical OR operator for multiword-based queries is
not natively supported by all search engines.
Practical private Web search mechanisms must scale. This is not the case of centralised schemes such as
PEAS or X-Search. In addition to the ability of private Web search to sustain the load coming from Internet
users, a more concrete problem comes from the rate limitations imposed by search engines to counter bots
and DDoS attacks. Google’s bot protection, for instance, triggers after about 1000 queries before either
asking to fill a captcha or refusing the request. Another problem of approaches like PEAS and X-Search
is the monetary cost of deploying proxies. In contrast, Cyclosa leverages client machines that require no
deployment. Table 2.3 summarizes the comparison between private web search solutions.
Web and SGX
TrustJs is a framework for trustworthy execution of security-sensitive JavaScript code inside commodity
browsers [168]. It leverages enclaves to protect the client-side execution of JavaScript, enabling a flexible
partitioning of web application code. Being attested by the server, the trusted interpreter can be used to
offload its computation, which results in lower latencies in the user experience and lower performance
demand for the application servers.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of private Web search mechanisms.
Tor TMN GooPIR PEAS X-Search Cyclosa
Unlinkability 3 7 7 3 3 3
Indistinguishability 7 3 3 3 3 3
Accuracy 3 3 7 7 7 3
Scalability 3 3 3 7 7 3
Kim et al. [169] explored the possibility of using enclaves to provide security and privacy in network
applications. They initially demonstrate how to use enclaves to prevent software-defined inter-domain
routers to disclose their routing policies. They also show how the Tor anonymity network [154] can be
strengthened by using enclaves to run its directory authorities to attest each other. Attackers can still
launch denial-of-service attacks but they cannot alter the directory behaviour. Also, by putting onion
routers within enclaves, they can attest their integrity and their admission can be done automatically so
directory authorities can be eliminated, and the routers can simply keep track of their membership in a
distributed hash table. Finally, they present how enclaves can be used to securely introduce in-network
functionality into TLS sessions.
Cyclosa resembles TrustJs in its client-side nature. Rather than processing scripts locally though, we
forward user queries to the P2P network of relays. With regard to Tor, Cyclosa is similar in the sense of
establishing the network of collaborating users. The difference, besides the usage of symmetric encryption
instead of layered ciphertexts, is that the enclave execution ensures fair behaviour. As the P2P network
establishment is outside the scope of Cyclosa, we do not discuss about peer directories. Nevertheless, the
aforementioned strategies in this regard could be employed.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented several commercially available TEEs and gave a general overview of how
they operate. Special emphasis was given to Intel SGX. Due to its ensemble of security guarantees
currently unmatched by alternatives, SGX is the TEE technology we further explore throughout the rest
of this dissertation.
To contextualise part of this work’s achievements, we briefly described the SecureCould project in Sec-
tion 2.3 before covering the related work. In Section 2.4 we gave a general overview of potential cloud
services materialised by communication and data processing frameworks, as per our contributions in this
domain presented in Chapter 3. First, in Section 2.4.1, we covered security and privacy in a pub/sub
middleware and next, batch (Section 2.4.2) and stream processing (Section 2.4.3) frameworks.
Section 2.5 outlined research work in cryptographic schemes that can be used for group data sharing in
untrusted channels. We discussed access control, cloud storages and messaging systems related to our
work detailed in Chapter 4, where we design innovative cryptographic protocols that count on TEEs for
achieving better performance and security guarantees.
Finally, Section 2.6 explained the state of the art in private Web search. It described the concepts of
unlikability and indistinguishability while presenting advantages and drawbacks of systems that enforce
them. Doing so, it gave grounds for the contributions we report in Chapter 5.
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Communication and processing
To reach our goals, we start with empirically exploring the usage of trusted execution environments (TEEs)
by designing, implementing and evaluating systems that naturally fit into cloud deployment scenarios,
where many potential threats are possible (see Chapter 2). Particularly, we describe the implementation of
a secure content-based routing engine in Section 3.1.1 and two distributed processing frameworks: one for
batch executions, in Section 3.2.2, and another for handling event streams in Section 3.2.3. The goal is to
quantify the software guard extensions (SGX) performance implications as discussed in Section 2.2.2 in the
context of practical systems, besides learning about the main design concerns involved in building secure
applications with the aid of TEEs. Results show that there are performance penalties whenever cache
and enclave page cache (EPC) limits are surpassed. However, horizontal scalability helps to overcome the
impact of memory constraints. In addition, the ability to replace complex cryptographic primitives with
simple ones allows considerable gains in processing time.
3.1 Communication
The choice of content-based routing (CBR), a flexible paradigm for scalable communication among distrib-
uted processes, conforms well to our target scenario because it handles sensitive data and is well suited
for off-site deployment. CBR decouples data producers from consumers by dynamically routing messages
depending on their content. For this purpose, routers must filter messages (publications) by matching
their content against a collection of stored predicates (subscriptions). Such scheme thus requires the
router to see the content of both publications and subscriptions, which represents a considerable privacy
threat. In the canonical example of stock market, for instance, quotes published by exchange platforms
have commercial value, while subscriptions may reveal the client’s interests and portfolio. Both the pub-
lisher’s assets and user’s privacy are at stake, hence why their sensitive information must be protected
from leakage.
Since interacting processes are geographically scattered and routers are supposed to be deployed some-
where in between data producers and consumers, it makes sense to deploy them in third-party infrastruc-
ture providers. Moreover, they could serve several organisations (data providers), each of which having
their own clients. All combined, we have the main elements for reinforcing the security of a system:
third-party servers, multi-tenancy and sensitive data processing.
In this section, we describe an original CBR architecture that exploits SGX for executing a routing engine
in a secure enclave. We also propose a protocol for securely exchanging keys among data producers, con-
sumers, and the routing engine in the enclave. Publications and subscriptions are encrypted and signed,
thus protecting the system from unauthorised parties willing to observe or tamper with the information.
Our system, called secure content-based routing (SCBR) [10], thus combines a key exchange protocol
and a state-of-the-art routing engine to provide both security and performance while executing under the
protection of the secure enclave. We then evaluate our implementation with a few workloads to observe
the sources of performance overheads and the various trade-offs of SGX. We provide comparative results
against plain-text (insecure) matching as well as with an encrypted filtering alternative. To the best of
our knowledge, SCBR was the first system to experimentally evaluate and demonstrate the benefits of
executing CBR in a TEE.
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Figure 3.1: SCBR overview.
3.1.1 Secure content-based routing
Even if one can rely on trusted environments, designing a secure, privacy-preserving CBR system is not
trivial. Consumers who want to protect their confidential data have to trust the code of the CBR engine.
If it handles multiple publishers, from different administrative domains, each of which with their own
clients, consumers might be discouraged of using the system fearing that their private subscription data
could be accessible by other organisations. Besides, that would require the maintenance of multiple data
structures within routers, one per group of data provider and their clients. Although technically feasible,
we consider a simpler model based on the following assumptions:
• The publish/subscribe (pub/sub) system operates as a service under the control of a single “data
provider” that publishes data.
• Consumers are the clients of the service and typically pay recurring fees to have access to the data.
Producers must be able to control which subscribers can join and read data from the service, and to
exclude clients who stop paying their fees or give any other cause for contract dissolution. The publishers
operate within the administrative domain of the service provider from which data originates, and they are
trusted by the clients for the purpose of the considered service. This model closely maps, for instance, to
the aforementioned scenario of a stock exchange.
Given the trust relationships between different components of SCBR, it is clear that publishers and clients
must share cryptographic keys that are not known by the infrastructure provider. Furthermore, there
should be some mechanisms for the publishers to include and revoke clients. Excluded clients should be
prevented from receiving new data, independently of whether they previously were legitimate custom-
ers.
System Model
Following the considerations discussed above, we distinguish three main roles in our architecture, as
illustrated in Figure 3.1:
• The data provider produces information streams for the clients, typically “as a service” and for a fee.
The data may be produced by multiple sources (publishers) operating within the same administrative
domain.
• The infrastructure provider hosts the CBR engines in the cloud. It provides secure hardware and
performs the actual data routing and transmission through its network. As it operates under a
different administrative domain and may share its resources among several customers in a multi-
tenant configuration, the infrastructure provider is not trusted, although it accordingly performs its
services.
• The clients of the service are the end users who are interested in the actual data and subscribe to
information flows via the CBR engines. They trust the data providers but not the infrastructure.
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Messages are composed of a payload, which is of interest to the end users but opaque to the router,
and a header that contains several attributes and associated values. Since SCBR is not concerned about
payload contents, its encryption is out of scope of this chapter. We discuss alternatives for encrypted
group communication in Chapter 4. The SCBR router filters publication messages based on the attribute
values in their header.
Subscriptions are composed of predicates specifying constraints over the attributes. Predicate expres-
sions can include equality constraints or any kind of ranges over the attribute values, i.e., they can use
the operators =, > or <. For instance, a subscriber interested in specific quotes for a company when they
fall below a certain price can register a subscription such as “symbol = "ABC" ∧ price < 40”. A publica-
tion message matches a subscription if its header satisfies the constraints expressed in the subscription
predicate.
Subscriptions are typically stored by the CBR engine in a dedicated data structure that operates as an
inverted database. Rather than actual data, the queries are stored instead, and data occasionally comes
to be matched against them. By exploiting relationships between the different predicates [84], one can
both reduce the memory footprint of the subscription index and improve the matching speed. In particular,
the property of containment (or coverage) can be leveraged to avoid unnecessary tests. Essentially, we say
that a subscription s contains or covers another subscription s′ if any event that matches s′ also matches
s. That is, s is more general than s′. For instance, predicate “x > 0” covers both predicates “x = 1” and
“x > 0 ∧ y = 1”. Note that the containment relationships create a partial order on subscriptions that can
be represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In SCBR, we use a matching algorithm that exploits
containment to minimise the footprint of stored subscriptions. This is particularly useful in enclaves,
where only a limited amount of memory is available.
SCBR makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric (public key) cryptography. The former is more efficient
and is used for communication between the publishers and the routers, while the latter is used between
clients and the service provider when registering subscriptions, as will be detailed next.
The subscription process
We designed the system so that producers are the owners of the generated data. They have therefore
the ability to decide whether they accept a subscription from a client, as well as to subsequently remove
it. To control access to the service, we rely upon an additional admission phase when registering a new
subscription. The client cannot freely submit its subscriptions to the CBR engines in the cloud, but has to
go through a data producer. The registration process works as follows (see Figure 3.2).
Consider a client c that wants to register a subscription s by the routing engine r and subsequently re-
ceive message with header h sent by the data producer p. The publisher has a public/private key pair
(PK /PK−1), as well as symmetric key (SK ) that is shared with the router running in the enclave, but
unknown to clients and to the infrastructure provider. This is made possible thanks to SGX. Particularly,
the symmetric key exchange happens during the attestation phase, as explained in Section 2.2.3.
1. The client first encrypts its subscription s using the data provider’s public key, hence preventing
unauthorised parties to see it, and sends the resulting encrypted subscription {s}PK to p.
2. Then, after decrypting and verifying that the subscription is valid, as well as verifying the client’s
status, the publisher re-encrypts s using SK and signs it. It then sends the encrypted subscription
{s}SK to the routing engine r.
3. Finally, r validates and decrypts the subscription inside the enclave and inserts it in its index.
Subscriptions also embed location information about the clients that it visible to the code running outside
the enclave. This allows the router to correctly address the forwarding of publications payload to matching
consumers.
The publication process
Once subscriptions have been registered by the routers, data can flow along the reverse path. The public-
ation process works as follows.
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Figure 3.2: SCBR messages cycle.
4. The publisher encrypts the header h of the message using SK , which is only known to the code
running inside the enclave. The encrypted message {h}SK is then sent to the routing engine r.
5. Upon receiving the message, r decrypts the header in the enclave, leaving the opaque payload out-
side, and matches it against its subscription index. The result of this operation is a list of clients that
have registered a matching subscription.
6. Finally, r forwards the encrypted message payload to all clients that have been identified as part of
the matching operation.
The payload of messages is encrypted separately. There are different approaches for doing so. A simple
solution would be to use a symmetric group key shared between the publisher and all its consumers.
Depending on the number and turnover of clients, this can incur in excessive communication overhead
since each revocation would require a new key to be propagated across the set of users. This would
allow publishers to prevent clients that have cancelled their membership from accessing newly published
messages. This process is orthogonal to the privacy-preserving CBR, i.e., the encryption performed for
protecting the publications’ header and subscriptions. We further discuss cryptographic protocols for
group communication in Chapter 4.
Having multiple routers in the path would increase the complexity of the key management between
publishers and matchers. We believe that an overlay broker network is not the best architecture for
a scalable privacy-preserving pub/sub engine, and we would rather advocate for a similar structure to
StreamHub [170], where system components are specialized in order to enhance performance. In such an
architecture, the current publisher-router key management scheme could be simply replicated.
Evaluation
We evaluated the system as described in Figure 3.2, with both the producer and consumer running in
one machine and the filtering engine in another. Measurements were collected at the machine running
the filter, which was equipped with an Intel Skylake central processing unit (CPU) model i7-6700 run-
ning at 3.4GHz with an 8MiB cache and 8GiB of main memory. We allocated 128MiB of main memory to
EPC (maximum allowed). In SCBR, encryption outside the enclave was implemented using the Crypto++
library [171] using respectively advanced encryption standard (AES) in counter mode (CTR) and Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) respectively for symmetric and asymmetric encryption. We use the ZeroMQ lib-
rary [172] for communication, and we encode messages in Base64 text format. Information about page
faults is obtained via the Linux system’s getrusage function (attribute minflt). Similarly, we rely on a
Linux system call to configure and read the processor’s performance counters for cache misses.
To evaluate SCBR and facilitate comparison, we reused the workloads from previous work [90] by picking
3 out of the 9 datasets used then. They were chosen based on the diversity of performance output when
applying our containment-aware matching algorithm to each dataset (Figure 3.4). They were built based
on real data corresponding to randomly selected stock quotes from the Yahoo! finance website [173].
Approximately 250,000 entries were collected in a period of 5 years, with publications composed by 8
to 11 attributes. The entries collected were used to produce synthetic subscription datasets containing
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between native and SGX executions, with and without encryption.
an assortment of equality and range predicates on the quotes’ attributes according to a uniform random
distribution. In order to assess the algorithms’ performance with a greater number of variables and
different levels of containment, one workload was synthesised with four times the number of attributes of
the original publications, by merging data from multiple quotes. Table 3.1 summarises the characteristics
of the datasets used.
Our first experiment aimed at evaluating the performance overhead caused by executing our filter inside
an enclave. We filled the subscription database with datasets with up to 100,000 subscriptions, reaching
a total memory size of approximately 43MiB. Then we sent a batch of 1,000 publications to be matched
against the subscriptions and measured the time it took to accomplish each filtering operation. We ran an
identical set-up with and without encryption, inside and outside an enclave, using the same filtering code.
When using encryption, publications and subscriptions were encrypted in the producer and decrypted in
the filter using AES-CTR. The average results for the first workload (e100a1 ) are shown in Figure 3.3.
By considering the proximity of the lines with and without encryption, we can see that encryption over-
head is small and nearly constant. Indeed, this overhead remains below 5µs for both SGX and native
executions, which is negligible when compared to the matching time given a reasonably large database
size. The overhead resulting from the enclave is more significant, reaching nearly 40% for the largest set
of subscriptions considered in this experiment, which is explained by enclave mode transitions and the
occurrence of cache misses. Cumulative cache sizes are shown by the vertical lines.
We then focused on the influence of the workloads. In order to understand the effect of different datasets
on SCBR performance, we first executed each of them without encryption outside secure enclaves. Results
are shown in Figure 3.4. The first (e100a1 ) workload show the best performance, since all subscriptions
contain equality predicates and the subscription set forms deeper containment trees. In contrast, datasets
with more attributes (e80a4 ) perform worse because they yield indexes with more roots and shallow trees,
therefore inducing more comparisons to traverse the whole subscription graph.
Figure 3.5 displays separate measurements for each workload running SCBR inside and outside an en-
clave, both using AES encryption. We also measured, for each workload, the performance of our imple-
mentation of asymmetric scalar-product preserving encryption (ASPE) [89, 90] as a baseline for a software-
only alternative that does not use enclaves. We measured only the matching step, and not the encryption
or decryption of ASPE messages. The presented ASPE performance cost was therefore inherent to its
Table 3.1: SCBR: Workloads description.
Workload Proportion of Number of
name equality predicates attributes
e100a1 100% : 1 eq. pred.
e80a1 20% : 0 eq. pred.
8–11 (original)
e80a4 80% : 1 eq. pred. 4× more
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Figure 3.5: SCBR response to different workloads.
matching algorithm, which grows faster than any other strategy when increasing the size of the subscrip-
tion database. The difference is more substantial for the first workload, although it remains close to at
least one order of magnitude in all setups. These observations indicate that the performance penalties of
SGX are largely tolerable when considering software-only alternatives for secure filtering, at least when
the amount of memory used by the routing engine remains below the EPC assigned size.
Another interesting aspect is the gap between the curves corresponding to native and SGX executions.
After approximately 10,000 subscriptions, the versions inside and outside enclaves begin to drift apart
due to the number of memory accesses necessary to accomplish every comparison. At some point, the
filtering data does not fit completely in the processor’s cache memory and cache misses start to occur
more frequently. When this happens, data must be fetched from system memory and, in the case of
enclave executions, it must be decrypted and checked for integrity and freshness. Moreover, the evicted
enclave’s cache node must be encrypted before being sent to system memory. That behaviour is consistent
with cache miss rates (measured outside the enclaves), which are also reported in Figure 3.5. We only
measured cache misses outside the enclaves, because our Linux version failed to properly monitor the
cache performance counters inside enclaves. Since the code running inside and outside the enclaves is
the same, it is reasonable to assume that cache miss rates would be similar.
We finally observe the performance penalties when exceeding the maximum protected memory size and
memory swapping begins to happen. Since EPC memory is limited, whenever it is full and more space is
required, pages must be evicted from the protected area to the main (untrusted) memory. Accordingly, a
page swap occurs every time a previously evicted page is accessed. Besides the fact that system memory
is slower than the processor’s cache, which already imposes performance costs, memory page swaps are
serviced by the operating system (OS) and hence incur an even higher overhead.
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Figure 3.6: Performance loss when surpassing the EPC limit.
Figure 3.6 shows the combined results of two executions when populating the in-memory subscription
storage. In one execution we registered subscriptions inside an enclave, and outside in the other. We used
the workload e80a1 in plain-text format, and we executed the same registration code in both experiments.
The graph accounts for a moving average of 5,000 points, registering up to 500,000 subscriptions. We
plotted the page fault rates by dividing the number of occurrences from the SGX execution over native.
The values measured outside are very large for the largest database size, reaching up to 40,000 more
page faults.
We also divided the time it took to register one subscription inside the enclave by the time required
outside. We can clearly see the point where paging kicks in, when memory consumption reaches just over
93.5MiB. The vertical line shows the usable EPC memory limit, excluding the reserved memory for SGX
internal data structures. At the maximum size of our experiment (213MiB), registering a subscription
inside the enclave took 18 times more time than doing it outside. These results show that the overhead
grows outrageously when paging starts to happen, and they make a strong case for further studies on
optimising the memory footprint of applications running inside secure SGX enclaves.
This concludes our evaluation on SCBR. We summarize the results as follows:
• The cost of symmetric encryption is negligible, less than 5µs of increase in matching time, be it in
enclaves or not. In fact, we did not observe any performance difference when using AES in enclave
mode in comparison to native execution.
• Exceeding L3 cache level, on the other hand, brings some costs. We observed overheads of 38%,
167% and 164% for the workloads e100a1, e80a1 and e80a4, respectively, with subscription data-
bases of up to 43MiB.
• The biggest performance issues come when overstepping EPC’s limit. In our experiments, up to 18×
for a memory usage of 213MiB.
3.2 Processing
With the growth of cloud computing, distributed data processing has been extensively studied. Offloading
processing to public clouds is a natural choice when organisations do not possess their own data centres,
or some specific hardware like graphics processing units (GPUs). Cost cutting can also be one important
reason for supporting this decision. Security, however, is still an important concern when it comes to data
crunching in third-party infrastructure providers. Even if it is possible to use effective encryption during
data transmission and storage, there is no performant way of doing the same when processing it. We have
therefore good reasons for enhancing the security in distributed data processing systems. We chose to port
a Lua interpreter to run within SGX enclaves and use it as a building block in such systems. Section 3.2.1
describes this port and presents some micro-benchmarks. Next, we use it in two processing frameworks:
one that follows the MapReduce programming model for batch processing, described in Section 3.2.2, and
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another event stream processing scheme that uses a library inherently asynchronous called RxLua that
implements the paradigm of reactive programming, described in Section 3.2.3.
In order to provide processing services, there must be a way of receiving the operations that clients want
to perform and the data supposed to be processed. Then, these services need to apply the computation on
the data and output the results to the next stage in the pipeline. The trusted environment runtime must
provide a way to load user instructions, integrate them into the engine and discard them to make room
for the following rounds. We discuss here the tradeoffs between different formats of these instructions:
binary machine code or scripts.
SGX enclave binaries must be previously signed (see Section 2.2.3), so that when interlocutors want to
attest it before sharing sensitive information, they are able to know the exact initial state of the protected
code, its author and some flags. Based on this, they assess whether to trust it and to continue the data
exchange. Although dynamic linking is possible after the enclave creation [66, 174], its use brings some
security concerns. In order to execute binary code received after initialisation, the enclave has to allocate
memory pages with read, write and execution permissions, or else it would be prevented by the memory
management unit (MMU) from running such code. In a way, this weakens the assurance given by the
attestation, since code that was not present during initialisation—and therefore not attested—can still be
executed. In this case, it is up to the enclave developer to care for the security of dynamically loaded
code, which is not an easy task. Moreover, if attackers are able to rewrite these pages by exploring some
vulnerability (e.g., stack overflow or control-flow hijacking), they would be able to execute arbitrary code
inside the protected environment. Because of such threats, page access rights are signalized in the flags
that compose the attestation data, so that an attestor can choose not to interact with enclaves that make
use of writable and executable heap.
Interpreted programs are executed by software. Although inherently slower because of that, they are
usually more flexible in terms of abstractions and memory management. The code, in this case, is actually
input data to the interpreter. Even if the execution of malicious code is still possible, its effects are easier
to mitigate. Since there is an intermediary between code and machine, forbidden instructions like system
calls or out-of-bounds memory accesses can be previously checked and acted upon. Besides, the machine
binary code is entirely available during initialisation, allowing the enclave to have read-only executable
pages and therefore inspiring more confidence to whichever process attesting it. For these reasons, we
decided to use an interpreted language to operate our distributed processing prototypes.
3.2.1 Lua within enclaves
We settled on a lightweight yet efficient embeddable runtime, based on the Lua virtual machine (VM) [175]
and the corresponding multi-paradigm scripting language [176]. Porting legacy code to SGX means that
every system call or input/output instruction have to be dealt with, since they are not allowed inside
Table 3.2: Parameters and memory usage for Lua benchmarks.
benchmark configuration memory ratio
name parameter peak SGX/Native
dhrystone 5× 103 275MiB 1.14
5× 106 275MiB 1.04
fannkuchredux 10 28MiB 0.99
11 28MiB 1.04
nbody 2.5× 106 38MiB 0.99
25× 106 38MiB 1.00
richards 10 106MiB 1.02
100 191MiB 0.97
spectralnorm 500 52MiB 1.00
5× 103 404MiB 0.99
binarytrees 14 25MiB 1.18
19 664MiB 4.76
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Figure 3.7: Enclave versus native running times for Lua benchmarks.
enclaves. To achieve this, we traced all system calls made by the interpreter to the standard C library
and replaced them by alternative implementations that either mimic the real behaviour or discard the call.
As a result, attempts made by malicious code to access the hard disk or make network connections are
frustrated.
The Lua runtime requires only few kilobytes of memory and is designed to be embeddable. The language
API provides the possibility to call Lua functions from C/C++ code. As such, it represents an ideal can-
didate to execute in the limited space allowed by the EPC. Moreover, application-specific functions can be
easily expressed in Lua, including complex algorithms [177]. Our changes to the vanilla Lua source code
consist of the addition of about 600 lines of code (LoC), or 2.5% of its total size.
We evaluate the raw performances of our SGX Lua interpreter by selecting six available benchmarks
from a standard test suite [178]. We based this choice on their library dependencies (by selecting the
most standalone ones) and the number of input/output instructions they execute (selecting those with the
fewest input and output (I/O)). Each benchmark runs 20 times with the same pair of parameters of the
original paper, shown in Table 3.2. Figure 3.7 depicts the total time (average and standard deviation)
required to complete the execution of the 6 benchmarks. We use a bar chart plot, where we compare the
results of the Native and SGX modes. For each of the benchmarks, we present two bars next to each other
(one per executing mode) to indicate the different configuration parameters used. Finally, for the sake of
readability, we use a different y-axis scale for the binarytrees case (from 0 to 400 s), on the right-side of the
figure.
In the first version of SGX, it is required to pre-allocate all the memory area to be used by the enclave
at initialisation. The most memory-eager test — binarytrees — used more than 600MiB of memory. If
we compared the running time including the initial allocation, its duration would preponderate for shorter
tests. Because of that, we subtracted the allocation time from the measurements of SGX executions, based
on the average for the 20 runs. Fluctuations on this event produced slight variations in the execution times,
sometimes producing the unexpected result of having SGX executions faster than native ones (by at most
3%). Table 3.2 lists the parameters along with the maximum amount of memory used and the ratio between
run times of SGX and Native executions. When the memory usage is low, the ratio between the Native
and SGX versions is small, less than 20% in our experiments. However, when the amount of memory
usage increases, performance drops to almost 5× worse, as in the case of the binarytrees experiment. As
we already observed in previous sections, the smaller the memory usage, the better performance we can
obtain from SGX enclaves when compared to native executions.
3.2.2 Lightweight MapReduce
Since its adoption by Google [179], the MapReduce programming model consistently gained ground as a
viable solution for assuring the necessary scalability of distributed data processing. The generic model,
composed of the map and reduce functions, was widely used to implement applications that can leverage
parallel task processing. The data to be processed are made available to a set of mapper nodes, which
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apply in parallel a map function responsible for converting individual data items to a finite set of key and
value pairs. The output is redistributed based on the keys, so that all values for a given key is grouped
in one single reducer node, in a step called shuffle. Reducer nodes, in turn, execute in parallel a reduce
function for processing each dataset and outputting a final result. This model can be used in processing
tasks that range from simple compoundable operations like counting, sorting, and searching data; to more
complex algorithms like cross-correlation or page rank. MapReduce was adapted in different ways to fit a
wide diversity of scenarios and deployment platforms (see Section 2.4.2).
We propose a self-contained framework for securing MapReduce that leverages SGX [12]. Our system
combines SCBR for communication (see Section 3.1.1), a Lua interpreter as processing engine (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1), and a MapReduce library. It is independent of the particular characteristics of the map and
reduce functions and can hence be used for any problem that can be made parallel with MapReduce. The
specific code to be executed in the MapReduce service can be integrated in simple scripts, which run
in isolation using SGX over data decrypted only inside the enclave. Our focus is on providing a flexible
framework for securely running MapReduce applications that can be easily implemented and deployed.
The basic word count MapReduce example, for counting the number of occurrences of different words in
a given text, can be implemented in our framework with less than 30 LoC. We evaluate our approach using
the widely used k-means clustering algorithm, showing that the overhead incurred is minimal and that our
solution is applicable to other use cases.
Solution architecture
Figure 3.8 displays the entities composing our solution: clients, SCBR pub/sub engine and workers, which
can assume the role either of a mapper or a reducer. Clients provide the code to be executed, the data to
be processed and gather the results after completion. In our work, we are concerned with assuring the
privacy and integrity of code and data processed within the map and reduce functions, while offering to
the programmer an accessible lightweight environment of implementing various use-cases. Data or code
is only seen in plain-text form at the client premises or inside enclaves. For simplicity, we assume a shared
key SK was previously established between clients and workers.
All communication channels use the ZeroMQ [180] message passing library, having a central point in
the SCBR engine. Although such a centralised approach is not suitable to large-scale data processing, it
is arguably useful for modest quantities of highly sensitive data that could be, for instance, partitioned
from higher amounts of non-sensitive data. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated [170, 181] that it is
possible to elastically scale a pub/sub engine by specializing its functional steps into replicable operators.
That could dramatically improve the network performance of such a centralised approach.
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Figure 3.8: Lightweight MapReduce components.
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Batch processing is the act of transforming one large and finite group of data that is entirely available
upfront. It contrasts with the processing of events, which are smaller pieces of data that are individually
processed and timely unbounded. In our system, a batch process is bootstrapped with an initial protocol
among all parties and with the provisioning of code and data made by the client, when he sends chunks of
the input data to mappers. We describe bellow what happens next.
1. Mapper nodes independently execute a map function on their input data chunk and output a col-
lection of n key and value pairs {< k0, v0 >,< k1, v1 >, ..., < kn−1, vn−1 >}. Optionally, pairs with
common keys can be aggregated by a combiner function in order to optimize the redistribution, e.g.,
if k0 = k1 then a combine function may be called with < k0, {v0, v1} > as input. Conceptually, combine
acts like a local reduce function, in the context of a single mapper.
2. < k, v > tuples are shuffled according to their keys and redistributed to reducer nodes. All tuples
corresponding to the same key arrive on the same reducer.
For instance, if the outputs of three mappers mi are:
• m0 → {< k0, v0 >,< k1, v1 >}
• m1 → {< k1, v2 >,< k2, v3 >}
• m2 → {< k0, v4 >,< k2, v5 >}
As a result of the shuffling phase, three reducers ri could receive as input:
• r0 ←< k0, {v0, v4} >
• r1 ←< k1, {v1, v2} >
• r2 ←< k2, {v3, v5} >
3. Reducer nodes independently execute the reduce function on all data associated to a given key and
output the result of their computation, which is forwarded back to the client.
MapReduce as topic-based pub/sub
The SCBR engine is responsible for securely storing subscriptions that contain the conditions under which
each message is forwarded to the corresponding interested party. To design the session establishment
protocol, we first list in Table 3.3 the interests of each role, i.e., what data kind each entity is interested
in. This will later define their subscriptions.
We decided to map payload data into topics [83]. By tagging each message with the corresponding con-
tent, subscriptions and publications are respectively made according to the columns Input and Output in
Table 3.3. Besides these messages, we also identified the need of having two more topics, so that idle
workers (mappers and reducers) are notified when there is a new client willing to process a batch of data
(job advertisement). Conversely, clients need to know when a worker is willing to serve them (apply for
position). Table 3.4 lists all topics. Workers stands for both mappers and reducers.
Worker nodes will act as subscribers registering queries to find out about new MapReduce job openings,
and also as publishers to signal their availability and type (mapper or reducer) in a job application. The
Table 3.3: MapReduce: Payload used as inputs and outputs for each role.
Role Input Output
Client Final Results
Map code
Reduce code
Mappable data
Mapper
Map code
Reducible data
Mappable data
Reducer
Reduce code
Final results
Reducible data
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Table 3.4: MapReduce: Topics for the pub/sub based protocol.
Description Symbol Subscribers Publishers
Map code MAP_CODETYPE Mappers Clients
Reduce code REDUCE_CODETYPE Reducers Mappers
Mappable data MAP_DATATYPE Mappers Clients
Reducible data REDUCE_DATATYPE Reducers Mappers
Final results RESULT_DATATYPE Clients Reducers
Job advertisement JOB_ADVERTISE Workers Clients
Apply for position JOB_APPLY Clients Workers
client of the MapReduce service, which is also the data owner, will both act as subscriber and publisher,
registering subscriptions for job applications and publishing advertisements on new MapReduce jobs to
be executed. Moreover, the client will publish code and data to the registered workers and obtain the
results after job completion.
The MapReduce processing starts with an initial message exchange, as shown in Figure 3.9. For simpli-
city, we use a reducer node as worker, but an analogous procedure applies for mappers. Worker nodes
register their intent of being notified for MapReduce job openings through subscriptions on the topic
JOB_ADVERTISE. The client registers its interest in knowing when workers are ready to perform a task by
subscribing to the topic JOB_APPLY. When the client has a new job to execute, it advertises it through a
JOB_ADVERTISE publication, which is received by workers that previously registered for this topic. Idle
workers notify then their readiness to execute the advertised job through a JOB_APPLY publication. They
also include in the message payload their subscriptions for code and data (particular to the role they
choose: mapper or reducer). At the end of this negotiation, if the client decides to hire a worker, it re-
gisters on SCBR the received subscriptions for code and data on the worker’s behalf. By doing so, the
client establishes the MapReduce chain and keeps track of how many workers it has hired and of which
kind (mappers and reducers).
The provisioning of code and data is shown in Figure 3.10. Besides the code itself, the client includes the
number of reducers along with the Lua scripts in case of MAP_CODETYPE publication topic, or the number
of mappers in case of type REDUCE_CODETYPE. The purpose is to make the workers aware of how many
messages indicating the stream’s termination that they have to wait before considering the work done.
This is important because the reduce phase can only start once all data for a given key is routed to the
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Figure 3.9: MapReduce: Session establishment protocol.
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Figure 3.10: MapReduce: Provisioning of code and data.
intended worker. Additionally, the amount of reducers (rcount in Listing 3.1) received by a mapper is used
in a hash function that takes as argument the tuple key and returns the indication of which reducer it has
to be forwarded to. After sending the code, data is split by the client among the mappers. The destination
identifier is included in the header of the MAP_DATATYPE publication.
Workers decrypt the received code and store it inside the enclaves. When data arrive, mappers perform
the processing and each one of the resulting key-value pairs is forwarded to the proper reducer. The
reducer’s identifier is obtained after providing the key and number of reducers as arguments to the hash
function that comes along with the code of the mapper. The shuffling phase is hence conducted by the
mappers. In order to forward data to the following step, all that the Lua script has to do is calling a special
function called push(key,value), and the framework handles all the communication aspects of forwarding
the data.
Listing 3.1 shows the sample code of a mapper of a word count application. The script can contain as many
helper functions as desired. The following special functions, however, are called by the framework:
function hash(key,rcount)
return string.byte(key,1) % rcount
end
function combine(key,values)
local sum = 0
for k,v in pairs(values) do
sum = sum + v
end
push(key,sum)
end
function map(key,value)
for word in value:gmatch("%w+") do
push(word,1)
end
end
Listing 3.1: Map code in Lua for word count.
function reduce(key, values)
local sum = 0
for k,v in pairs(values) do
sum = sum + v
end
push(key,sum)
end
Listing 3.2: Reduce code in Lua for word count.
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Figure 3.11: K-means with MapReduce.
map(key, value) Contains the functional implementation of mapper.
combine(key, values) [Optional] Post-processing on values grouped by keys.
hash(key, rcount) Returns the reducer id that is supposed to receive a given key
considering that there are rcount reducers in total.
Likewise, listing 3.2 shows a sample code for the reduce step that contains a single special function:
reduce(key, values) Contains the functional implementation of reducer.
Evaluation
To test our solution, we use the k-means clustering method for data classification. K-means [182] is an un-
supervised learning algorithm (i.e., it does not depend on training data) widely used for data classification.
It operates as following:
(i) A certain k number of clusters is fixed a priori and k corresponding centres are defined for each one
of them;
(ii) Data items are iterated and assigned to the nearest cluster centre (typically through Euclidean dis-
tance); and
(iii) Every cluster centre is recomputed as the centroid of the assigned data items (the mean of those
points).
Steps (ii) and (iii) repeat until a termination criterion is reached (e.g., the sum of distances between the
old and the new cluster centres is below a given threshold). For implementing k-means in the MapReduce
model we put (ii) in the map function and (iii) in the reduce function as displayed in Figure 3.11. The
termination criterion is checked by the client, who decides whether to iterate again. If it does, the centres
input for mappers are replaced by the most recently calculated ones.
We conducted all the experiments using two SGX-capable machines, both with processor Intel i7-6700
64bits, clock of 3.4GHz, 8MB cache, 4 cores, 8 threads, with 8GB of installed memory and solid-state
drive (SSD) of 256GB. In terms of software, we used the Intel SGX software development kit (SDK) 1.7.100
over Ubuntu 14.04.1, kernel 4.2.0-42. Unless mentioned otherwise, messages were all encrypted with
AES-CTR [183] with key and input vector both of 128 bits and were decrypted only inside the enclaves.
The process placement was made as follows: Machine 1: the client, 8 mappers and 5 reducers. Machine
2: 8 mappers and 5 reducers. The number of mappers was chosen to be twice as much as the number
of cores in each machine to take advantage of parallelism, while the number of reducers was set to be a
divisor of input data size to stimulate an even distribution of work among them. To illustrate how small
our final code-base is, Table 3.5 shows the memory section sizes of executables and shared libraries that
are loaded into enclaves.
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Table 3.5: Lightweight MapReduce: binaries’ size.
text data bss sum
client 371KiB 26KiB 376B 397KiB
worker 282KiB 26KiB 768B 308KiB
worker enclave 663KiB 59KiB 82KiB 803KiB
scbr 271KiB 14KiB 72B 285KiB
scbr enclave 272KiB 7KiB 79KiB 358KiB
Initial state 20 iterations 40 iterations
Figure 3.12: K-means example with 6 centres and 7000 data points.
Figure 3.12 illustrates 3 out of 40 iterations that k-means took to converge. In this example, we synthet-
ically generated 7,000 observation points and 6 centres. As it can be seen in the first frame, the initial
centroids are far from an even distribution across the grid. After 20 iterations, the centroids assume
closer positions to those of the final result, which is achieved at the 40th iteration. We arbitrarily set the
threshold to be one thousandth of the diagonal of the rectangle that contains all the observed points. That
means that the iterative process finishes when the average distance of centroids between two subsequent
iterations is less than that fraction. In such algorithm, the final result and convergence speed depend on
the initial points. Besides, there is no guarantee that the solution is the global optimum.
Next, we conducted experiments to assess the influence of input data sizes, i.e., the number of observation
points n and centroids k, on the memory usage and processing time. Figure 3.13 shows the average time
it took to complete one iteration of Kmeans with varying input sizes. It can be noticed that, although the
variation on the number of clusters can cause some inflection in the curves, the completion time is mostly
affected by the number of observed data points. Moreover, while the two first increments on the number
of data points (n = 10k and n = 100k) caused a proportional increase on consumed time regarding the
data growth (ten times), the last one (n = 1M ) induced a twenty-fold rise. That can be explained by the
growth in the occurrence of cache misses within each worker. When that happens, data must be fetched
from main memory. When using SGX protected executions, this means one page has to be evicted from
cache (and hence, encrypted), while the one that is fetched must be decrypted and checked for integrity
and freshness.
To better analyse these cache effects, we decided to measure cache miss rates. Since the reduce phase
is more memory intensive, we chose to make the average on the cache miss rates per second of all 10
reducers in each execution, i.e., for the same second, cache miss rates of reducers were summed and
divided by 10. Wall clocks were synchronized with a common NTP server, so that the resulting skew was
at the range of tens of milliseconds and should not affect the sampling resolution of 1 s. Figure 3.14 shows
that measurement as reported by the tool pidstat when the number of centroids is k = 50. Note that y
scale is logarithmic, so that the cache miss rates for n = 1M is at least two orders of magnitude higher
than n = 100k. Valleys in the curves represent the interval between iterations, which is more apparent in
the larger experiments.
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Figure 3.13: MapReduce: Average time to run one iteration with varying input sizes.
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Figure 3.14: MapReduce: Cache miss rates for different input sizes.
Finally, we measured the influence of SGX when compared to native executions, i.e., with no hardware
protection. We ran the same datasets with a fixed number of clusters k = 50 and varying the number of
observed points from n = 1000 until n = 1M . Results are plotted in Figure 3.15. Table 3.6 shows the
data volume exchanged in each MapReduce step for these experiments. We also include the ratio between
SGX and native run times. The time corresponds to the average of all iterations in a single run of k-means
(until the threshold was reached). Coefficient of variation across multiple runs was negligible. Enclave
execution overhead is kept around 35% until we start to get high occurrence of cache misses, as discussed
before, when it reaches more than 200%.
This concludes our experiments with lightweight MapReduce. As in Section 3.1.1, we notice again some
expressive overhead after using more than the processor’s cache limit. Based on its size, we can establish
the maximum amount of data that a single SGX-capable machine would be able to handle before incurring
in too much overhead. In our experiments, we perceived that behaviour when processing amounts some-
where in between 11MiB and 96.5MiB shared between two machines (average of around 54MiB, or 27MiB
per machine). A rough estimation based on our empirical evaluations would be to limit those amounts to
three times the cache size, or 24MiB in our case. Scalability could be achieved horizontally, with the
Table 3.6: MapReduce: Data volume exchanged per iteration.
Split Shuffle Output
n = 1k 58.7KiB 112.1KiB 4.3KiB
n = 10k 257.2KiB 1.1MiB 4.5KiB
n = 100k 2.2MiB 11MiB 4.6KiB
n = 1M 19.1MiB 96.5MiB 4.6KiB
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Figure 3.15: MapReduce: SGX overhead.
addition of more machines. This reinforces the lightweight aspect of our approach, both in terms of the
framework code size (2MiB summing up all components) and its capacity before incurring into important
overheads (24MiB per machine in the shuffling phase).
3.2.3 SecureStreams
The Internet of things (IoT) has fostered the emergence of novel data analytics and processing technolo-
gies to support the continuous flow of information gathered by a large amount of sensing devices. Since
these data streams may convey sensitive information, stream processing requires support for end-to-end
security guarantees in order to prevent third parties from accessing restricted data. We present Se-
cureStreams [14], a middleware framework for developing and deploying secure stream processing on
untrusted distributed environments.
SecureStreams supports the implementation, deployment, and execution of stream processing tasks in
distributed settings. It employs a message-oriented middleware [184], the transport layer security (TLS)
protocol [29] for communication and SGX to deliver end-to-end security guarantees along data stream pro-
cessing pipelines. SecureStreams can scale vertically and horizontally by adding or removing processing
nodes at any stage of the pipeline. Its design is inspired by the dataflow programming paradigm [185],
where the developer combines independent processing components (e.g., mappers, reducers, sinks, shuf-
flers, joiners) to compose specific processing pipes. Regarding packaging and deployment, SecureStreams
smoothly integrates with a lightweight virtualisation technology, namely Docker [186].
Architecture
SecureStreams combines two base components: worker and router. A worker continuously listens for
incoming data by means of non-blocking I/O. As soon as data flows in, an application-dependent busi-
ness logic is applied. Router components act as message brokers between workers according to a given
dispatching policy. A typical use-case is the filter/map/reduce pattern from the functional programming
paradigm [187], in which each worker executes one of these functions. Figure 3.16 depicts a possible
implementation of this dataflow using the SecureStreams middleware.
SecureStreams is designed to support the processing of sensitive data inside SGX enclaves. Each compon-
ent is wrapped inside a lightweight Linux container (in our case, the industrial standard Docker [186]).
Each container embeds all the required dependencies, while guaranteeing the correctness of their con-
figuration, within an isolated and reproducible execution environment. By doing so, a SecureStreams
processing pipeline can be easily deployed without changing the source code on distinct public or private
infrastructures. Containers’ deployment can be transparently executed on a single machine or a cluster,
using a Docker network and the Docker Swarm scheduler [188].
Like in SCBR (Section 3.1.1), communication is done with ZeroMQ, a high-performance asynchronous mes-
saging library [172]. Each router component hosts inbound and outbound queues, according to ZeroMQ’s
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pipeline pattern [189]. Messages are streamed from a set of push peers, i.e., the upstream workers in
the pipeline. They use push sockets that send messages to downstream workers in a round-robin fashion.
These, in turn, have an inbound pull socket, which uses fair-queuing scheduling to deliver messages to
upper layers.
We define the processing pipeline components and their chaining by means of Docker’s Compose [190]
description language. Once the processing pipeline is defined, the containers can be deployed on the
computing infrastructure. We use the constraint placement mechanism to make the Docker Swarm’s
scheduler deploy workers requiring SGX on appropriate hosts.
Implementation
SecureStreams is implemented in Lua version 5.3. The implementation of the middleware itself requires
careful engineering, especially with respect to the integration with SGX enclaves. A SecureStreams ap-
plication, on the other hand, can be implemented in remarkably few lines of code. For instance, the
implementation of the map/filter/reduce pipeline accounts for only 120 LoC (not including dependencies).
The framework partially extends RxLua [191], a library for reactive programming in Lua. RxLua provides
the required API to design a data stream processing pipeline following the dataflow programming pat-
tern [185].
Listing 3.3 provides an example of a RxLua program (and consequently a SecureStreams program) to com-
pute the average age of a population by chaining :map, :filter, and :reduce functions. The :subscribe
function performs the subscription of 3 functions to the data stream. Following the observer design pat-
tern [192], these functions are observers, while the data stream is an observable.
SecureStreams ships the business logic for each component into a dedicated Docker container and ex-
ecutes it. Communication between routers and workers happens through ZeroMQ (version 4.1.2) and the
corresponding Lua bindings [193]. The framework safely forwards data and code to enclaves, so that they
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Rx.Observable.fromTable(people)
:map(
function(person)
return person.age
end
)
:filter(
function(age)
return age > 18
end
)
:reduce(
function(accumulator, age)
accumulator[count] = (accumulator.count or 0) + 1
accumulator[sum] = (accumulator.sum or 0) + age
return accumulator
end
)
:subscribe(
function(data)
print("Adult people average:", data.sum / data.count)
end,
function(err)
print(err)
end,
function()
print("Process complete!")
end
)
Listing 3.3: Example of process pipeline with RxLua.
do not have to operate on files or any other I/O. In case such attempts occur, they are frustrated by san-
itized versions of libc procedures. By adopting this set of measures, SecureStreams safely abstracts the
underlying network and computing infrastructure from the developer perspective.
We reuse here the SGX Lua interpreter described in Section 3.2.1. Additionally, we include in the enclave
both json [194] and csv [195] parsers to ease the development of SecureStreams applications. With these
libraries, the enclave size containing the complete runtime remains small, approximately 220KiB (19%
larger than the original). Besides the SGX Lua interpreter, we still had to provide support for communica-
tion and the reactive streams framework itself. For this, we use an external vanilla Lua interpreter, with a
couple adaptations to allow the interaction with the enclaves and the Lua interpreter therein. Figure 3.17
shows the resulting scheme. We extend the Lua interface with 3 functions: sgxprocess, sgxencrypt, and
sgxdecrypt. The first one forwards the encrypted code and data to be processed in the enclave, while the
remaining two provide cryptographic functionalities. We assume that attestation and key establishment
was previously performed.
Evaluation
We conducted our experiments on 2 machines using the Intel Core i7-6700 processor [196] and 8GiB
random-access memory (RAM) running Ubuntu 14.04.1 long term support (LTS) (kernel 4.2.0-42-generic).
Each node runs Docker (v1.13.0) and joins a Docker Swarm [188] (v1.2.5) using the Consul [197] (v0.5.2)
discovery service. The Swarm manager and the discovery service are deployed in a third machine. Con-
tainers that compose the pipeline leverage the Docker overlay network to communicate with each other.
Machines are physically interconnected using a switched 1Gbps network.
To evaluate our system, we chose a dataset released by the American Bureau of Transportation Statist-
ics [198]. It reports on flight departures and arrivals of 20 air carriers [199]. We implemented a Se-
cureStreams application to compute average delays and the amount of delayed flights of each air carrier
(inspired by [200]). Table 3.7 specifies the code size of each application component. We implemented a
processing pipeline that
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Table 3.7: Code size of a SecureStreams application.
System layer Size (LoC)
DelayedFlights app 86
SecureStreams library 350
RxLua runtime 1, 481
Total 1, 917
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Figure 3.18: SecureStreams: Throughput comparison between native and SGX versions with 1 and 4
workers per stage.
(i) maps the input dataset, in comma separated value (CSV) format, into a data structure;
(ii) filters out irrelevant data, i.e., only let data concerning delayed flights go through; and
(iii) reduces the filtered data by computing the output information.
We use the 4 last years of the available dataset (from 2005 to 2008), for a total of 28 million entries and
2.73GiB of data. To measure the achievable throughput and the network overhead of our system, we
deploy the SecureStreams pipeline in 2 configurations:
1. The baseline does not use enclaves. The input dataset is encrypted before its injection in the pipeline,
so that data transmission is secure. This approach is however unsafe for deployment in untrusted
infrastructures since data is decrypted before being processed.
2. In the SGX deployment, the input dataset is encrypted and the data processing is operated inside
enclaves.
Data nodes inject the input dataset as fast as possible while bandwidth measurements are collected from
Docker’s internal monitoring and statistical module. For each configuration, we vary the number of work-
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Figure 3.19: Average processing time when varying number of workers.
ers per stage, from one to four. Figure 3.18 shows the results in the form of stacked percentiles. To
exemplify, the median (50th percentile) throughput at 200 s when operating with four nodes per stage cor-
responds to 3.1MiB/s and 1.5MiB/s for native and SGX executions, respectively. This means that 50% of
the nodes output data at no more than these rates at that moment in time.
The baseline configuration, i.e., native execution with 1 worker per stage, completes in 794 s with median
of 1.8MiB/s and peak of 9.8MiB/s. Doubling the number of workers reduces the processing time down to
442 s, a speed-up of 1.8× (median: 3MiB/s, peak: 16.5MiB/s). Scaling up the workers to 4 per stage in
the native execution makes the dataset be consumed in 302 s (median: 2.9MiB/s, peak: 27MiB/s1), or 1.5×
speed-up considering the previous experiment.
When using SGX enclaves, data processing slows down by 2.7× (2120 s) for the setup with one worker per
stage. We also pay a penalty in terms of overall throughput—i.e., the median rarely exceeds 650KiB/s,
peak of 4.6MiB/s. Increasing the workers per stage renders speed-ups of 2.1× (median: 1.3MiB/s, peak:
5.9MiB/s) and 1.6× (median: 1.4MiB/s, peak: 9.9MiB/s), with 2 and 4 workers, respectively. In comparison
to native execution though, they present slow-downs of 2.3× and 2.1×.
We further evaluate SecureStreams in terms of scalability by establishing correlations among running
time, number of worker nodes and available hardware resources. Specifically, the number of processing
units. We do so by changing the number of workers, like in the previous experiment, and also by only
varying the number of mappers, the most significant stage in terms of overall performance. Additionally,
as baseline, we experiment with plain-text data across the whole pipeline. We repeat each configura-
tion for 5 times. Figure 3.19 shows the mean runtime, with error bars corresponding to the standard
deviation.
First, we increase the number of workers in each stage of the pipeline. We observe an ideal acceleration
when going from the configuration using 1 worker per stage to 2. In the setup using 4 workers, on the other
hand, we do not reach the same speed-up. This mainly happens due to the number of deployed containers,
which becomes greater than the amount of available cores in each processor. Containers account for the
sum s of input data streams i, routers r = 4 and workers. The amount of the latter is equal to the number
of stages in the pipeline (3 in our setup, see Figure 3.16) multiplied by the number of workers per stage w.
Besides, we define the number of input data streams as i = w. The total number of containers is therefore
s = 4w + 4, or s = 20 when w = 4, which is greater than the number of physical processing units in our
setup (2 machines with 8 cores each, i.e., 16 cores).
Finally, we observe the running time when varying from 1 to 16 the number of mappers in the first stage of
the pipeline, as it is the most computational intensive one number of filters and reducers is kept constant.
Again, we observe an ideal speed-up (2×) until the number of deployed containers reaches the amount
of physical cores. Beyond that, the improvement is only marginal (1.07× from 8 to 16 mappers). These
1not visible in the figure due to visualisation purposes, so that y-axis scale is kept consistent for comparison while allowing some
noticeable detail in lower throughput experiments
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experiments show that SecureStreams’ scalability is primarily limited by the total number of physical cores
available, for a map/filter/reduce pipeline.
Apart from that, other factors contribute for limited streaming throughput. We observed, for instance, that
the system does not saturate the available network bandwidth. We believe this behaviour can be explained
by the lack of optimisations in the application logic and tuning options of the inner ZeroMQ queues.
For this reason, we did not reach memory occupancy beyond the EPC limit, which would dramatically
deteriorate performance (see Section 3.1.1). Nevertheless, we reached our primary goal of finding out
the overhead when using SGX enclaves for processing real data in a streaming pipeline, along with a
couple insights about scalability. As expected, one should anticipate longer processing times (roughly
2−3× in our experiments) and lower throughputs when executing stream processing within SGX enclaves.
Disadvantages of this trade-off between security and runtime can be mitigated by parallelisation, as long
as the workload is adapted to hardware resources, as our experiments indicate.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed and empirically evaluated a set of distributed systems that use TEEs and
naturally fit in cloud scenarios. They are therefore supposed to be deployed in third-party administrative
domains, which are commonly reputed as hostile and unsafe environments.
First, we presented the architecture and evaluation of SCBR (Section 3.1.1), a secure content-based rout-
ing engine that takes advantage of SGX enclaves. In doing so, we were able to leverage state-of-the-art
techniques for efficient filtering in plaintext, since the trusted perimeter is limited to the CPU die. Out-
side that boundary, private data in main memory is always encrypted and protected from tampering and
replay attacks, even from OSes, hypervisors, and administrators with physical access to machines. As a
result, we do not suffer from the prohibitive performance and space overheads of software-based secure
approaches, such as homomorphic encryption or dedicated algorithms like ASPE.
As part of our experiments, we tested the system with different workloads and analysed the influence of
cache misses and page faults on the code running within secure enclaves. While both events introduce
some overhead (as compared to insecure matching outside the enclave), performance degrades much
more heavily with the latter, which occurs when exceeding the available amount of protected memory. We
also compared the performance of SGX against the software-based ASPE alternative and observed that
SGX performs systematically better as long as memory usage is kept below 93.5MiB.
Next, we proposed a lightweight framework for implementing secure MapReduce applications in untrusted
environments (Section 3.2.2). From the user’s perspective, our approach does not require any particular
programming knowledge of cryptographic mechanisms or communication aspects of data distribution.
Also, preserving privacy and integrity is not dependent in any way on the specific characteristics of map
and reduce functions, which are defined and easily maintainable by relying on a standard Lua interpreter
for code execution (Section 3.2.1). In the security aspect, we simply took advantage of isolation guarantees
provided by SGX enclaves.
Our objective was to show the viability of such batch processing framework and to assess its behaviour
under different conditions. We observed a correlation between the number of cache miss occurrences
and the slow down of SGX executions in comparison to native ones. Besides, based on our results, we
established an upper bound limit of memory usage after which it would be advisable to horizontally scale
out in order to minimise the referred slow down.
We moved on to secure stream processing by introducing the design and evaluation of SecureStreams,
a concise middleware framework to implement, deploy and evaluate processing pipelines for continuous
data streams (Section 3.2.3). We reused our Lua port that operates in SGX enclaves with a couple adapt-
ations aiming at interacting with a vanilla interpreter that operates outside enclaves. This, in turn, runs
libraries for communication message queuing and reactive programming.
Empirical results based on real-world traces showed performance penalties of 2−3× when using enclaves.
We also assess SecureStreams scalability capabilities. In our setup, it reaches theoretical speed-ups as
long as the number of worker nodes is kept below the total amount of processing units.
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All in all, we clearly noticed performance deterioration when exhausting different memory levels: first, the
L3 cache and later, the EPC limit. On the bright side, this limitation can be overcome through horizontal
scalability or future hardware evolutions of SGX. Security-wise, these systems’ safety relies entirely on
SGX and it could be compromised by trapdoors, design flaws or hardware bugs (see Section 2.2.6). Our
results open the way for further research on TEE- and cloud-based distributed systems. We keep analysing
different design strategies targeted at distinct scenarios in the upcoming chapters.
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Group communication and data
sharing
Looking into the adjustments that one should make to leverage secure enclaves in distributed communica-
tion and processing systems, we observed considerable performance implications under memory-intensive
scenarios. Notwithstanding, the benefits of trusted execution environments (TEEs) outreach such niche.
Confidentiality and isolation can be used in less memory-eager applications.
In this direction, we turn our attention to designing or adapting cryptographic schemes in order to profit
from TEEs. The principle is basically the same and in fact derived from the construction of software
guard extensions (SGX) itself: it conceals a master key somewhere very hard to find (the processor die)
and uses it to derive other secrets. We do the same in Section 4.1.1, where a master secret is generated
within an enclave and never leaves it, thus allowing for its usage instead of more complex asymmetric
encryption derivations in the context of group access control. As a consequence, we are able to lower the
computational cost of an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme. Likewise, in Section 4.2.1,
the enclave is used to harbour keys and group membership data, so that users can share information
yet guaranteeing anonymity among them. Through empirical analysis, we show the practicality of both
systems and discuss their outcomes.
4.1 Cryptographic group access control
Cloud storage services have largely grown in the last decade. Many approaches rely on cryptographic
solutions where data is secured on the client side before reaching the storage premises [141], therefore
extenuating concerns caused by the lack of trust in the cloud provider. In the case where there is only
one single reader and writer, keys can be simply shared beforehand or established over public channels
according to protocols like Diffie-Hellman (DH). To enable collaborative operations, however, one needs
to enforce access control policies, so that only rightful users get access to keys.
A number of cryptographic constructions have been proposed for achieving access control. The simplest,
known as hybrid encryption (HE), uses symmetric and public-key cryptography by employing the former on
the actual data and the latter on the symmetric key [201]. The drawback is the huge amount of metadata
composed by the cumulative ciphertext produced when using the public keys of each and every group
member to protect the group shared key. Other approaches rely on pairing-based cryptography (PBC) as
a substitute for public-key cryptography. Even though pairing-based approaches produce small metadata
volume irrespective of group sizes, they suffer from important performance issues, one order of magnitude
slower than public-key cryptography [123].
We present here a cryptographic access control scheme that is both computationally- and storage-efficient
considering large sets of users and dynamic membership operations [16]. This is achieved by cutting
the computational complexity of an IBBE construction [202], since we profit from the isolation guarantees
provided by TEEs and use a master key for performing membership updates. When users need to perceive
such changes though, we still would obtain high overheads considering that we assume they may not have
access to hardware protection (e.g., mobile devices, Internet of things (IoT), distinct chip manufacturers).
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Figure 4.1: IBBE-SGX model diagram.
To mitigate this, we propose a group partitioning mechanism that imposes a complexity upper bound on
the user side, limited by the partition size.
We implemented our access control scheme using Intel SGX as TEE. To do so, we adapted a PBC lib-
rary [203] and its underlying dependency, GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (GMP) [204], to run
within SGX enclaves. Our evaluation shows that our scheme performs better than HE with regard to
metadata expansion, group creation and user removal from a group; and worse for user addition to a
group and key decryption time. The benefits of having small metadata, though, goes beyond access con-
trol latencies, since it leads to less storage and network usage. Additionally, the fact that we run the access
control inside secure enclaves prevents curious administrators to snoop on group keys, an extra security
feature not present in traditional HE.
Even though the main motivation for this work is to securely share data in cloud environments, the pro-
posed solution can be applied for encrypting arbitrary information that is securely broadcast to a group
of users in any shared media, e.g., peer-to-peer networks and pay-per-view TV. In the remaining of this
section, we (i) propose a new approach to IBBE encryption by relying on Intel SGX; (ii) propose an original
partitioning scheme that lowers the time required by users to absorb access control changes; (iii) imple-
ment and evaluate our system in a realistic setup; and (iv) compare it with state-of-the-art solutions.
Model
IBBE-SGX targets at managing groups of users who perform collaborative editing on cryptographically
protected data stored on untrusted cloud storages. Data are protected using a block cipher encryption
algorithm such as advanced encryption standard (AES), using a symmetric group key gk that is derivable
by every legit group member based on metadata accessible to him.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, we distinguish three actors:
• administrators, who perform membership operations: group creation, group members’ addition and
revocation. They may express an honest-but-curious behaviour by correctly performing their duties
and maliciously trying to spy on group keys;
• clients, who derive keys for groups to which they belong and use them to add or modify data in the
group’s shared content. They are trustworthy, meaning that they do not disclose group keys; and
• cloud storage, which stores metadata that hold group access control information along with encryp-
ted shared files. Besides the role of storage medium, we also use the cloud storage as communication
channel between administrators and users. When the formers update membership information, this
action is propagated through the respective changes in the storage. Users, in turn, may listen to
modifications in files that are relevant to them. The cloud storage may try to eavesdrop on users’
data and collude with administrators or revoked users.
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Figure 4.2: IBBE-SGX: System components.
We enforce authenticity only with respect to administrator identities on membership operations. Managing
encryption and authenticating data created or altered by users is out of scope. Identities of group members
are not secret, nor the type of membership operations, as they can be inferred by the cloud storage from
traffic access patterns. Privacy constructions offering such guarantees [205, 206, 207] are orthogonal to
our work. We propose a system that considers members anonymity in Section 4.2.1.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the system components, including a client and an administrator which use Dropbox
as public cloud storage provider. The administrator’s application programming interface (API) makes calls
to the underlying SGX enclave that contains IBBE-SGX. This, in turn, uses the IBBE component. Clients
are not required to have a TEE, although that could enhance the protection of their private key. IBBE
decrypting functionalities are directly called by the client’s API. Both administrators and clients may
use local caches in order to save round-trips to the storage provider. Administrators use the hypertext
transfer protocol (HTTP) verb PUT to send data to the cloud, whereas clients listen to updates on relevant
files through HTTP long polling. In Dropbox, long polling works at the directory level. As a consequence,
we index group metadata in a two-level hierarchy: parent folders represent one group, and each child a
partition.
4.1.1 IBBE-SGX
IBBE-SGX access control scheme can be broadly described in 3 steps: (i) trust establishment and private
key provisioning; (ii) membership definitions and group key provisioning; and (iii) membership changes
and key updates. IBBE schemes generate a single public key that can be paired with several private keys,
one per user. Users, in turn, need to be sure that the private key they receive is indeed generated by
someone they trust, otherwise they would be vulnerable to malicious entities trying to impersonate the
key issuer. To achieve that, we rely upon a public key infrastructure (PKI) to provide verifiable private
keys to users.
Another security requirement of IBBE-SGX is that the key management must be kept in a TEE, so that
the master key is never accessible by attackers (not even administrators). Therefore, there must be a
way of checking whether that is the case. On that front, Intel SGX makes it possible to attest enclaves
(Section 2.2.3). Running this procedure gives the assurance that a given piece of binary code is truly the
one running within an enclave, on a genuine Intel SGX processor.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the initial setup of trust that must be executed at least once before any key leaves
the enclave. Initially, the enclave generates a pair of asymmetric keys. While the private one never leaves
the trusted domain, the public key is sent along with the enclave measurement to the Auditor Ê, who is
both responsible for attesting the enclave and signing its certificate, thus also acting as a certification
authority (CA). Next, the Auditor checks with Intel attestation service (IAS) Ë if the enclave is genuine.
Being the case, it compares the enclave measurement with the expected one, so that it can be sure that the
code inside the shielded execution environment is trustworthy. Once that is achieved, the CA issues the
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Figure 4.3: IBBE-SGX initial setup.
enclave’s certificate Ì, which also contains its public key. Finally, users are able to receive their private
keys and the enclave’s certificate Í. Users’ keys will be encrypted by the enclave’s private key generated
in the beginning. To be sure they are not communicating with rogue key issuers, users check the CA’s
signature in the certificate and then use the enclave’s public key contained therein. All communication
channels described in this scheme must be encrypted by cryptographic protocols such as transport layer
security (TLS).
Once user private keys are established, they can be used to retrieve group keys from metadata held in
a shared storage. This can only happen, though, if the administrator has first included a given user as a
member of some group and updated the respective group metadata in the storage. Likewise, if metadata
were updated after a user revocation, such user will not be able to derive the group key any longer.
Cryptographic operations
Suppose that we want to come up with a simple, yet secure, cryptographic scheme to protect a group
key gk by using an asymmetric encryption primitive [208], based on Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) or
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). As each user in the system has a public-private key pair, the scheme
consists in encrypting gk using the public key of each member in the group. Group members can access
gk by decrypting the resulting ciphertext using their private key. This construction is referred to as trivial
broadcast encryption [134], or HE [123].
In such scheme, the amount of group metadata grows linearly with the number of members in the group,
making it impractical in the context of very large groups. Besides, when revoking group members, a new
key gk needs to be created. As a consequence, the entire group metadata needs to be regenerated and
updated. This causes the propagation of the linear increase both to the cipher generation and to data
transmission latencies.
Additionally, when performing group membership operations, administrators must check the authenticity
of public keys that are linked to members’ identity. A PKI [208] can be used to solve this issue. Apart
from risks that PKI brings [209], one needs to account for the practical costs of setting up, running and
accessing a PKI.
Alternatively, one could replace public-key primitives with identity-based ones. Using identity-based en-
cryption (IBE) [210, 211] allows for the adoption of arbitrary strings (e.g., user name or e-mail) as public
keys, alongside public known parameters. It is even possible to encrypt messages which are addressed
to users who have not yet interacted with the system. The user secret key is generated at setup phase or
later by a trusted authority (TA), which guards a private master key for that purpose.
In conclusion, HE combines symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA or ECC) encryptions for group com-
munication. It shows a linear growth on metadata with respect to the number of group members. RSA
requires PKI for checking authenticity of each user’s public key, whereas IBE replaces the PKI for publicly
known parameters plus a user identifier string, therefore obviating the need of checking the public key
authenticity for every user.
Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE)
Broadcast encryption (BE) [137] allows a node to encrypt a message that is only accessible to a subset of
all users who were provided with a private key when they initially joined the system. In such scenario, a
system-wide public key (as opposed to one per user as in HE) is used to encrypt messages, which typically
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contain a group key gk. The cipher is then decrypted by private keys and used by rightful group members
in order to get access to protected content.
There are BE solutions that tolerate any coalition of illegitimate members [143] or allow dynamic changes
of broadcast groups [212]. We chose, however, IBBE [202] that besides contemplating both features, also
integrates with IBE, therefore taking advantage of small sized metadata: the system-wide public key is
linear to the maximum group size, while ciphertexts and private keys have constant sizes. The drawback,
however, is the quadratic complexity of crypto operations in the number of group members. In short, even
though the scheme brings a tremendous gain in the size of group metadata, the computational cost of
IBBE might render it unpractical.
Figure 4.4 compares hybrid encryption with public key (HE-PKI) (RSA-2048, not considering signature
check), hybrid encryption with identity-based encryption (HE-IBE) (as in [210]) and IBBE schemes when
encapsulating a 32B key. We see, on the left, the total time taken for group creation when varying the
number of members and, on the right, the group metadata expansion. IBBE always produces 256B of
metadata, regardless of the group members amount. That is preferable when compared to HE-PKI and
HE-IBE, which produce increasingly larger values: 27MiB for groups of 100,000 users, and 274MiB for
the largest group size. On the other hand, IBBE performs much worse than HE-PKI when considering the
execution time. It is 150× and 144× slower for groups of 10,000 and 100,000 users, respectively.
It is clear that IBBE would be a better choice if it were not so slow. Since we can take advantage of the
shielding provided by TEEs, we are able to improve its performance during encryption. Moreover, we
propose a mitigation technique for lower decryption times, when we assume there is no TEE available. We
succinctly explain how traditional IBBE works before introducing the proposed modifications. Let
• e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a bilinear map defined by cyclic groups of prime order p.
• g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 and γ, k ∈ Z∗p be random values. Besides, w = gγ and v = e (g, h).
• n be the largest possible group size.
• H : Z∗ → Z∗p be a cryptographic hash function
The IBBE scheme [213, 202] consists of the following operations.
1. System setup: TA runs it once by generating a master secret key MK and a system-wide public key
PK .
MK = {g, γ} (4.1)
PK = {w, v, h, hγ , hγ2 , ..., hγn} (4.2)
2. Extract user secret: TA uses the MK to extract the secret key UK for each user.
UK = g
(γ+H(u))−1
1K 10K 100K 1M
50ms
1 s
1min
1h
10h
Group size
G
ro
u
p
cr
e
a
ti
o
n
ti
m
e
IBBE HE-PKI HE-IBE
1K 10K 100K 1M
1B
1KiB
1MiB
1GiB
Group size
M
e
ta
d
a
ta
si
ze
Figure 4.4: Comparison between HE-PKI, HE-IBE and IBBE regarding group creation time and metadata
produced.
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3. Encrypt broadcast key: The broadcaster generates a randomized broadcast key bk for a given set
of receivers S. Along with PK , this operation turns bk into a public broadcast ciphertext C.
bk = vk
C = {C1, C2}, where :
C1 = w
−k
C2 =
((
hγ
N
)
·
(
hγ
N−1)E1 · (hγN−2)E2 · ... · (hγ)EN−1)k , where :
N = |S|
E1 =
∑
u∈S
H (u)
E2 =
∑
u1,u2∈S,u16=u2
H (u1) · H (u2)
...
EN−1 =
∏
u∈S
H(u)
4. Decrypt broadcast key: any member of S can derive bk from (S, C) using UK .
In contrast to traditional IBBE that requires a TA to perform the system setup and extract user secret
operations, we use SGX enclaves instead. By doing so, the master secret key MK can be used in plaintext
form inside the enclave, and securely sealed when stored outside for persistence.
The operation to encrypt the broadcast key rely on the system-wide public key PK , hence it can be per-
formed by any user of the system in traditional IBBE. We, instead, require that all group membership
changes and group key encryption are performed by an administrator. Since administrators operate on
the same SGX machines where system setup and user key generation take place, encryption in IBBE-SGX
may use MK instead of PK , which dramatically reduces the computational complexity of such operation.
The decryption operation, however, remains identical to the traditional IBBE approach, executable by any
user.
By using MK inside the enclave, we are able to bypass the polynomial expansion of quadratic cost shown
in step 3 of IBBE. As a consequence, the encryption operation’s complexity drops from O(N2) in IBBE to
O(N) in IBBE-SGX. The value C2 is simply computed by:
C2 = h
k· ∏
u∈S
(γ+H(u))
(4.3)
This complexity cut is sufficient to tackle the IBBE’s impracticality highlighted in Figure 4.4. Moreover,
operations for re-keying, adding or removing a user from a broadcast group are done in O(1). In order
to remove a user and update the broadcast key bk in constant time, we had to add a third component
C3 = (C2)
k−1 to the ciphertext, which is completely safe since it may be entirely derived from public key’s
components (Equation (4.2)). This is due to the fact that the administrator has no access to the random
component k which is required for updating the cipher upon key update, which happens in both user
removal and re-key operations. Table 4.1 shows how to recompute the ciphertext for each of them.
Unfortunately, IBBE-SGX maintains the quadratic complexity when a group member needs to decrypt the
ciphertext by performing a polynomial expansion similar to the encrypt operation described above. We
address this issue by introducing a partitioning mechanism.
Partitioning
As the decryption time is bound to the number of users in the receiving set, we split the group into m
partitions (sub-groups) of at most n users each, thus limiting the user decryption time to the number of
members in a single partition. Each partition p ∈ P corresponds to a broadcast group such that m = |P|
with its respective broadcast key bki encapsulated in a ciphertext Ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Such key bki is
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Table 4.1: IBBE-SGX: Constant time operations.
Add user ua Remove user ur Re-keying
and update key to kn with a new kn
C2 ← (C2)γ+H(ua)
C3 ← (C3)γ+H(ua)
C1 ← w−kn
C3 ← (C3)(γ+H(ur))
−1
C2 ← (C3)kn
C1 ← w−kn
C2 ← (C3)kn
{C1, y1, IV1}
<latexit sha1_base64="TU1PrakQ FfgOhWcBK8U41qYFkVc=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdekmWAQXWpIq6L LYje4q2Ac0IUymk3bo5MHMjRBCv8KNv+LGhSJuxZ1/4yTNQlsPXDiccy/33 uPFnEkwzW9taXlldW29slHd3Nre2dX39rsySgShHRLxSPQ9LClnIe0AA077 saA48DjteZNW7vceqJAsCu8hjakT4FHIfEYwKMnVz2zuCUyoHWAYE8yz1tS1 TlNVhQKQ3XaVYouiy9VrZt0sYCwSqyQ1VKLt6l/2MCJJQEMgHEs5sMwYnAw LYITTadVOJI0xmeARHSga4oBKJyvemhrHShkafiRUhWAU6u+JDAdSpoGnOvN b5byXi/95gwT8KydjYZwADclskZ9wAyIjz8gYMkEJ8FQRTARTtxpkjFUAoJ KsqhCs+ZcXSbdRt87rjbuLWvO6jKOCDtEROkEWukRNdIPaqIMIekTP6BW9a U/ai/aufcxal7Ry5gD9gfb5A1SJn3g=</latexit>
{C2, y2, IV2}
<latexit sha1_base64="rfsH4QGnZ4su8MgxmUZuNL0+pWg=">AAACFnic bVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdekmWAQXWpIq6LLYje4q2Ac0IUymk3bo5MHMjRBCv8KNv+LGhSJuxZ1/4yTNQlsPXDiccy/33uPFnEkwzW9taXlldW29slHd3Nre2dX 39rsySgShHRLxSPQ9LClnIe0AA077saA48DjteZNW7vceqJAsCu8hjakT4FHIfEYwKMnVz2zuCUyoHWAYE8yz1tRtnKaqCgUgu+0qxRZFl6vXzLpZwFgkV klqqETb1b/sYUSSgIZAOJZyYJkxOBkWwAin06qdSBpjMsEjOlA0xAGVTla8NTWOlTI0/EioCsEo1N8TGQ6kTANPdea3ynkvF//zBgn4V07GwjgBGpLZIj/h BkRGnpExZIIS4KkimAimbjXIGKsAQCVZVSFY8y8vkm6jbp3XG3cXteZ1GUcFHaIjdIIsdIma6Aa1UQcR9Iie0St60560F+1d+5i1LmnlzAH6A+3zB1lKn3s =</latexit>
{Cm, ym, IVm}
<latexit sha1_base64="YpbX+OZfzk6/M0/vAq5Q/3YiEAE=">AAACFnicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdekmWAQXWpIq6LLYje4q2Ac0IUymk3bo5MHMjRBCv8K Nv+LGhSJuxZ1/4yTNQlsPXDiccy/33uPFnEkwzW9taXlldW29slHd3Nre2dX39rsySgShHRLxSPQ9LClnIe0AA077saA48DjteZNW7vceqJAsCu8hjakT4FHIfEYwKMnVz2zuCUyoHWAYE8yz1tQNTlNVhQKQ3XaVYouiy9VrZt0sYCwSqyQ1VKLt6l/2MCJJQEMgHEs5sMwYnAwLYITTadVOJI0xmeARHSga4oBKJyvem hrHShkafiRUhWAU6u+JDAdSpoGnOvNb5byXi/95gwT8KydjYZwADclskZ9wAyIjz8gYMkEJ8FQRTARTtxpkjFUAoJKsqhCs+ZcXSbdRt87rjbuLWvO6jKOCDtEROkEWukRNdIPaqIMIekTP6BW9aU/ai/aufcxal7Ry5gD9gfb5A3HUoCw=</latexit>
y1 = AES(bk1, IV1, gk)
<latexit sha1_base64="QRqwNlpL Xwk7FKhb3EwUrxHpSvo=">AAACEHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSJWkJJUQT dCVQTdVbQPaEuYTKftkMmDmRshhHyCG3/FjQtF3Lp05984bSNo9cDAmXPu5 d57nJAzCab5qeVmZufmF/KLhaXlldU1fX2jIYNIEFonAQ9Ey8GScubTOjDg tBUKij2H06bjno/85h0VkgX+LcQh7Xp44LM+IxiUZOu7sW2ddDwMQ4Dk9OIm LTmube1/K1eNVP0G7p6tF82yOYbxl1gZKaIMNVv/6PQCEnnUB8KxlG3LDKG bYAGMcJoWOpGkISYuHtC2oj72qOwm44NSY0cpPaMfCPV8MMbqz44Ee1LGnqM qR4vKaW8k/ue1I+gfdxPmhxFQn0wG9SNuQGCM0jF6TFACPFYEE8HUrgYZYo EJqAwLKgRr+uS/pFEpWwflyvVhsXqWxZFHW2gblZCFjlAVXaIaqiOC7tEje kYv2oP2pL1qb5PSnJb1bKJf0N6/AF3znCc=</latexit>
y2 = AES(bk2, IV2, gk)
<latexit sha1_base64="ENzvMM0G3q58Agxh4j9fV/D8BRg=">AAACEHic bVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqEs3wSJWkJJEQTdCVQTdVbQPaEuYTKftkMmDmRshhHyCG3/FjQtF3Lp05984fQhaPTBw5px7ufceN+JMgml+armZ2bn5hfxiYWl5ZXV NX9+oyzAWhNZIyEPRdLGknAW0Bgw4bUaCYt/ltOF650O/cUeFZGFwC0lEOz7uB6zHCAYlOfpu4tgnbR/DACA9vbjJSq7n2PvfylU9U7++t+foRbNsjmD8J daEFNEEVUf/aHdDEvs0AMKxlC3LjKCTYgGMcJoV2rGkESYe7tOWogH2qeyko4MyY0cpXaMXCvUCMEbqz44U+1Imvqsqh4vKaW8o/ue1Yugdd1IWRDHQgIwH 9WJuQGgM0zG6TFACPFEEE8HUrgYZYIEJqAwLKgRr+uS/pG6XrYOyfX1YrJxN4sijLbSNSshCR6iCLlEV1RBB9+gRPaMX7UF70l61t3FpTpv0bKJf0N6/AGK 5nCo=</latexit>
ym = AES(bkm, IVm, gk)
<latexit sha1_base64="RXkTu53I41vOUp2N4WPSIs08NbI=">AAACEHicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3wSJWkJJUQTdCVQTdVbQPaEuYTKftkJkkzNwIJeQ T3Pgrblwo4talO//GaRtBqwcGzpxzL/fe44acKbCsTyMzMzs3v5BdzC0tr6yu5dc36iqIJKE1EvBANl2sKGc+rQEDTpuhpFi4nDZc73zkN+6oVCzwb2EY0o7AfZ/1GMGgJSe/O3TESVtgGADEpxc3SdH1HLH/rVzVE/3re3tOvmCVrDHMv8ROSQGlqDr5j3Y3IJGgPhCOlWrZVgidGEtghNMk144UDTHxcJ+2NPWxoKoTj w9KzB2tdM1eIPXzwRyrPztiLJQaCldXjhZV095I/M9rRdA77sTMDyOgPpkM6kXchMAcpWN2maQE+FATTCTTu5pkgCUmoDPM6RDs6ZP/knq5ZB+UyteHhcpZGkcWbaFtVEQ2OkIVdImqqIYIukeP6Bm9GA/Gk/FqvE1KM0bas4l+wXj/AnxqnNs=</latexit>
bkm
<latexit sha1_base64="EqTjLToOlgtKBHKgj3unY3F4nmI=">AAAB63icbVBNSwMxEJ34WetX1aOXYBE8ld0q6LHoxWMF+wHtUrJ ptg1NskuSFcrSv+DFgyJe/UPe/Ddm2z1o64OBx3szzMwLE8GN9bxvtLa+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk41ZS0ai1h3Q2KY4Iq1LLeCdRPNiAwF64STu9zvPDFteKwe7TRhgSQjxSNOic2lcDKQg0rVq3lz4FXiF6QKBZqDyld/GNNUMmWpIMb0fC+xQUa05VSwWbmfGpYQOiEj1 nNUEclMkM1vneFzpwxxFGtXyuK5+nsiI9KYqQxdpyR2bJa9XPzP66U2ugkyrpLUMkUXi6JUYBvj/HE85JpRK6aOEKq5uxXTMdGEWhdP2YXgL7+8Str1mn9Zqz9cVRu3RRwlOIUzuAAfrqEB99CEFlAYwzO8whuS6AW9o49F6xoqZk7gD9DnDw7Fjj8=</latexit>
bk2
<latexit sha1_base64="z9dD7CThOhVfbOtZt2cBNHZCcCo="> AAAB63icbVBNSwMxEJ34WetX1aOXYBE8ld0q6LHoxWMF+wHtUrJptg1NskuSFcrSv+DFgyJe/UPe/Ddm2z1o64OBx3szzMwLE8GN9bx vtLa+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk41ZS0ai1h3Q2KY4Iq1LLeCdRPNiAwF64STu9zvPDFteKwe7TRhgSQjxSNOic2lcDKoDypVr+bNg VeJX5AqFGgOKl/9YUxTyZSlghjT873EBhnRllPBZuV+alhC6ISMWM9RRSQzQTa/dYbPnTLEUaxdKYvn6u+JjEhjpjJ0nZLYsVn2cvE/ r5fa6CbIuEpSyxRdLIpSgW2M88fxkGtGrZg6Qqjm7lZMx0QTal08ZReCv/zyKmnXa/5lrf5wVW3cFnGU4BTO4AJ8uIYG3EMTWkBhDM/ wCm9Iohf0jj4WrWuomDmBP0CfP7VKjgQ=</latexit>
bk1
<latexit sha1_base64="4F9ESWZHolcwAFoaPODQxDzo5+Y="> AAAB63icbVBNSwMxEJ34WetX1aOXYBE8ld0q6LHoxWMF+wHtUrJptg1NskuSFcrSv+DFgyJe/UPe/Ddm2z1o64OBx3szzMwLE8GN9bx vtLa+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk41ZS0ai1h3Q2KY4Iq1LLeCdRPNiAwF64STu9zvPDFteKwe7TRhgSQjxSNOic2lcDLwB5WqV/Pmw KvEL0gVCjQHla/+MKapZMpSQYzp+V5ig4xoy6lgs3I/NSwhdEJGrOeoIpKZIJvfOsPnThniKNaulMVz9fdERqQxUxm6Tkns2Cx7ufif 10ttdBNkXCWpZYouFkWpwDbG+eN4yDWjVkwdIVRzdyumY6IJtS6esgvBX355lbTrNf+yVn+4qjZuizhKcApncAE+XEMD7qEJLaAwhmd 4hTck0Qt6Rx+L1jVUzJzAH6DPH7PGjgM=</latexit>
Partition metadata
gk
<latexit sha1_base64="gDZzwRiuRzylHgyLZXMK4J9g56o=">A AAB6XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0mqoMeiF49V7Ae0oWy2m3bJZhN2J0Ip/QdePCji1X/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekEph0HW/ncL a+sbmVnG7tLO7t39QPjxqmSTTjDdZIhPdCajhUijeRIGSd1LNaRxI3g6i25nffuLaiEQ94jjlfkyHSoSCUbTSwzDqlytu1Z2DrBIvJxXI0 eiXv3qDhGUxV8gkNabruSn6E6pRMMmnpV5meEpZRIe8a6miMTf+ZH7plJxZZUDCRNtSSObq74kJjY0Zx4HtjCmOzLI3E//zuhmG1/5EqDR DrthiUZhJggmZvU0GQnOGcmwJZVrYWwkbUU0Z2nBKNgRv+eVV0qpVvYtq7f6yUr/J4yjCCZzCOXhwBXW4gwY0gUEIz/AKb07kvDjvzseit eDkM8fwB87nD5VJjWQ=</latexit>
Partition key
Group key
…
…
u11
<latexit sha1_base64="JaH cSm8jPeW/CQ2YKuG2oNsGSm8=">AAAB7XicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX 7V+VT16CRbBU9lUQY9FLx4r2A9ol5JNs21sNlmSrFCW/gcvHh Tx6v/x5r8xbfegrQ8GHu/NMDMvTAQ31ve/vcLa+sbmVnG7tL O7t39QPjxqGZVqyppUCaU7ITFMcMmallvBOolmJA4Fa4fj25n ffmLacCUf7CRhQUyGkkecEuukVtrPMJ72yxW/6s+BVgnOSQVy NPrlr95A0TRm0lJBjOliP7FBRrTlVLBpqZcalhA6JkPWdVSS mJkgm187RWdOGaBIaVfSorn6eyIjsTGTOHSdMbEjs+zNxP+8b mqj6yDjMkktk3SxKEoFsgrNXkcDrhm1YuIIoZq7WxEdEU2od QGVXAh4+eVV0qpV8UW1dn9Zqd/kcRThBE7hHDBcQR3uoAFNoP AIz/AKb57yXrx372PRWvDymWP4A+/zBz3sjug=</latexit>
u12
<latexit sha1_base64="1B2 nG25jaFGhObi6oVQFQWO9F7U=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNr xhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmAckS5idzCZjZmeWeQhhyT948a CIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddHdFKWfa+P63V1hb39jcKm6Xdn b39g/Kh0ctLa0itEkkl6oTYU05E7RpmOG0kyqKk4jTdjS+nfn tJ6o0k+LBTFIaJngoWMwINk5q2X4W1Kb9csWv+nOgVRLkpAI5 Gv3yV28giU2oMIRjrbuBn5oww8owwum01LOappiM8ZB2HRU4 oTrM5tdO0ZlTBiiWypUwaK7+nshwovUkiVxngs1IL3sz8T+va 018HWZMpNZQQRaLYsuRkWj2OhowRYnhE0cwUczdisgIK0yMC 6jkQgiWX14lrVo1uKjW7i8r9Zs8jiKcwCmcQwBXUIc7aEATCD zCM7zCmye9F+/d+1i0Frx85hj+wPv8AT9xjuk=</latexit>
u13
<latexit sha1_base64="5lJNUcw1C3qI7MbiOLKMW+Zdr6M=" >AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8hd1E0GPQi8cI5gHJEmYns8mY2ZllHkJY8g9ePCji1f/x5t84SfagiQUNRVU33V1Rypk2v v/tra1vbG5tF3aKu3v7B4elo+OWllYR2iSSS9WJsKacCdo0zHDaSRXFScRpOxrfzvz2E1WaSfFgJikNEzwULGYEGye1bD8LatN+qe xX/DnQKglyUoYcjX7pqzeQxCZUGMKx1t3AT02YYWUY4XRa7FlNU0zGeEi7jgqcUB1m82un6NwpAxRL5UoYNFd/T2Q40XqSRK4zwWak l72Z+J/XtSa+DjMmUmuoIItFseXISDR7HQ2YosTwiSOYKOZuRWSEFSbGBVR0IQTLL6+SVrUS1CrV+8ty/SaPowCncAYXEMAV1OEOG tAEAo/wDK/w5knvxXv3Phata14+cwJ/4H3+AED2juo=</latexit>
u1n
<latexit sha1_base64="YPrtneqQvadcfxkWrUs6fEjrAjI =">AAAB7XicbVBNSwMxEJ3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqexWQY9FLx4r2A9ol5JNs21sNlmSrFCW/gcvHhTx6v/x5r8xbfegrQ8GHu/NMD MvTAQ31vO+UWFtfWNzq7hd2tnd2z8oHx61jEo1ZU2qhNKdkBgmuGRNy61gnUQzEoeCtcPx7cxvPzFtuJIPdpKwICZDySNOiXV SK+1nvpz2yxWv6s2BV4mfkwrkaPTLX72BomnMpKWCGNP1vcQGGdGWU8GmpV5qWELomAxZ11FJYmaCbH7tFJ85ZYAjpV1Ji+fq 74mMxMZM4tB1xsSOzLI3E//zuqmNroOMyyS1TNLFoigV2Co8ex0PuGbUiokjhGrubsV0RDSh1gVUciH4yy+vklat6l9Ua/eXlf pNHkcRTuAUzsGHK6jDHTSgCRQe4Rle4Q0p9ILe0ceitYDymWP4A/T5A5qdjyU=</latexit>
u2n
<latexit sha1_base64="QENwcgOhOfdsfAAbOtQPQoQLo2M =">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmAckS5idzCZjZmeWeQhhyT948aCIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddH dFKWfa+P63V1hb39jcKm6Xdnb39g/Kh0ctLa0itEkkl6oTYU05E7RpmOG0kyqKk4jTdjS+nfntJ6o0k+LBTFIaJngoWMwINk5 q2X5WE9N+ueJX/TnQKglyUoEcjX75qzeQxCZUGMKx1t3AT02YYWUY4XRa6llNU0zGeEi7jgqcUB1m82un6MwpAxRL5UoYNFd/ T2Q40XqSRK4zwWakl72Z+J/XtSa+DjMmUmuoIItFseXISDR7HQ2YosTwiSOYKOZuRWSEFSbGBVRyIQTLL6+SVq0aXFRr95eV+k 0eRxFO4BTOIYArqMMdNKAJBB7hGV7hzZPei/fufSxaC14+cwx/4H3+AJwjjyY=</latexit>
u23
<latexit sha1_base64="VK3/UTyP4zJoYIpNNpUM1cZWi2c=" >AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8hd1E0GPQi8cI5gHJEmYns8mY2ZllHkJY8g9ePCji1f/x5t84SfagiQUNRVU33V1Rypk2v v/tra1vbG5tF3aKu3v7B4elo+OWllYR2iSSS9WJsKacCdo0zHDaSRXFScRpOxrfzvz2E1WaSfFgJikNEzwULGYEGye1bD+r1qb9Ut mv+HOgVRLkpAw5Gv3SV28giU2oMIRjrbuBn5oww8owwum02LOappiM8ZB2HRU4oTrM5tdO0blTBiiWypUwaK7+nshwovUkiVxngs1I L3sz8T+va018HWZMpNZQQRaLYsuRkWj2OhowRYnhE0cwUczdisgIK0yMC6joQgiWX14lrWolqFWq95fl+k0eRwFO4QwuIIArqMMdN KAJBB7hGV7hzZPei/fufSxa17x85gT+wPv8AUJ8jus=</latexit>
u22
<latexit sha1_base64="w7tAD6qcYU/RToTzovrUuvXC3qs =">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0mioMeiF48V7Ae0oWy2m3btZjfsboQS+h+8eFDEq//Hm//GbZqDtj4YeLw3w8 y8MOFMG9f9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCorWWqCG0RyaXqhlhTzgRtGWY47SaK4jjktBNObud+54kqzaR4MNOEBjEeCRYxgo2 V2ukg8/3ZoFpz624OtEq8gtSgQHNQ/eoPJUljKgzhWOue5yYmyLAyjHA6q/RTTRNMJnhEe5YKHFMdZPm1M3RmlSGKpLIlDMrV 3xMZjrWexqHtjLEZ62VvLv7n9VITXQcZE0lqqCCLRVHKkZFo/joaMkWJ4VNLMFHM3orIGCtMjA2oYkPwll9eJW2/7l3U/fvLWu OmiKMMJ3AK5+DBFTTgDprQAgKP8Ayv8OZI58V5dz4WrSWnmDmGP3A+fwBA947q</latexit>
u21
<latexit sha1_base64="wKxDfJENDpHxVY33vHU0TlFkMq4 =">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmAckS5idzCZjZmeWeQhhyT948aCIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddH dFKWfa+P63V1hb39jcKm6Xdnb39g/Kh0ctLa0itEkkl6oTYU05E7RpmOG0kyqKk4jTdjS+nfntJ6o0k+LBTFIaJngoWMwINk5 q2X5WC6b9csWv+nOgVRLkpAI5Gv3yV28giU2oMIRjrbuBn5oww8owwum01LOappiM8ZB2HRU4oTrM5tdO0ZlTBiiWypUwaK7+ nshwovUkiVxngs1IL3sz8T+va018HWZMpNZQQRaLYsuRkWj2OhowRYnhE0cwUczdisgIK0yMC6jkQgiWX14lrVo1uKjW7i8r9Z s8jiKcwCmcQwBXUIc7aEATCDzCM7zCmye9F+/d+1i0Frx85hj+wPv8AT9yjuk=</latexit>
…
um1
<latexit sha1_base64="RMMQkycIpZXf2ZqU8ZxUAU+0DOo=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmA ckS5idzCZj5rHMzAphyT948aCIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddHdFCWfG+v63V1hb39jcKm6Xdnb39g/Kh0cto1JNaJMornQnwoZyJmnTMstpJ9EUi4jTdjS+nfntJ6oNU/LBThIaCjyULGYEWye10n4mgmm/XPGr/hxolQQ5qUCORr/81RsokgoqLeHYmG7gJzbM sLaMcDot9VJDE0zGeEi7jkosqAmz+bVTdOaUAYqVdiUtmqu/JzIsjJmIyHUKbEdm2ZuJ/3nd1MbXYcZkkloqyWJRnHJkFZq9jgZMU2L5xBFMNHO3IjLCGhPrAiq5EILll1dJq1YNLqq1+8tK/SaPowgncArnEMAV1OEOGtAEAo/wDK/w5invxXv3PhatBS+fOY Y/8D5/AJlUjyQ=</latexit>
um2
<latexit sha1_base64="WARJRPIZzLGK5BlmpRHpiCguVHk=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmA ckS5idzCZj5rHMzAphyT948aCIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddHdFCWfG+v63V1hb39jcKm6Xdnb39g/Kh0cto1JNaJMornQnwoZyJmnTMstpJ9EUi4jTdjS+nfntJ6oNU/LBThIaCjyULGYEWye10n4matN+ueJX/TnQKglyUoEcjX75qzdQJBVUWsKxMd3AT2yY YW0Z4XRa6qWGJpiM8ZB2HZVYUBNm82un6MwpAxQr7UpaNFd/T2RYGDMRkesU2I7MsjcT//O6qY2vw4zJJLVUksWiOOXIKjR7HQ2YpsTyiSOYaOZuRWSENSbWBVRyIQTLL6+SVq0aXFRr95eV+k0eRxFO4BTOIYArqMMdNKAJBB7hGV7hzVPei/fufSxaC14+cw x/4H3+AJrZjyU=</latexit>
um3
<latexit sha1_base64="L8qWMC4jS+vj+/slzCa8wzNU90A=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6tHLYBA8hd1E0GPQi8cI5gHJEm Yns8mYeSwzs0JY8g9ePCji1f/x5t84SfagiQUNRVU33V1Rwpmxvv/tra1vbG5tF3aKu3v7B4elo+OWUakmtEkUV7oTYUM5k7RpmeW0k2iKRcRpOxrfzvz2E9WGKflgJwkNBR5KFjOCrZNaaT8TtWm/VPYr/hxolQQ5KUOORr/01RsokgoqLeHYmG7gJzbMsLaMcDot9lJDE 0zGeEi7jkosqAmz+bVTdO6UAYqVdiUtmqu/JzIsjJmIyHUKbEdm2ZuJ/3nd1MbXYcZkkloqyWJRnHJkFZq9jgZMU2L5xBFMNHO3IjLCGhPrAiq6EILll1dJq1oJapXq/WW5fpPHUYBTOIMLCOAK6nAHDWgCgUd4hld485T34r17H4vWNS+fOYE/8D5/AJxejyY=</latexi t>
umn
<latexit sha1_base64="JR6a0b2ArarUEEcwbVjO3Ql4nHE=">AAAB7XicbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY9eBoPgKexGQY9BLx4jmA ckS5idzCZj5rHMzAphyT948aCIV//Hm3/jJNmDJhY0FFXddHdFCWfG+v63V1hb39jcKm6Xdnb39g/Kh0cto1JNaJMornQnwoZyJmnTMstpJ9EUi4jTdjS+nfntJ6oNU/LBThIaCjyULGYEWye10n4m5LRfrvhVfw60SoKcVCBHo1/+6g0USQWVlnBsTDfwExtm WFtGOJ2WeqmhCSZjPKRdRyUW1ITZ/NopOnPKAMVKu5IWzdXfExkWxkxE5DoFtiOz7M3E/7xuauPrMGMySS2VZLEoTjmyCs1eRwOmKbF84ggmmrlbERlhjYl1AZVcCMHyy6ukVasGF9Xa/WWlfpPHUYQTOIVzCOAK6nAHDWgCgUd4hld485T34r17H4vWgpfPHM MfeJ8/9gWPYQ==</latexit>
…
Figure 4.5: IBBE-SGX: Partitioning mechanism.
used to encrypt the group key gk shared across all partitions. To encrypt gk, we use symmetric encryption,
such as AES, and produce a new component yi = AES(bki, IVi, gk) where IVi is a random input vector, which
are both appended to the partition metadata, i.e., {Ci, yi, IVi}. A partition p groups a set of users uij ∈ p
such that n = |p| and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Figure 4.5 illustrates the scheme.
From the administrator perspective, there is an impact when removing a user from the group, since that
would provoke an update on the group key gk and therefore the recalculation of yi for all partitions, along
with bki of the implicated one. This renders the complexity O(m) to the remove user operation instead
of O(1) with no partitioning. Diversely, all other operation complexities are kept or reduced. Table 4.2
compares them. In order to distinguish cardinalities, we use n = |p| for partitions and N = |S| for a single
broadcast group, i.e., without the partitioning scheme.
Extracting a user key and adding a user to a group remain O(1). The addition of a user can cause the
creation of a new partition if all existing ones are full. In such case, the constant complexity is kept since
it corresponds to that of encrypting the broadcast key bki for the new partition with a single member
(Equation (4.3)). Creating a group has the cost of creating the first partition, or O(n) (Equation (4.2)). The
biggest gain comes, however, in key decryption. Instead of being quadratic in the total number of users
O(N2), it becomes quadratic in the number of users per partition O(n2).
Partitioning also impacts storage footprint. The public key PK is linear in the maximal number of users
per partition O(n) instead of the total user amount O(N). Concerning group metadata, the footprint is
augmented by the symmetrically encrypted group key, i.e., yi, and the respective initialisation vector (IV).
For an entire group, metadata storage corresponds to the number of partitions times the size of {Ci, yi, IVi},
Table 4.2: IBBE-SGX: Operations complexities comparison.
Operation IBBE [202] IBBE-SGX IBBE-SGX with partitioning
System setup O(N) O(N) O(n)
Extract user key O(1) O(1) O(1)
Create group key O(N2) O(N) O(mn)
Add user to group O(1) O(1)
Remove user from group O(1) O(m)
Decrypt group key O(N2) O(N2) O(n2)
Cardinalities: N : global number of users. n: members in one partition. m: number of partitions.
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Algorithm 1: IBBE-SGX: Create group.
input : g: group
S = {u1, ..., uN}: members
n: partition size
1 C ← ∅
2 P ← {{u1, ..., un}, {un+1, ..., u2n}, ...}
10
Enclaved
3 gk ← RandomKey()
4 foreach i ∈ P do
5 {bki, Ci} ← create_partition(Mk, i)
6 IVi ← RandomIV ()
7 yi ← AES(SHA(bki), IVi, gk)
8 C ← C ∪ {i, Ci, yi, IVi}
9 sealed_gk ← sgx_seal(gk)
10 store_key(g, sealed_gk)
11 ∀c ∈ C : store_meta(g, c)
Algorithm 2: IBBE-SGX: Add user to group.
input : g: group
P: partitions of g
n: partition size
ua: user to add
sealed_gk: sealed group key
1 pa ← ∃p ∈ P, such that |p| < n
2 if pa = ∅ then
3 pa ← {ua}
8
Enclaved
4 {bka, Ca} ← create_partition(Mk, pa)
5 gk ← sgx_unseal(sealed_gk)
6 IVa ← RandomIV ()
7 ya ← AES(SHA(bka), IVa, gk)
8 store(g, {pa, Ca, ya, IVa})
9 else
10 pa ← pa ∪ {ua}
12
11 Ca ← add_user_to_partition(Mk, pa, ua)
12 update_meta(g, {pa, Ca,−,−})
in addition to a data structure that keeps the mapping between users and partitions. Although this induces
a slight overhead, the number of partitions in a group is relatively small compared to the group size.
Besides, administrators alone manipulate partition metadata. They can therefore use a local cache to
bypass the cost of accessing remote storage.
Determining the optimal value for the partition size mostly depends on the dynamics of the group. There
is a trade-off between the number and frequency of group membership operations performed by the ad-
ministrator and those performed by regular users for decrypting the broadcast key. A small partition
size reduces the decryption time on the user side while a larger one reduces the number of operations
performed by the administrator to run IBBE-SGX and to maintain the metadata. We further evaluate this
trade-off in the upcoming sections.
Membership operations
In order to create a group, we execute the instructions in Algorithm 1. Once the partitions are determined
(line 2), the execution enters the SGX enclave (lines 3 to 9), when the group key is encrypted with the
partition broadcast key. The ciphertext and the sealed group key leave the enclave to be later pushed to
the shared storage (lines 10 and 11).
The operation of adding a user to a group, shown in Algorithm 2, starts by finding one partition which is
not yet full (line 1). If none is found, a new partition is created with a single user (line 3) and the group
key is enveloped by the broadcast key of this new partition (lines 4 to 7), before storing the corresponding
ciphertexts (line 8). Otherwise, the user is added to the not-yet-full partition found (lines 10 and 11).
Since both the partition broadcast and the group key remain unchanged, only the ciphertext needs to be
updated (line 12).
When a user needs to be removed from a group (Algorithm 3), his identifier is extracted from the partition
to which he belongs (lines 1 and 2) and a new group key is randomly generated (line 3). Next, metadata
from the partition that used to contain the removed user is updated (line 4) and the new partition key bkr
is used for enveloping the new group key gk (line 6). For all the remaining partitions, a constant time
re-keying operation (see Table 4.1) regenerates each partition broadcast key, which is used to encrypt the
new group key (lines 8 to 10). After sealing the new group key (line 11), the resulting value is persisted
(line 12) along with all updated metadata (lines 13 and 14).
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Algorithm 3: IBBE-SGX: Remove user from group.
input : g: group
P: partitions of g
ur: user to remove
1 pr ← p ∈ P, such that ur ∈ p
2 pr ← pr \ {ur}
12
Enclaved
3 gk ← RandomKey()
4 (bkr, Cr)← remove_user(Mk, pr, ur)
5 IVr ← RandomIV ()
6 yr ← AES(SHA(bkr), IVr, gk)
7 for p ∈ P \ pr do
8 (bkp, Cp)← rekey_partition(p)
9 IVp ← RandomIV ()
10 yp ← AES(SHA(bkp), IVp, gk)
11 sealed_gk ← sgx_seal(gk)
12 update_key(g, sealed_gk)
13 update_meta(g, {pr, Cr, yr, IVr})
14 ∀p ∈ P \ pr : update_meta(g, {p, Cp, yp, IVp})
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Figure 4.6: Performance of IBBE-SGX’s bootstrap phase.
As many removal operations may cause sparsely occupied partitions, we propose a re-partitioning scheme
whenever partition occupancies are low. We implement a heuristic to detect low occupancy when half
of the partitions in one group are two thirds full or less. In such case, re-partitioning is triggered by
simply re-creating the implicated group according to Algorithm 1. The client decrypt operation works by
first using the standard IBBE to discover the broadcast key, whose hash is then used to obtain the group
key.
Implementation and evaluation
We used the PBC [203] library which depends on GMP [204]. They both have to be used inside SGX
enclaves to implement the IBBE component (see Figure 4.2). Luckily, since both PBC and GMP mostly
perform computations rather than input and output operations, the challenges on adapting them were
chiefly restrained to tracking and adapting calls to GNU C library (glibc). The adaptations were done
either by relaying operations to the operating system through outside calls (ocalls), or performing them
with equivalent operations inside enclaves. Outside calls, in turn, do not perform any sensitive action
that could compromise security. Aside from source code, we also adapted the compilation toolchain,
since enclaves must use curated versions of standard libraries (we used Intel SGX software development
kit (SDK)). Moreover, specific code generation flags must be used, along with the prevention of using the
compiler’s built-in functions. The modifications account for 32 line of code (LoC) for PBC and 299 for
GMP.
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Figure 4.7: Evaluation of create and remove operations and storage footprint, by varying the partition size
for IBBE-SGX (1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000).
Apart from these changes, we also needed to use common cryptographic libraries. Due to limitations in
Intel SGX SDK v.1.9, we used an OpenSSL SGX port [214]. The end-to-end system including both IBBE-SGX
and HE schemes consists of 3,152 lines of C/C++ code and 170 lines of Python.
Micro-benchmarks
We benchmark the performance of IBBE-SGX in isolation, by comparing it to HE, and by using access
control traces. Experiments were performed on a quad-core Intel i7-6600U machine with a processor at
3.4 GHz, 16 GB of random-access memory (RAM) and Ubuntu 16.04 long term support (LTS).
First, we evaluate the bootstrap’s performance. It consists of setting up the system and generating user
private keys. Results are shown in Figure 4.6. The setup latency increases linearly according to partition
size, with a growth of 1.2 s per 1.000 users. Differently, extracting secret user keys gives an average
throughput of 764ops/s, irrespective of the partition size. This is unsurprising, since we have seen that
such operations are O(n) and O(1), respectively (see Table 4.2).
Next, we compare IBBE-SGX with HE. Figure 4.7 displays performance measurements of operations for
creating a group and removing a user from a group, along with the storage footprint of metadata. IBBE-
SGX is better than HE in all three by approximately a constant factor. Create and remove operations with
62
4.1. Cryptographic group access control
IBBE-SGX HE
1 2 3 4
0
50
100
Latency [ms]
C
D
F
[%
]
Add user to group
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
0.01
0.1
1
Partition size
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
ti
m
e
[s
]
Decrypt
Figure 4.8: Performance of adding a user to a group and decrypt operations.
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
Partition size
R
e
p
la
y
ti
m
e
[s
]
0
0.5
1
1.5
A
ve
ra
g
e
d
e
cr
yp
ti
o
n
ti
m
e
[s
]
IBBE-SGX replay time IBBE-SGX average decryption time
HE replay time HE average decryption time
Figure 4.9: Measuring total administrator replay time and average user decryption time per different
partition sizes using the Linux Kernel access control list data set.
IBBE-SGX is 1 order of magnitude faster than HE. If we compare to the original IBBE scheme, IBBE-SGX
is better by 2 orders of magnitude for groups of 1,000 users and 3 for one million users (see Figure 4.4).
Concerning memory usage, IBBE-SGX is up to 6 orders of magnitude better than HE. The plots on the
right-hand side in Figure 4.7 show the same data in linear axis but disregarding HE, so that we are able
to observe the effect of different partition sizes. One can notice that the remove operation takes half the
time of creating a group. Considering the storage footprint, the increase in memory use brought by using
smaller partition sizes is fairly small. For instance, 422KiB with 1000 users per partition vs. 105KiB with
4000 users per partition, both for groups with 1 million members.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of latencies for adding a user to a group is shown in Figure 4.8.
The operation has a constant time complexity for both IBBE-SGX and HE. As noted in Algorithm 2, the
user addition operation in IBBE-SGX can take two paths: to an existing partition or to a new one if all
the others are full. Such effect can be perceived in the plot from 80th percentile on. Besides, the HE add
operation is generally twice as fast as IBBE-SGX.
The client decryption performance is shown on the right-hand side in Figure 4.8. This operation is also
faster with HE. The difference of 2 orders of magnitude is caused by the quadratic cost of IBBE-SGX
decryption operation. We argue that a slower decryption time for IBBE-SGX can be acceptable in practice,
since it is preceded by metadata updates which involve cloud communication and is therefore minimised
when put into perspective. Additionally, the decryption cost is bounded to the partition size, no matter the
number of users in the group.
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Macro-benchmarks
To capture the performance of the IBBE-SGX scheme within a realistic scenario, we replay an access con-
trol trace based on the membership changes in the version control repository of the Linux Kernel [215]. We
derive the membership trace by considering one single group where the first commit of a user represents
his addition. Conversely, the last commit is interpreted as his removal from the group. This crafted trace
contains 43,468 membership operations that spawn across a period of 10 years, during which the group
size never exceeds 2803 users. We replay the generated trace sequentially for both HE and IBBE-SGX by
varying partition sizes. We measure the total time spent by the administrator to replay the whole trace
and the average user decryption time. Figure 4.9 shows the results.
Considering the administrator replay time, IBBE-SGX performs better when the partition size converges to
the number of users in the group because, in this case, the overhead of maintaining partitions is minimised.
Using a small partition size, e.g., 250, is 2.8× more inefficient when compared to partitions of 1000 users.
Compared to HE replay time, IBBE-SGX is 1 order of magnitude faster for partitions of 1250 users and
beyond. Contrarily, decryption time for IBBE-SGX grows quadratically according to the partition size
while in HE it remains constant. This highlights the IBBE-SGX’s trade-off caused by different partition
sizes. Satisfactory outcomes both in terms of administrator performance and user decryption times may
be hence achieved by finding a partition size (such as 750 users) that balances both metrics given the
application requirements (e.g., decryption times of 250ms).
In order to observe the impact of different workloads of group membership access control, we generated
a set of synthetic traces with incremental revocation rates. Namely, eleven traces consisting of 10,000
membership operations. Each trace is composed by randomly generated operations according to different
revocation rates. We replay the traces and measure the total time required by the administrator to perform
all membership changes and repeat the experiment for distinct partition sizes.
Results are shown in Figure 4.10. We observe a linear increase in the total time when incrementally
increasing the revocation ratio roughly up to 50%, i.e., in workloads dominated by constant-time addition
operations. After this point, the total time stabilizes and finally decreases when the revocation ratio is more
than 90%. This behaviour is caused by the merging of sparse partitions, which happens more frequently
with the increase of revocations. With fewer partitions, IBBE-SGX’s remove operation becomes faster,
therefore decreasing the total time.
In conclusion, although IBBE-SGX loses in performance for some operations (i.e., decryption and user
addition) when compared to HE, its gains arguably outweigh the drawbacks. Due to TEE usage, adminis-
trators are prevented from accessing group keys, and are therefore restricted to only perform membership
operations, i.e., they could not possibly inspect into groups’ shared content. Apart from the operations of
creating groups and removing users from groups, which are more performant in IBBE-SGX, the biggest
advantage comes with metadata reduction — orders of magnitude lower than HE, which saves resources
both in bandwidth and storage space. Although shared content is protected by this scheme, group mem-
bership information is not. This raises privacy concerns when the very fact of belonging to a group is
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sensitive information. In order to address this issue, we propose in the following section a scheme where
this is not leaked.
4.2 Anonymous file sharing
Besides shared data, identity of users may also be sensitive information. For instance, virtual data
rooms (VDRs) [216] are used for exchanging confidential documents during business acquisitions. Apart
from having to enforce access control, stakeholders’ identities must be protected, or else they could have
business strategies disclosed to competitors.
Confidential systems that focus on group communication offer anonymity guarantees by group key ex-
change methods [147], requiring all active members to be present and take part in a multi-phase protocol
(e.g., Diffie-Hellman) each time a key is derived. Such an approach is indeed suitable for instant group
communication, but impractical for file sharing that generally does not require online users. Theoretical
anonymous file sharing extensions have been proposed [149, 151] without ever turning into functional
systems.
Anonymous sharing of confidential content was practically addressed in an unsophisticated manner by
GNU privacy guard (GPG). It drops public keys from the resulting ciphertext, therefore keeping no refer-
ences to the identity of recipients. The drawback comes at decryption time, when recipients must perform
asymmetric decryption trials until the portion of the ciphertext matching their private key is found, if
any. Due to this, GPG works well for groups of few users but quickly becomes impractical for larger ones
(Section 2.5, Table 2.2).
To tackle that, we propose an anonymous access control scheme that leverages SGX for a narrow scope:
enforcing anonymity during the publishing operation (i.e., upon writing). Our scheme does not require
a TEE on the user side for performing the read operation, nor does it require that users connect to a
designated proxy. To demonstrate the feasibility of our solution, we propose a scalable system design
leveraging micro-services that can possibly scale depending on the workload.
By doing so, we achieve an improvement of three orders of magnitude when compared to state-of-the-art
anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE) [149]. Besides, our end-to-end implementation, A-Sky [18], can
scale to cope with a realistic amount of administrative and user operations.
In the remaining of the section, we (i) define a theoretical anonymous cryptographic access control ex-
tension that relies on TEEs for a minimal subset of operations (i.e., writes but not reads); (ii) propose an
end-to-end design that leverages micro-services which can scale according to the undergoing workloads;
and (iii) implement and evaluate the system, first in isolation showing its benefits against state-of-the-art
cryptographic schemes, and then by benchmarking its scaling capabilities and practical feasibility.
Model and use case
We consider users (humans or software agents) that are uniquely identified within the premises of an
organisation and share files. They are clustered into uniquely identifiable groups by organisation-specific
policies. We consider two functional categories: access control and content management. The first rep-
resents group membership operations (adding and removing users from groups) and is performed by
administrators, while the latter comprises file creation and consuming by group members (writes and
reads). A group member can perform one or both roles of writer or reader within one or multiple groups.
The cloud object storage holds uniquely-identified binary objects (e.g., Amazon S3).
We define four security properties for our confidential and anonymous file sharing system:
1. Confidentiality and authenticity: content of shared files is exclusively accessible by group mem-
bers.
2. Forward secrecy: compromising a group secret does not compromise past sharing sessions.
3. Recipients privacy: no recipient except the group administrator is able to know other recipients’
identities (i.e., readers).
4. Sender privacy: no recipient except the group administrator is able to know the sender’s identity
(i.e., writer).
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Figure 4.11: A-Sky architecture.
Revoked and external users behave arbitrarily. They may try to read shared content and identify group
members by intercepting, replaying, deciphering and altering exchanged messages (i.e., Dolev-Yao [217]
adversarial model). User anonymity is not only threatened by external adversaries, but also internally by
peer group members. Being so, active users that can rightfully decrypt group content may maliciously try
to infer their peers’ identities.
The storage provider is honest-but-curious, i.e., it accordingly provides its services while possibly trying
to inspect file contents and user identities (e.g., by traffic analysis). Revoked users may collude with the
cloud storage to get access to content shared after their revocation. Lastly, our privacy model enforces
anonymity guarantees solely with respect to user identities, and not to group sizes, content lengths and
traffic patterns.
Virtual data rooms (VDRs) [216], for instance, strictly control repositories of electronic documents for
company mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Thanks to VDRs, sellers, supporting parties who assist them
and bidders can confidentially exchange documents (e.g., terms and valuations) atop of untrusted remote
storage mediums. The seller acts as administrator and enforces access control. User roles are composed
by writers (sellers and supporting parties) and readers (bidders). As enforced by confidentiality agree-
ments, supporting parties operate in the seller’s interest, and remain unidentifiable from one another.
Similarly, bidders identities are concealed among themselves. As such, inner anonymity guarantees need
to be enforced within writers and readers, while outer anonymity has to withstand against any external
entity to the M&A process. Additionally, withdrawing bidders or misbehaving supporting parties can be
revoked by the seller, therefore becoming unable to access the document corpus any further.
4.2.1 A-Sky
A-Sky is composed of two components: a cryptographic key management and a data delivery protocol, both
designed to combine performance, data confidentiality and user anonymity. In order to avoid passing all
the system operations through a SGX monitor, we propose a design in which only writers are constrained
to pass through such a proxy (Figure 4.11, step Í). Readers consume confidential content without com-
municating with the TEE-enabled monitor (Ð), therefore reducing service time penalties.
The monitor acts as an outbound TA that authenticates all the content passing by. Being a proxy, it also
masks the identities of data writers. Moreover, since it executes in a TEE, traditional anonymous key
management schemes [149, 151] can count on a trusted entity for the key enveloping operation, therefore
allowing the usage of simpler and more efficient encryption schemes.
The monitor sits in between end-users and the cloud storage. It is split into two micro-services, whose
amount of instances can be independently adapted according to the undergoing load:
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(i) the AccessControl provides a cryptographic mechanism for storing and enforcing access control to
data.
Our cryptographic key management solution requires the connection to a TEE monitor. It gener-
ates keys that are securely shared with users at their first interaction with the monitor (Ê). This
allows the usage of symmetric encryption during the enveloping step, therefore taking advantage of
hardware acceleration and smaller ciphertexts while achieving equivalent security in comparison to
asymmetric approaches. The AccessControl ensure that only authorized entities can write and de-
crypt data, according to memberships established by an administrator (Ë). Based on this, envelopes
are generated with metadata that allow rightful users to decipher shared content (Ì).
(ii) the WriterShield acts as an outgoing proxy for write operations.
A-Sky requires that users write the encrypted shared content through the WriterShield service (Í),
which checks with the AccessControl whether a user has the permission to write in a given group
(Î). Being the case, it authenticates the outgoing content and does the writing itself (Ï). Since it
runs in an enclave, the cloud storage credentials are safely stored by the WriterShield service.
In traditional anonymous key sharing solutions [149], a TA sets up the key management system and ex-
tracts user private keys, while end users perform key enveloping and content encryption by employing
asymmetric cryptographic primitives, i.e., using the public keys of group members. Differently, we lever-
age TEEs and are therefore able to use more efficient symmetric constructs. This change also brings
advantages with respect to creating indexes that make de-enveloping more efficient, which will be de-
scribed later.
Before relying on any service of the A-Sky monitor, it is necessary to check whether the service is running
on a trustworthy Intel SGX platform and that the instances of the AccessControl and WriterShield are
genuine. This validation phase is performed by administrators and users using the typical SGX attestation
procedure and establishment of a secure channel (see Section 2.2.3).
System design and implementation
AccessControl
The AccessControl is responsible for generating and storing user keys, maintaining group membership
information and generating envelopes. Since it deals with sensitive information, its core runs entirely
within enclaves. All exchanges are encrypted with keys only known in the trusted environment: persisted
state is ciphered and stored in a database while external communication is done through TLS connections
terminated inside the enclave.
Its methods are invoked by regular users and administrators after secure channels are established upon
successful attestation processes. All these interactions happen through a TLS-encrypted REST-like pro-
tocol. Exchanges are represented in JavaScript object notation (JSON), for which we slightly modified a
C++ library [218]. In order to terminate TLS connections in the enclave, we use a port of OpenSSL for
SGX [219].
Users interact with the AccessControl either to obtain (i) their credentials, which are randomly generated
256bit secret shared keys that are stored by the monitor; or (ii) envelopes, to be attached to shared
encrypted files. Given a unique user identifier uid, the service generates a key uk and stores it in a
container keys of pairs 〈uid, uk〉, i.e., keys[uid] ← uk. Administrators, on the other hand, may create and
populate groups. Depending on granted access capabilities, users can be content readers, writers or
both. Such information is kept within persistent dictionaries, groupr and groupw, which store sets of users
belonging to each group identifier gid, e.g., groupw[gid] = {ua, ..., uz}. Only administrators can modify these
dictionaries.
Once groups are defined, metadata that grants access to files may be generated upon user requests. We
call this operation key enveloping, and it consists of encapsulating an access key such that only group
members with read permission are able to retrieve it. An envelope contains a file access key encrypted
several times, once per group member. Just like user keys, access keys are 32B long. We use AES Galois
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Algorithm 4: A-Sky: AccessControl key en-
veloping.
input : uid: writing user identity
gid: group identifier
k: file access key
output : envelope: ciphertext of the access
key
1 Procedure KeyEnveloping(uid, gid, k):
2 envelope← ∅
3 if uid ∈ groupw[gid] then
4 forall users u ∈ groupr[gid] do
5 usk ← keys[u]
6 (ck, t)← AE(usk, k)
7 envelope← envelope ∪ {(ck, t)}
8 return envelope
Algorithm 5: A-Sky: Key enveloping with effi-
cient decryption.
input : uid: writing user identity
gid: group identifier
k: file access key
output : envelope: ciphertext of the access key
1 Procedure KeyEnveloping(uid, gid, k):
2 envelope← ∅
3 if uid ∈ groupw[gid] then
4 nonce← Random
5 forall users u ∈ groupr[gid] do
6 usk ← keys[u]
7 lu ←H(usk || nonce)
8 (ck, t)← AE(usk, k)
9 envelope← envelope ∪ {(lu, ck, t)}
10 Sort(envelope) // by label lu
11 envelope← nonce || envelope
12 return envelope
counter mode (GCM), which generates a tag of 16B for integrity. Considering the addition of 12B for the
IV, each group member adds 60B to the envelope.
As shown in Algorithm 4, given the identity of the writing user uid, the group unique identifier gid, and the
file access key k, the algorithm produces a ciphertext called envelope. The AccessControl first checks if
the user uid has writing permission for the group gid (line 3). If it is the case, the envelope is built by the
union of ciphertexts and authentication tags resulted from encrypting the access key k using the secret
key usk of each group member u (lines 4-7).
We establish the following operations and notations for the Algorithms:
• E(k, p) → c and D(k, c) → p are symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms (e.g., AES-counter
mode (CTR)) using the key k, where p is plaintext and c is ciphertext;
• AE(k, p) → (c, t) and AD(k, c, t) → {p,⊥} are authenticated encryption and decryption algorithms
(e.g., AES-GCM). Besides encrypting, it also produces an authentication tag t that ensures the in-
tegrity of the ciphertext c under the key k. During decryption, in case the integrity check fails, no
plaintext is generated (⊥).
• S(PK−1, p) → σ and V (PK, p, σ) → {true, false} are digital signature and verification algorithms
(e.g., RSA-based or ECDSA) employing an asymmetric public/private key pair (PK and PK−1).
• H is a unidirectional cryptographic hash function, e.g., secure hash algorithm (SHA); and
• || is the literal concatenation operation.
As in traditional ANOBE schemes [149, 151], we propose a method that reduces user decryption times
by circumventing the need to perform O(n) key decryption trials (line 5 of Algorithm 8) by trading it off
for an increase in key enveloping times and in the envelope size (these trade-offs are evaluated later). To
this end, publicly known labels are appended to each user fragment in the envelope and used as its index.
Such fragments are lexicographically sorted by labels and can be hence located in logarithmic time with
respect to the group size (e.g., binary search). Consequently, users retrieve their keys performing one
single decryption of the located fragment.
Labels are computed as the SHA-224 hash of the user’s secret shared key (also known by the AccessControl
service) salted with a nonce. This adds 28B to the envelope for each group member. Our approach is
more efficient in comparison to traditional ones that perform modular exponentiations [149] or tag-based
encryption [151]. Algorithm 5 details the efficient variant of key enveloping with the creation of labels as
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Figure 4.12: Data model of user and group documents stored in MongoDB.
the salted hash of the user secret key (line 7) and the fragments sorting (line 10). The random nonce to
be used as salt is generated for each envelope (line 4) and publicly attached to it (line 12).
For implementation purposes, we split the AccessControl service into two components. The first, de-
veloped in C++ for a total of 3000 LoC, constitutes the entry-point for service requests. The other holds
users and groups metadata within a replicated database. For this purpose, we use a cluster of Mon-
goDB [220] servers with three replicas, since it offers out-of-the-box scale-out support and is well suited
to store denormalized documents. In order to perform queries against it from the first sub-component, we
ported the official MongoDB client library [221] to run inside an enclave. To secure the data stored in the
MongoDB back-end, each replica of the entry-point sub-component is provisioned with a master key Mk at
attestation time.
Since the storage back-end runs outside of enclaves, we make sure that every piece of stored data is either
hashed using the keyed-hash message authentication code HMAC-SHA256 or encrypted using AES-GCM.
We thus guarantee that providers that host MongoDB instances cannot infer any information about users
or groups (apart from the size of each group, which is already leaked in the envelopes). Figure 4.12 shows
how we organize data in MongoDB: one collection of users and other of groups. Users are stored once in
the users collection and again in each group of which they are member. This de-normalisation prevents
the service provider from inferring to which groups a user belongs, since the attributes of a given user
are hashed or encrypted differently for each representation (i.e., we use the name of the group as salt
when hashing, and different IVs when encrypting). To ensure integrity, each document is signed using
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC).
WriterShield
The WriterShield serves the purposes of (i) protecting cloud storage credentials; (ii) signing the ciphertext
content; (iii) hiding user identities by proxying their requests to the cloud storage; and (iv) generating
access tokens to the cloud storage to improve performance. When forwarding user requests to write files,
the WriterShield checks with the AccessControl whether the query comes from a user who has the correct
permissions.
User requests, including file contents, cross over the enclave boundary. This obviously slows down trans-
mission rates because of content re-encryptions and trusted/untrusted edge transitions. To tackle that, we
have also implemented a variant where temporary access tokens are given to users. Such tokens allow
them to upload content without crossing through the TEE. The ciphertext digest, however, still needs to
be authenticated by the signing key available in the WriterShield. In such case, users are responsible
for using appropriate proxies that can conceal the request’s origin. Also, communication with the cloud
storage must happen through encrypted connections. Even if the data files are encrypted, metadata can
leak group information along the network path.
We modelled the cloud storage component using Minio [222], a distributed object store that is fully com-
patible with the APIs of Amazon simple storage service (S3). As we need to perform operations in the
cloud storage from enclaves, we ported the Java version of the Minio client library to C++ so that it can
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Algorithm 6: A-Sky: WriterShield proxy
file.
input : f: file reference
uid: writing user identity
gid: group identifier
C: file ciphertext
A: AccessControl instance
1 Procedure ProxyFile(f , uid, gid, C, A):
2 if uid ∈ A.groupw[gid] then
3 σ ← S(PK−1TA, C)
4 UploadToCloud(f, C, σ)
Algorithm 7: A-Sky: User write file to group.
input : f: file reference
uid: writing user identity
gid: group identifier
P : file plaintext
A: AccessControl instance
W: WriterShield instance
1 Procedure WriteToGroup(f , uid, gid, P , A,W):
2 fk ← Random // file access key
3 envelope← A.KeyEnveloping(uid, gid, fk)
// i.e., Alg. 4 or Alg. 5
4 cipher ← E(fk, P )
5 C ← envelope || cipher
6 W.P roxyF ile(f, uid, gid, C,A)
// i.e., Alg. 6
run together with the WriterShield. These modifications account for 4000 LoC of C++. Without accounting
for external libraries, the WriterShield consists of 800 LoC.
As the WriterShield is the sole service possessing the write credentials for the cloud provider, it constitutes
a necessary hop for uploading the file: either for relaying the upload operation to the cloud storage
(Algorithm 6) or for obtaining the token and signature of the file content. The proxying routine first
verifies that the invoking user has write capabilities for the desired group (line 2). If positive, the content
is authenticated (line 3) by using long term credentials PK−1TA provisioned during attestation. The file
ciphertext and the corresponding signature are then uploaded to the cloud (line 4).
Users
Users (i) get their secret key from the AccessControl; (ii) write shared content; and (iii) read content
shared with them. The write operation is shown in Algorithm 7. The writing user first randomly creates a
file access key fk (line 2) and asks the AccessControl service A to envelope this key (line 3) for the group
gid, so that it can be anonymously deciphered by any member of it. He then encrypts the file using fk (line
4) and concatenates the two ciphertexts, key envelope and encrypted file (line 5), before transmitting the
result to the WriterShield, so that it is uploaded to the cloud storage (line 6).
A-Sky satisfies the lazy revocation model [223], where a revoked user can continue accessing data created
prior to revocation but not beyond that. Additionally, past data becomes inaccessible upon the first suc-
ceeding write to the same resource. The revocation is triggered by an administrator removing the user’s
id from the groupr and groupw access lists. Later, when new content is published in that group, a new
random key is derived for encrypting the content and a new envelope is attached to it (Algorithm 7, lines
2-3). The revoked user’s key will not be included in the envelope, and therefore he will be unable to access
the new group key along with the newly published content.
Users read files according to Algorithm 8. First, they download the ciphertext package from the cloud
storage (line 2), that can be validated by the signature check (line 3). In case the signature is valid,
the user then splits the package between the key envelope and the file ciphertext (line 4). Next, the user
iterates over user fragments in the envelope and tries to decrypt each of them with his secret key usk (lines
5-6). If successful, the obtained file access key can be used to symmetrically decrypt the file ciphertext
(lines 7-8).
In case the indexed envelopes are used, the user read operation (Algorithm 9) requires the label recon-
struction (line 5) followed by a binary search for the corresponding envelope fragment (line 6). Once
located, the file access key is retrieved and the shared file is deciphered (lines 8-9).
As part of our prototype implementation, we developed a full-featured client in 1200 LoC of Kotlin. The
client can be set up to operate in all possible configurations of A-Sky: keys in linear or indexed envelopes,
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Algorithm 8: A-Sky: User read file.
input : f: file reference
usk: user secret key
output : P : plaintext file content
1 Procedure ReadFile(f , usk):
2 (C, σ)← DownloadFromCloud(f)
3 if V (PKTA, C, σ) = true then
4 envelope, cipher ← split(C)
5 forall pairs (kc, t) in envelope do
6 fk ← AD(usk, kc, t)
7 if fk 6= ⊥ then
8 P ← D(fk, cipher)
9 return P
10 return ⊥
Algorithm 9: A-Sky: User read file with efficient
decryption.
input : f: file reference
usk: user secret key
output : P : plaintext file content
1 Procedure ReadFile(f , usk):
2 (C, σ)← DownloadFromCloud(f)
3 if V (PKTA, C, σ) = true then
4 nonce, envelope, cipher ← split(C)
5 lu ←H(usk || nonce)
6 (kc, t)← BinarySearch(lu, envelope)
7 if (kc, t) 6= ⊥ then
8 fk ← AD(usk, kc, t)
9 P ← D(fk, cipher)
10 return P
11 return ⊥
writes through the WriterShield, or through a standard proxy onto a Minio or Amazon S3 storage back-
end with short-lived token-based authentication. Kotlin’s full interoperability with the Java ecosystem
allows us to easily integrate with the Java microbenchmark harness (JMH) [224] and Yahoo! cloud serving
benchmark (YCSB) [225] frameworks that we use to perform the evaluation of A-Sky.
Evaluation
We evaluate the performance and scalability of our solution by first conducting micro-benchmarks. Then,
we use the well-known YCSB [225] test suite to evaluate the overall system performance. All our exper-
iments run on a cluster of 5 SGX-enabled Dell PowerEdge R330 servers, each having an Intel Xeon E3-
1270 v6 processor and 64GiB of memory. Additionally, we use 3 Dell PowerEdge R630 dual-socket servers,
each equipped with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2683 v4 CPUs and 128GiB of RAM. One of the latter machines is split
in 3 virtual machines (VMs) to handle the roles of Kubernetes master, Minio server and benchmarking
client (when a second client is needed). SGX machines use the latest available microcode revision 0x8e,
and have the Hyper-threading feature disabled to mitigate the Foreshadow security flaw [78].
Communication between machines is handled by a Gigabit Ethernet network. All our components can
be independently replicated to provide availability, fault tolerance or cope with the load. Therefore, we
have packaged our micro-services as individual containers, which we then orchestrate using an SGX-
aware adaptation of Kubernetes [8]. When error bars are shown, they represent the 95% confidence
interval.
Cryptographic scheme
We first isolate and measure the performance of the underlying cryptographic primitive of A-Sky and
compare it to the ANOBE scheme defined by Barth et al. [149] (BBW ). Our implementation of BBW uses
an elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme as the indistinguishability under non-adaptive and adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA)2 public key cryptosystem. Both key materials (i.e., keys, curve) are
chosen to meet 256bit of equivalent security strength [226]. We also implement the efficient decryption
of BBW as suggested in the paper by relying on the DH problem hardness, however in the context of
elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH).
Table 4.3 shows throughputs for cryptographic key enveloping and de-enveloping considering that user
keys are available. Apart from the experiment with efficient de-enveloping (where only one decryption is
performed), units are in number of group members handled per second. While BBW can create envelopes
at the rate of 330 members per second, A-Sky sustain rates 3 orders of magnitude bigger. Likewise,
performance is improved by 2 orders of magnitude during de-enveloping operation. Such considerable
difference is due to the performance gap between asymmetric and symmetric encryption primitives.
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Table 4.3: Throughput comparison between A-Sky cryptographic scheme and BBW .
Enveloping De-enveloping Enveloping De-enveloping
[|G|/s] [|G|/s] Efficient [|G|/s] Efficient [µs]
BBW 3.3× 102 5 × 103 3 × 102 <4
A-Sky 1.9× 106 2.5× 106 1.2× 106 <4
Ratio 5.8× 103 5 × 102 4 × 103 n/a
|G|/s: group members per second
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Figure 4.13: Throughput for administrative actions in the AccessControl: (i) adding or revoking users
to/from groups of various sizes, and (ii) creating users.
BBW provides an efficient decryption mode that achieves less than 4µs for the largest group size. How-
ever, this comes at the cost of a lower throughput during enveloping of 300 members per second, or 90%
of the standard version. A-Sky is able to support the same decryption speed with indexed envelopes. In
contrast, we achieve the rate of 1.2 million members per second when building envelopes (63% of standard
version), three orders of magnitude faster than BBW . Furthermore, A-Sky produces ciphertexts of 60B and
88B per member for standard and efficient modes, respectively, whereas BBW produces 126B and 154B
for the equivalent methods.
Scalability
In order to evaluate the throughput of operations performed by administrators when varying the number
of AccessControl instances, we delegate to Kubernetes the distribution of requests among such instances,
where a service is exposed. Figure 4.13 shows the results. The scalability of adding users to a group or
revoking their access rights is limited, as these operations require one a read-modify-write (RMW) cycle to
check and update the signature of the group document. The larger the group, the more time the operation
takes as each signature encompasses every user within the group, e.g., we reach an average of only
8.8ops/s for groups with 10 000 users and 135ops/s for groups containing a single user. This effect could be
mitigated by, e.g., batching together multiple operations on a given group. Diversely, the operation that
creates users scales linearly with the number of AccessControl instances, allowing more than 5000 user
creations per second with 10 replicas.
Next, we look at the number of keys that can be included in an envelope per unit of time, also when varying
the number of instances of the AccessControl service. A close-to-linear trend can be observed according
to number of instances in Figure 4.14, showing that this operation also benefits from horizontal scalability.
For groups of 1000 to 10 000 members, the throughput ceases to increase with more than 7 instances as
the MongoDB backend becomes a bottleneck. In smaller groups, the performance is diminished due to the
overhead associated with each request (e.g., network connection, REST formatting, enclave transitions),
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Figure 4.14: A-Sky: Throughput of enveloping a message for groups of various sizes with varying instances
of the AccessControl micro-service.
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Figure 4.15: A-Sky: Throughput vs. latency of enveloping a message for groups of various sizes.
although it benefits from more AccessControl instances. Additionally, we ran the same experiment with
the indexing feature turned on. For groups of 10 000 users, the throughput is reduced by 6% to 26%,
having a marginal impact on smaller groups where the performance mostly depends on fixed costs.
We also evaluated the latency of the enveloping operation by increasing the throughput until saturation,
again with indexing turned on and off. Looking at Figure 4.15, we notice that for groups which are larger
than 100 users, latency increases linearly according to the group size, while the saturation throughput
decreases linearly.
To evaluate the performance of the WriterShield, we conduct two experiments. In the first, data written
to the cloud is proxied through the TEE, while in the other the WriterShield is solely used for generating
temporary cloud storage access tokens, with write operations being proxied through a NGINX server in
TCP reverse-proxy mode. In order to establish a baseline, we also wrote directly to the cloud storage
service, without intermediaries. Results are shown in Figure 4.16. The bar plot on the left-hand side
shows that for files of 1kB and 10kB the difference in performance is negligible, whereas bigger files
cause more performance degradation when using the token feature. When the WriterShield is used to
forward data instead (right-hand side), we see that the throughput increases with the number of service
instances until it plateaus at about the same values as with the tokenized variant. For files of 1MB, adding
WriterShield instances renders no benefit. This effect happens due to the saturation of enclave resources
acting as a TLS bridge between clients and the cloud storage server. Overall, using tokens would be the
most efficient approach, although in this case the client would be responsible for using adequate proxies
in order to hide its identity from the cloud storage.
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Figure 4.17: A-Sky: User throughput observed by our YCSB-based macro-benchmark, with various file
access patterns, varying file sizes, and additioning simultaneous administrative operations.
Macro-benchmarks
To observe the behaviour of A-Sky under specific conditions of data serving systems, we use YCSB [225]
workloads A (update heavy1 50/50), B (read heavy 95/5) and C (read only). Additionally, we include a
write-only workload in our tests. As our system is not capable of direct-access writes, updates are replaced
by RMW operations. We implemented an interface layer to link the benchmarking tool to A-Sky and ran
each workload with 3 different file sizes: 1KiB, 100KiB and 1MiB. We simulate 100 000 operations across
64 concurrent users and report the achieved throughput of user operations. Additionally, we activate a
concurrent instance of YCSB that simulates 8 administrators doing group membership operations at three
different rates: 0, 50 and 100ops/s. The administrative operations are equally distributed between user
additions and revocations, so that the user database size stays more-or-less constant.
Results are shown in Figure 4.17. Overall, we notice that user throughputs are not influenced by con-
current administrative operations, as each type of operation involves separate components of our archi-
tecture. For files of 1KiB, an increasing proportion of writes causes a performance degradation from
4100ops/s (read-only) down to 628ops/s (write-only). For larger files (1MiB), the difference is less dra-
matic, with throughputs going from 320ops/s to 155ops/s. Therefore, fixed costs are dominant when writ-
ing small files (e.g., enveloping the file key), but are increasingly amortized for larger ones. We can also
observe that the throughput in B/s (i.e., multiplying the result in ops/s to the file size) is largely superior
1nomenclature used by YCSB: https://github.com/brianfrankcooper/YCSB/wiki/Core-Workloads
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for larger files, as we have already noticed in Figure 4.16. In a nutshell, we retain that the end-user exper-
ience offered by A-Sky is not influenced by concurrent administrative operations, and that the overhead of
the additional operations required for writing become smaller for larger files.
4.3 Summary
Diverging from intensive data processing protection within TEEs, this chapter rather focused on the gen-
eration and management of shared keys, which are obviously very sensitive information. More specifically,
we were interested in schemes that allow users to share content in a secure manner. Besides guarantee-
ing data confidentiality and integrity, we also enforced access control, i.e., being sure that only rightful
users are able to read or modify shared content. The trusted environment brings new design perspectives
regarding cryptographic protocols since shielded computation may operate on computationally simpler
yet secure encryption constructs. We took advantage of this property by proposing and evaluating two
original systems.
IBBE-SGX is a cryptographic access control extension that derives cuts in the computational complexity of
IBBE thanks to secure enclaves. Such simplification came from the fact that the IBBE encryption operation
took place in a TEE and could therefore use a master key that otherwise could not be available in untrusted
environment. In such case, a much more complex operation involving a large public key would take place.
Turning IBBE into a viable solution brought along its advantages regarding little metadata generation and
the ability to dismiss the usage of a PKI.
Since we assumed that a variety of client devices should be able to access IBBE-SGX, possibly with no
TEE available, the same encryption simplification could not be done for decryption. To mitigate the high
performance cost, we proposed a group partitioning mechanism such that the complexity was bound to
a fixed constant partition size rather than the size of the whole group. We conducted experiments with
real and synthetic benchmarks, demonstrating that IBBE-SGX is efficient both in terms of computation
and storage, even when processing large and dynamic workloads of membership operations. Apart from
producing group metadata six orders of magnitude shorter than the traditional HE, which makes it more
efficient both in terms of storage and bandwidth, our construction also performed membership changes at
rates one order of magnitude faster than HE. At the same time, administrators cannot infer user keys and
snoop into sensitive shared content.
Next, we introduced A-Sky, an end-to-end system that brings the additional guarantee of anonymity among
group members. A-Sky leverages a TEE intermediary exclusively for the content sharing operation, while
users can consume the shared content by reading it directly from cloud storage providers. We incorpor-
ated the cryptographic construction into a scalable system design that leverages micro-services that can
possibly scale according to the undergoing access control and data sharing workloads. Results indicated
that our cryptographic scheme is faster than state-of-the-art ANOBE schemes by 3 orders of magnitude
and can serve groups of 10 000 users with a throughput of 100 000 key derivations per second per service
instance.
75

Chapter 5
Privacy enforcement
Until now, we described the design of different kinds of services in order to protect data owned by their
clients, whether they be at rest or being processed. These techniques are useful when one has access
to the development stages of a system. However, sometimes users must rely on a service provided by
third parties, who in turn may not be able or willing to change it. In such cases, privacy concerns may
arise. Despite possible legal agreements, there is no fail-proof way of being sure that service providers do
not stealthily track user habits or preferences while accordingly servicing their requests. The reasons for
doing so can range from commercial (e.g., targeted advertisements) to espionage (e.g., by governments).
To prevent that, we identify in this chapter ways of using trusted execution environments (TEEs) for
privacy assurance.
We chose the domain of web search as it is the most prominent instance of such scenario. In Section 5.1.1,
we describe a centralised proxy that obfuscates queries in order to make it hard for search engines to
keep accurate user profiles. As any centralised approach, it suffers from the fact of simultaneously being
a bottleneck and a single point of failure. In response to such disadvantage, we propose in Section 5.2.1
a decentralised peer-to-peer (P2P) solution that is better in terms of performance and fault tolerance and
optimal in terms of accuracy.
5.1 Private web search
Web search is the most widely used online service, with billions of queries sent on a daily basis to Google
alone. Indeed, search engines have become an essential service for finding content on the Internet. By
regularly querying these services, though, users disclose large amounts of personal data (e.g., [227, 228]).
Queries are generally stored by search engines to analyse user behaviour and to personalize responses ac-
cording to profiles inferred from past queries [229, 230]. Additionally, the economic model of many online
services heavily relies on personalized advertising [231]. Numerous studies point, however, that the col-
lection of search queries opens a number of privacy threats as they possibly disclose sensitive information
about individuals (e.g., age, gender, religion, political preferences, sexual orientation) [232].
To limit personal information disclosure, solutions enabling users to query search engines in a privacy-
preserving manner have been proposed. They can be classified in categories, which enforce:
1. unlinkability between users and their queries.
This is done by hiding identities of users through anonymous communication (e.g., the onion router
(Tor) [154], Dissent [157, 158] and RAC [156]). Systems in such category are limited for two reasons:
• they typically suffer from poor performance because of the heavy cryptographic mechanisms on
which they rely;
• despite ensuring the requester’s anonymity, it has been shown [161] that the actual content of
search queries may be sufficient to link them back to the originating users’ profiles by running
re-identification attacks [162].
2. indistinguishability between user profiles and queries.
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To that end, they obfuscate user profiles in such a way that the search engine cannot distinguish
between users’ real interests and fake ones (e.g., Track me not [164], GooPIR [165]). These ap-
proaches generally operate by sending fake queries on behalf of the user.
It has been shown [162], however, that search engines may easily distinguish fake from real traffic
due to external resources used for generating fake queries (e.g., RDF Site Summary (RSS) feeds,
dictionaries).
3. a combination between unlinkability and indistinguishability.
The only existing solution of which we are aware, PEAS [166], assumes a weak adversarial model of
non-colluding proxy servers.
4. private information retrieval (PIR) (e.g., [233, 234]).
These approaches build specialized search engines based on cryptographic techniques enabling to
answer a user request without having access to its content. These techniques are, however, still
unpractical due to their limited performance. Response times can reach seconds for very large data
stores [153], which is the case of search engines.
Based on these considerations, it appears that in order to fully support privacy-preserving Web search one
must provide a protocol that (i) enables the protection of requesters’ identities in a realistic adversarial
model; and (ii) provides effective indistinguishability with realistic fake queries, i.e., difficult to distinguish
from real ones.
5.1.1 X-Search
X-Search [20] consists of a proxy that enables Internet users to access Web search engines in a privacy-
preserving manner. Instead of submitting queries directly to the search engine, a user sends them through
an encrypted channel to the X-Search proxy, where the connection endpoint lies inside a software guard
extensions (SGX) enclave. Once in there, queries are decrypted and manipulated in plain-text form before
being forwarded to the search provider. Such manipulation involves the generation of an obfuscated
query by aggregating k random past queries and the original one using the logical OR operator. As a
consequence, the search engine is not able to distinguish which one is the original query. Due to the
obfuscation, results returned by the search engine are mixed. The X-Search proxy therefore filters them
and forwards only the results related to the initial query back to the user.
The X-Search protocol involves three entities:
1. the client, whose code and platform are trusted;
2. the X-Search proxy, which runs on cloud platforms and may behave in a Byzantine manner [235], i.e.,
they are subject to failures, bugs or malicious behaviour; and
3. the search engine, which is honest-but-curious [236], i.e., it correctly behaves when fetching answers
to requests, while possibly collecting and exploiting the information they receive from clients. We
also assume that search engines may run re-identification attacks (e.g., [237]) in order to associate
the received request to a known user profile. Besides, they may collude with proxy nodes (e.g., Tor
relays or X-Search proxies) in order to learn more about users.
Protocol overview
X-Search combines two complementary schemes: unlinkability and indistinguishability. The former hides
the identity of requesting users; the latter their queries. Figure 5.1 depicts the architecture and execution
flow of X-Search. The user interacts with the search engine through a X-Search proxy hosted on untrusted
public cloud services and deployed on physical SGX-enabled nodes. As the proxy intermediates the contact
between search engine and users, it hides their identities (i.e., IP addresses). It is also in charge of
obfuscating user queries and filtering the results returned from the search engine before forwarding them
back to requesting users.
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Figure 5.1: X-Search architecture and execution flow.
Initially, the user sends the query Qu to the X-Search proxy (Ê). The proxy then generates a new obfuscated
query by retrieving k random past queries Qp1, ..., Qpk (Ë), which are aggregated to the original Qu in
a random order with the logical OR operator. Next, the proxy stores the initial query in the table of
past queries (Ì) and sends the obfuscated one to the search engine (Í). Unlike other indistinguishability
protocols, X-Search reuses past queries as fake queries. Since they were sent by real users, they are
effectively indistinguishable from the current user’s real request. This is possible because past queries
are securely stored inside the TEE with no correlation to the identity of their originating issuers. This
database is therefore shielded against exploitation by malicious agents.
As the obfuscated query can alter the information returned by the search engine (Î) by mixing results
for the original and fake queries, the proxy node performs a filtering step. It consists of removing all the
results which are not associated to the original query. Finally, the remaining results are returned to the
user (Ï).
The X-Search proxy does not maintain individual profile structures associated to each user. Instead, it only
updates a table containing the past queries. Moreover, the user sends queries to the proxy through an
encrypted tunnel terminated inside the SGX enclave. Consequently, the protection of the original query is
ensured from the client until inside the TEE of the proxy node. From the proxy to the search engine, the
original query is protected thanks to the obfuscation mechanism.
Implementation details
The search unlinkability provided by X-Search relies on a query broker that runs within the client’s domain.
It consists of a local daemon process executing alongside the client’s Web browser and is in charge of the
SGX attestation step (see Section 2.2.3). When users issue a Web search query, their Web clients first
connect to this local broker, which encrypts the request and forwards the cipher to an X-Search node
hosted in an untrusted cloud provider. The X-Search proxy decrypts the cipher, generates the obfuscated
query, and securely stores the original one in the SGX reserved memory. When the search engine sends
back the response to the X-Search node, relevant results are extracted and delivered backwards to the
broker. Finally, the broker decrypts the results and delivers it to the Web client.
To enforce indistinguishability, X-Search relies on an obfuscation mechanism that hides user queries among
multiple fake ones (Algorithm 10), so that an adversary cannot distinguish them. More precisely, the
original query is aggregated with k randomly chosen fake queries connected by logical OR operators
(lines 1–8). Once the obfuscated query is generated, the initial query is stored in the history (line 9).
These fake queries come from the table of past requests maintained in the private memory of the X-Search
proxy (H). Due to the enclave page cache (EPC) limitation of SGX enclaves (see Section 2.2.2), we limit
the size of H, so that a sliding window of the most recent queries are exploited. Since they are real, each
sub-query of the obfuscated request can potentially be mapped to an existing user profile by an adversary
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Algorithm 10: X-Search: Query obfuscation.
input : Qu: initial query
H = {Q0, ..., Qm}: query history
k: number of fake queries
output: Qobf : obfuscated query
1 Qobf ← ∅
2 index ← random(k + 1)
3 while sizeof(Qobf ) <= k do
4 if index = 0 then
5 Qobf ← OR(Qobf , Qu)
6 else
7 Qobf ← OR(Qobf , H[random(m)])
8 index ← index − 1
9 H ← H ∪Qu
10 return Qobf
Algorithm 11: X-Search: Results filtering.
input : Qu: initial query,
fakes = {Qp1, . . . , Qpk}: aggregated queries,
R: set of results for Qu ∨Qp1 ∨ · · · ∨Qpk.
output: R¯: filtered results
1 R¯← ∅
2 q+ ← Qu ∪ fakes
3 for r ∈ R do
4 smax ← −∞
5 for qi ∈ q+ do
6 score[qi]← nbCommonWords(qi, r)
7 smax ← max(smax, score[qi])
8 if score[Qu] = smax then
9 R¯← R¯ ∪ {r}
10 return R¯
conducting re-identification attacks. The attacker would thereby introduce some noise in their source,
which would make it less accurate and consequently hinder re-identification attempts.
In spite of that, the obfuscation mechanism has an impact on the results returned by the search engine.
This is due to the fact that they contain a mix of answers corresponding to (k + 1) queries (i.e., k fake
queries and the real one). The X-Search proxy takes this into account by filtering the returned results, so
that those which are not related to the initial query are removed (Algorithm 11). For each response r from
the result set (line 3), the algorithm determines whether it corresponds to the initial query based on a
similarity score assigned to each query qi that composed the obfuscated request q+ (line 5). Such score is
calculated as the amount of common words (nbCommonWords) between the query qi and the result r under
evaluation (title and description—line 6). A result r is considered related to the initial query, and hence
forwarded to the user, if the original query Qu has the largest score smax (lines 8–9).
To evaluate our system, we implemented in C++ a fully-functioning prototype based on Intel SGX software
development kit (SDK) (v1.8) libraries and tools [42]. In order to avoid costly trusted/untrusted mode
transitions, we limit the enclave interface to essential operations that deal with sensitive information (2
enclave calls (ecalls) and 4 outside calls (ocalls)). Concerning EPC memory consumption, an excessive
amount could potentially be caused by the management of the past queries inside the enclave’s protected
memory. We evaluate this aspect later on.
Experimental setup and metrics
To assess X-Search, we use a real world Web search dataset from America online (AOL) query logs [167].
It contains approximately 21 million queries, issued by 650,000 unique users between March and May
2006. Our evaluation takes into account the 100 most active users (as in [166]), since they are the most
exposed to an adversary that aims at discovering their identities. This is simply because they disclose more
information to search engines, and therefore allow for meaningful profile histories. In order to build these
user profiles, we split the dataset in training (two thirds of queries) and testing sets (one third).
We compare the robustness and quality of X-Search against two systems: Tor [154] and PEAS [166]; and
a baseline solution, where users directly send their queries to the search engine without any protection.
Tor provides unlinkability by leveraging several layers of encryption to hide user identities. PEAS, in
turn, combines unlinkability—by relying on a trusted proxy— and indistinguishability— by obfuscating the
original request with fake queries in random order. These fake queries are generated from the graph of
co-occurrence between terms in the user history.
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We assess X-Search along three dimensions: privacy (i.e., the protection of users’ data), accuracy (i.e., the
results’ quality), and performance (i.e., X-Search’s efficiency in terms of throughput, latency and memory
usage). To evaluate privacy, we leverage SimAttack [162] a re-identification attack that outperforms pre-
vious approaches. To run it, we assume the attacker holds a set of user profiles built at the learning stage.
Next, X-Search intermediates the requests (testing dataset) between users and search engine. For each
obfuscated query the attacker receives, it tries to identify both the requesting user and the original query
among fake ones.
SimAttack is based on a similarity metric s(q, Pu) that corresponds to the proximity between a query q and
a user profile Pu. Such profile is assumed to have been built by the adversary before users started using
any privacy protection. In our evaluation, Pu contains queries that belong to the training set and were
issued by a user u. The metric accounts for the cosine similarity of q to all queries belonging to the user
profile Pu and returns the exponential smoothing of these similarities. We empirically set the smoothing
factor to 0.5 as this provided better re-identification rates. Considering one obfuscated request q+, the
function s(q, Pu) is applied for every pair composed of the sub-query q ∈ q+ and user profiles. A successful
match happens when a single pair 〈q, Pu〉 achieves a score beyond a given threshold. Otherwise, the attack
is considered as failed for the obfuscated query q+ under scrutiny.
Once we obtain all successful matches, we assess privacy by establishing a metric called re-identification
rate, which is defined as follow:
re-identification rate =
|Qid|
|Q| (5.1)
where Qid is the set of correctly re-identified queries: both the initial query and the associated user; while
Q is the set of original queries sent by users. This metric is defined between [0, 1] where 0 represents
the best solution (i.e., no re-identification) and 1 represents the worse solution (i.e., all queries are re-
identified).
Since the obfuscation mechanism impacts the results returned by search engines, we evaluate the capacity
of X-Search to filter responses not related to the initial query, i.e., the results’ accuracy. This is done
by comparing the search engine’s reply (first 20 results) for a non-obfuscated query and the X-Search’s
filtered results. For each value of k (i.e., the number of fake queries), we pick a random subset of the
testing workload composed of 100 queries. Our experiments use the Bing search engine1. At the time of
our work, Bing supported only single words with the OR operator, albeit our dataset comprises multi-word
real queries. To circumvent that, we simulated the answer to an obfuscated query by merging the result
sets of each individual request.
The accuracy evaluation consists in comparing the lists of results associated to the original query Ror and
the ones returned by X-Search Rxs, after obfuscation and filtering. We consider precision (i.e., correctness)
and recall (i.e., completeness) as defined below. Both metrics are within the interval [0, 1]. The best
accuracy is provided with precision and recall at 1.
precision =
|Ror ∩Rxs|
|Rxs| recall =
|Ror ∩Rxs|
|Ror| (5.2)
To evaluate X-Search performance, we consider throughput, memory usage and round-trip time. The
throughput (requests/second) allows the assessment of X-Search’s scalability, since it indicates its capabil-
ity to operate under adequate response times even with a growing number of requesting users. Memory
usage measurement, in turn, allows for verifying when the EPC would become saturated, and therefore
incur in larger overheads. Finally, we measured response times considering the complete chain, including
the search engine delays, so that we could compare our proposal to alternative approaches.
1queries are directed to http://www.bing.com/search=q?
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Figure 5.2: X-Search reduces the number of de-anonymized queries compared to PEAS.
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Figure 5.3: Results returned by X-Search are close to results associated to the original query.
Evaluation
X-Search was deployed on a machine with Intel® Core™ i7-6700 processor [196] and 8GiB random-access
memory (RAM) running on Ubuntu 14.04.1 long term support (LTS) (kernel 4.2.0-42-generic). First, we
evaluate the capacity of X-Search to preserve user privacy and to improve user protection when compared
to PEAS. To this end, we measure re-identification rates when leveraging SimAttack, as previously de-
scribed. Figure 5.2 shows the results for PEAS and X-Search when varying the number of fake requests
k. When k = 0, the evaluated systems enforce only unlinkability (e.g., Tor). In such case, i.e., without
query obfuscation, the adversary is able to re-associate almost 40% of the queries to their originating user
by making use of the profiles established with training data. This confirms that unlikability alone is not
enough to effectively protect users against re-identification attacks.
Adding only one fake query drops this re-identification rate to 16% for X-Search and almost 20% for PEAS.
This difference comes from the generation process of fake queries. Using real past queries makes X-Search
more robust against re-identification attacks since all sub-queries can be mapped to past queries of other
users, which creates confusion from the attacker’s perspective. Contrarily, generating fake queries on the
basis of co-occurrence of terms does not ensure PEAS to create the same kind of disorientation. The re-
identification rate decreases according to the augmentation of k and X-Search provides better protection
than PEAS in all scenarios. Such improvement varies from 23% for k = 1 to 35% for k = 7.
X-Search’s accuracy is measured by quantifying its ability to remove results related to fake queries and
keeping those resulted from the original query. Figure 5.3 depicts precision and recall according to raising
values for k. As expected, both decrease as k increases, i.e., more noise in the input causes more incorrect
and incomplete outputs. Nevertheless, results returned to users are fairly accurate. For instance, the
recall value for k = 2 is 87%, i.e., only 13% of the results delivered by X-Search are not part of the set
returned by the search engine if the original query was sent directly. For the same value of k, precision
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Figure 5.5: X-Search memory usage: The memory allowed to a single enclave can fit more than 1M queries
before hitting the SGX EPC usable memory limit.
is equal to 74%, meaning that 26% of the results returned to users are noise introduced by fake queries.
These numbers confirm that X-Search preserves the quality of results.
With regard to system performance, we begin by observing the throughput × latency relation of the X-
Search proxy. By iteratively increasing the rate at which requests are performed, we measure the latency
to handle each request until it becomes too high. To do so, we use the wrk2 [238] workload generator
without actually hitting the web search engine, so that we understand the saturation point of the SGX-
based proxy in isolation. We compare X-Search against Tor and PEAS in similar conditions. From the
usability perspective, unlike PEAS and Tor which require custom clients to forge messages that follow their
protocol, X-Search can be used with third-party clients issuing regular hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)
requests, such as wget or curl.
Figure 5.4 presents these results. We observe that X-Search scales well, being capable of serving up to
25 000 req/s with sub-second latencies. Differently, PEAS deteriorates much faster, with only 1000 req/s
being served with sub-second latency. In our experiments, Tor performs very poorly: handling as few
as 100 req/s at an average reply latency of 8.86 s. This result confirms our implementation to be fast and
scalable.
Next, we investigate how much memory is required by the obfuscation scheme. For this experiment, we
used a larger dataset. Instead of considering only the 100 most active users, we use all the 6 millions
unique queries available in the AOL dataset. To trace and profile the heap memory, we leverage Valgrind’s
Massif [239]. Figure 5.5 presents the results. Observing the trend of the X-Search curve, it is clear that
the EPC size is largely sufficient to store at least 1 million queries, a number that can support with ease
the obfuscation mechanism.
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Figure 5.6: User-perceived web search round-trip time for 100 queries with X-Search, over the Tor network
and directly contacting the web search engine.
Finally, we evaluate the end-to-end latency of a Web search query from submission to results’ reception.
Due to limiting policies adopted by Bing’s search engine, we only issue 100 queries, picked at random in
the AOL dataset. Our experiments were done in May 2017, and repeated for weeks in order to mitigate
possible occasional disturbances in the service provider. We compare the observed round-trip time for
three scenarios: (i) client directly contacts the search engine with no privacy guarantees; (ii) queries
are routed through Tor network; and (iii) using X-Search. Figure 5.6 presents the results as a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of measured end-to-end latencies. We observe that X-Search allows for much
faster replies in comparison to Tor. X-Search’s median response time is 0.58 s, and the 99th percentile is
0.87 s. Tor, on the other hand, renders way worse results from the user perspective: the round-trip median
time using onion routers was 1.06 s, while the 99th percentile reached 3 s. The Tor network largely exceeds
well-known usability margins [240], while X-Search offers a usable yet secure browsing experience.
To summarize, we presented X-Search, a novel architecture to allow privacy-preserving Web searches that
exploits Intel SGX to operate under stronger adversarial models than existing systems in literature. We
contribute with a novel query obfuscation mechanism and the implementation choices of our full prototype.
The assessment is made from three perspectives: privacy, accuracy, and performance. We analytically
show that X-Search offers more vigorous privacy guarantees than its competitors as it operates under
a stronger adversarial model. Furthermore, we experimentally demonstrate using a real dataset that X-
Search is more resilient to a state-of-the-art re-identification attack than PEAS by 30% in average. From the
accuracy perspective, we show that the negative impact of X-Search’s obfuscation scheme remains limited.
Lastly, from the performance perspective, we show that X-Search outperforms previous privacy-preserving
systems both in terms of latency and throughput.
5.2 TEE in the client-side
Although X-Search (see Section 5.1.1) advances private Web search in some aspects, centralised ap-
proaches like itself and PEAS [166] are not easily scalable and constitute a single point of attack and
failure. For instance, they may be easily blocked by search engines that have anti-bot policies. Besides,
results filtering due to query obfuscation are not perfect and cause lower quality responses. Moreover,
in previous approaches, all queries are treated equally, i.e., with the same protection level. Taking query
obfuscation as an example, all requests are appended with the same amount of fake queries. This is not
always effective as user searches may have different levels of sensitivity, i.e., non-sensitive queries may
be overprotected, while the opposite may happen to sensitive ones. We propose, in this section, a solution
that tackles these issues: privacy, accuracy, scalability and employs adaptive protection.
The scalability aspect, in particular, is of special interest. Up to now, all proposed solutions could be
possibly deployed in a third-party service provider. Contrarily, we now shift this design aspect to the
client-side. We assume that each client node supports SGX, as it has been shipped in Intel processors
targeting desktops and portable computers since 2015, therefore being by now fairly widespread. By
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doing so, general user machines—which are more vulnerable to generic malwares and simpler infection
vectors like social engineering—may be regarded as trusted. This brings new possibilities like server pro-
cessing offloading [168], network monitoring [241] or trusted decentralised P2P networks, as we propose
here.
5.2.1 Cyclosa
We present Cyclosa [21], a decentralised private Web search solution that leverages TEEs and:
(i) enforces privacy by protecting users against re-identification attacks through unlinkability and in-
distinguishability;
(ii) enforces accuracy by providing users with similar responses to those they would get by directly
querying the search engine; and
(iii) is scalable to millions of users while enforcing service availability even if search engines limit bulk
requests.
To enforce unlinkability between a query and its sender, each node participating in Cyclosa acts both as
a client when sending its own requests and as a proxy by forwarding queries on behalf of other nodes.
Each node has a TEE such as SGX wherein Cyclosa keeps secure inter-enclave communication endpoints
and from where interactions with search engines are triggered. These nodes are therefore regarded as
untrusted from the other peers’ perspective and therefore no query information is leaked to them. The
enclave they host, on the other hand, is trustworthy.
Re-identification attacks are mitigated by sending both fake queries and the real user query through
multiple paths to the search engine. Differently from X-Search though, instead of blindly sending the same
amount of fake queries regardless of the real query, Cyclosa assess its sensitivity and adapts the amount
of noise to be sent along. This query sensitivity evaluation is made by quantifying two attributes:
(i) linkability, which relates to the current request’s similarity with the user local profile: the more
similar the bigger the chances of user re-identification; and
(ii) semantic sensitivity, based on the query’s topic. Out of a predefined set of topics, users pick a subset
that they consider to be sensitive.
Whenever a query is sent to the search engine, Cyclosa checks whether it is linkable to its issuer profile
and if the query’s topic belongs to user-defined sensitive topics. Based on this, it accordingly adjusts the
amount of fake queries, i.e., Cyclosa strongly protects sensitive queries and avoids overloading the system
with fake ones when they are not sensitive.
In order to provide accurate results for clients, Cyclosa sends the real and fake queries through distinct
relays. In this way, filtering becomes straightforward, since results that correspond to fake requests can
be entirely discarded. Therefore, Cyclosa returns the same responses as when users directly query the
search engine, hence reaching perfect accuracy.
Cyclosa’s decentralised architecture consists of nodes with equal roles. This allows the system to scale
well, even for a large number of clients as the load gets evenly distributed between participating nodes.
Moreover, it brings advantages regarding fault tolerance: as there is no central point of failure, the system
remains operative even in presence of localised attacks or blacklisting by search engines.
We implemented and evaluated Cyclosa using the same workload we used previously: the query logs
extracted from the AOL dataset [167]. Results show that Cyclosa meets the expectations concerning load
balancing, economy of resources and privacy protection.
Adversary model
The computations performed by Cyclosa for each user query go through three premises, namely:
(i) the client machine, which is trusted by its owner but untrusted by peers that compose Cyclosa
P2P network. Such trust includes all computations that involve client information (e.g., assessing
the sensitivity degree of a query), which are performed locally outside of enclaves. Furthermore, we
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Figure 5.7: Cyclosa architecture and operating flow.
assume that the interaction between a human user and Cyclosa is trusted, i.e., an adversary cannot
modify a typed query, nor it can tamper with the local configuration of Cyclosa that a human user
has set up, that is, the set of topics the user considers as semantically sensitive.
Clients cannot bypass the SGX enclave. Session keys are generated between pairs of Cyclosa en-
claves after successful remote attestation. Therefore, untrusted code is not able to forge requests
correctly encrypted and signed. If the client is breached though, the sensitivity analysis could be
subverted. As third-party sensitive data (e.g., table of past queries) is only handled inside enclaves,
such attack would only compromise the infected peer;
(ii) a set of proxies, i.e., forwarding peers who mutually distrust each other. They can act in a Byzantine
manner [242, 235], i.e., they can arbitrarily crash, be subject to bugs or under control of malicious
adversaries.
Inter-enclave traffic as well as between enclaves and the search engine are protected by encrypted
channels. In addition, query forwarding performed by the proxy is done inside the SGX enclave.
Consequently, a malicious or compromised proxy cannot hamper Cyclosa (side-channel attacks are
not considered - see Section 2.2.6). However, malicious hosts may replay past queries. This threat
can be mitigated by including a random identifier in each message to detect replays of a limited set
of recent messages. Also, a malicious proxy can deny initialisation or calls into enclaves. Cyclosa
tackles this issue by letting clients blacklist non-responding or slow peers; and
(iii) the search engine, which is honest but curious, i.e., it faithfully replies to search queries while
possibly gathering information to build user profiles and run re-identification attacks [162].
The search engine’s capability of re-identifying users is very limited (more in the evaluation section).
However, the search engine could identify a real query when it receives this query for the first time.
Later on, the request tends to become indistinguishable from others as it will be re-issued as fake.
Even in this case, the identity of the requesting user is still hidden by the proxy (unlinkability).
Protocol overview
To use our system, clients install the Cyclosa browser extension, so that they seamlessly get protection
without changing their browsing habits. Figure 5.7 illustrates the operating flow. When the user formu-
lates a query Qu (Ê), Cyclosa evaluates its sensitivity (Ë) by checking whether the query is linkable to
the user profile and if there is a match between the semantic analysis of Qu with the user-defined set of
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sensitive topics previously established. As a result, a score k is produced and used as the number of fake
queries needed to make the real user query indistinguishable from others.
A peer discovery component (Ì) then selects k + 1 random peers Pp0, Pp1, ..., Ppk to which it sends (Î) the
real query Qu and k fake queries Qp1, ..., Qpk obtained from the database of past queries (Í), issued by
other users in the system. They are stored in a local table whenever a node acts as a relay. As indicated
in X-Search evaluation, real past queries used as fake make them seem real from the search engine’s
perspective. In contrast, systems such as TrackMeNot or GooPIR, where fake queries are generated using
RSS feeds or dictionaries, are more easily recognized as artificial.
When a request is received by peers acting as relays, it is stored in the local table of past queries (Ï)
before it is forwarded to the search engine (Ð). Relays are not aware of whether the queries they handle
are real or fake. An external observer therefore learns nothing by analysing the encrypted network traffic.
In contrast, systems where fake queries are appended in the relays (e.g., X-Search or PEAS) allow an
adversary to infer whether an outgoing message corresponds to a real query or an obfuscated one based
on the request size, since obfuscated queries built with the OR operator are larger in length.
Upon receiving a request from the node acting as a relay, the search engine provides it with the query
results (Ñ). Such responses are then routed back to the original client (Ò). Finally, Cyclosa drops the
responses corresponding to fake queries before the user gets access to the initial query’s results (Ó).
To avoid information leakage, all Cyclosa components that process sensitive data, i.e., queries issued
by other users, are located within enclaves. In order to minimize the amount of trusted code, however,
components that process data related to the user who owns the machine are placed outside the enclave.
Specifically, the unit in charge of query sensitivity assessment issued by the local user is performed out-
side the enclave. This allows to drastically minimise the amount of trusted code, which reduces the risk
of having critical bugs and unnoticed vulnerabilities. Since remote peers are untrusted, components that
handle other users’ queries in plain text are placed within enclaves, along with the communication end-
points where they are encrypted and decrypted before or after transmissions. Components placed inside
trusted environments include: peer discovery, query forwarding, encrypted communication endpoints and
the past user queries database.
Query sensitivity analysis
Aiming at avoiding the network overload potentially caused by excessive noise injected by our proposal yet
achieving indistinguishability of sensitive queries, Cyclosa performs a sensitivity analysis. Specifically, it
dynamically protects user queries according to their susceptibility by adjusting the amount of fake queries
sent along with them. To quantify query sensitivity, Cyclosa relies on two measurements computed outside
the enclave:
(i) semantic assessment, i.e., indicates whether a query is related to sensitive topics previously declared
by the user; and
(ii) linkability assessment, i.e., the risk that the query gets linked back to its issuer by means of compar-
ison with past queries issued by such user.
Since semantic sensitivity is subjective, i.e., one query might be considered as sensitive by one user and
non-sensitive by another, Cyclosa proposes a user-centric approach. Users select what they consider
semantically-sensitive topics among health, politics, sex, and religion2. Nevertheless, a user can import
dictionaries to create other sensitive topics. The semantic-based assessment’s result is binary and in-
dicates whether the query belongs to at least one topic marked as sensitive. To achieve that, we use
information retrieval approaches and build dictionaries of terms associated to each sensitive topic.
These dictionaries are built with keywords based on two datasets:
(i) WordNet [244], a machine-readable lexical database that is organised by meanings, where words are
grouped into sets of synonyms called synsets; and
2Based on Google’s privacy policy [243] which defines sensitive personal information as "a particular category of personal inform-
ation relating to topics such as confidential medical facts, racial or ethnic origins, political or religious beliefs, or sexuality."
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(ii) eXtended WordNet Domains [245], which maps WordNet synsets to 170 domain labels. By using this,
we identify keywords related to our privacy-sensitive topics.
Additionally, we leverage a statistical approach to enrich our keyword dictionaries of sensitive topics. It
consists of latent topic models, or latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) [246], a generative probabilistic model
which captures correlations among words and topics that is well adapted for modelling text corpora. In
the LDA model, a topic is described through thematic vectors that indicate the topic’s latent dimensions.
Once this model is trained with a text corpora associated to the user-defined sensitive topics, we build the
dictionary by gathering the terms of all thematic vectors.
In the experiments, we consider sexuality as an example of sensitive subject in user queries. We trained a
LDA statistical model using the Mallet toolkit [247], with 200 topics on 2 million titles and descriptions of
videos related to the sensitive subject [248]. Finally, a query is identified as semantically sensitive either if
it contains a term in at least one LDA topic or if it is linked to a WordNet domain tagged as sensitive.
The linkability assessment’s goal is to determine if the query is vulnerable to a re-identification attack. In
such attacks, an adversary tries to link an anonymous query to a specific user by measuring the distance
between the query and a set of user profiles built from past queries that were collected, for instance, before
users started using private Web search mechanisms. Concretely, the linkability assessment performed on
the client side provides a score l within the interval [0, 1] that corresponds to the current query’s proximity
to the user profile. To do that, we first represent the user query in a vector where each element is a term
in the query. Then, the cosine similarity between this vector and the one corresponding to each past query
made by the user is computed. Finally, we use exponential smoothing as a window function3 to produce an
aggregated score. Instead of ordering the samples by time though, we order them by cosine similarities
to compute this score, so that the similarity has more importance than how long ago a given query was
submitted.
The number of fake queries k may be defined based on one or both assessments. As a result from the
semantic evaluation, we simply obtain a boolean that indicates whether the current query is related to
sensitive topics. If it is the case, k is defined to a maximum value kmax and the linkability assessment
can be skipped. Otherwise, i.e., when the query is not semantically sensitive, k is defined as the linear
projection of the linkability score l with regard to kmax, i.e., k = l · kmax, with l ∈ [0, 1].
Enclave operation and implementation details
Once the number of fake queries k is decided according to the user query sensitivity, the process continues
in the SGX enclave as it involves forwarding sensitive data to remote peers. Each node discovers these
peers and dynamically maintains a view of other alive nodes in the system. When a query is issued, Cyclosa
randomly picks k+1 out of these nodes to act as proxies for the original query and k fake ones—randomly
selected from the table of past queries. Inter-enclave communication is always encrypted and the identity
of the proxy handling the original query is kept in a table within the enclave.
Once a proxy receives a query forwarding request, it adds this query in its local table of past queries
and routes it to the search engine. Answers from the search engine are returned to the original user
who, in turn, receives the result that came from the proxy which carried the real query, silently dropping
all others. Routing real and fake queries through different paths makes them indistinguishable from the
search engine’s perspective.
At bootstrap phase, besides the user declaration of sensitive topics, there are other key elements that
need to be initialised when Cyclosa is first launched by a given user:
1. Initially, there are no past requests stored in the enclave. Hence, Cyclosa fills the table with popular
Google queries [249], as they are issued by real users regarding trendy topics.
2. Then, peer discovery is bootstrapped. We assume it is done as in classical P2P systems using public
repositories of IP addresses (e.g., Tor) from which a Cyclosa instance can select a first sample of
random peers. Peer discovery is done using classical algorithms and contributions to this field fall
3Window functions consider only a limited interval of the samples to compute a final score, usually based on time, i.e., the most
recent samples. Exponential smoothing, unlike the moving average where samples are equally weighted, assigns exponentially
decreasing weights to “old” samples.
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outside the scope of this work. For implementation purposes of our prototype, we use Zyre [250], a
library based on ZeroMQ [172] for peer discovery, groups organisation and multicast of events.
3. Finally, SGX remote attestation of connecting peers must be performed (see Section 2.2.3).
To allow seamless integration to end-users’ workflow, Cyclosa was designed as an extension to the Firefox
browser. It is JavaScript-based and integrates the SGX enclave using js-ctypes, which allows asynchronous
calls between the enclave and the untrusted extension code. Connections to search engines, in turn, are
established with transport layer security (TLS) tunnels. They must originate from enclaves in order to
prevent sensitive data disclosure. To do so, we use a SGX-compatible version of mbedTLS [251]. All in all,
the Cyclosa enclave object accounts for only 1.7MiB. This and a circular buffer for the past queries table
prevents Cyclosa from suffering of EPC paging.
Experimental setup and metrics
We compare Cyclosa against five approaches for protecting privacy in Web search: Tor [154], Track-
MeNot [164], GooPIR [165], PEAS [166] and X-Search [20]; and a protection-free Web search scenario
(see Section 2.6). As in Section 5.1.1, we use the AOL query log dataset [167] and the same methodology
described in [237] to evaluate privacy by considering a subset of the most active users. Here, however,
we manually extracted 198 users who sent at least one semantically sensitive query. Again, to perform a
re-identification attack, we split the queries into training set (two thirds) and testing set (one third). In
the training set, this represents an average of 487.6 queries per user out of 96.547 queries.
To determine user-perceived sensitivity regarding Web queries, we conducted a crowd-sourcing campaign
using Crowdflower [252]. We selected the first 10, 000 queries over all user queries in the testing set,
and asked the workers to determine if these queries are related to sensitive topics (e.g., health, politics,
religion and sexuality). Each query was annotated by 5 distinct workers. It resulted that only 15.74% of
the queries are related to sensitive topics. Since the great majority are non-sensitive, lots of resources
(e.g., processing, storage, bandwidth) would be wasted should all queries be equally protected as in
X-Search. This motivates Cyclosa’s adaptive approach, which applies a dynamic protection scheme to
sensitive queries.
To measure the accuracy of Cyclosa’s ability to automatically determine if a query belongs to a sensitive
topic, we consider the precision and recall metrics. The precision indicates the proportion of truly sensitive
queries among those detected as such by Cyclosa (correctness), while the recall express the ratio between
the queries detected as sensitive with regard to all sensitive queries in the testing set (completeness). We
consider the crowd-sourcing annotations as ground truth. Let Qs be the set of actually sensitive queries
(i.e., related to sensitive topics), and Qm the set of queries that are identified as sensitive by Cyclosa.
Precision and recall are defined as follows:
precision =
|Qm ∩Qs|
|Qm| recall =
|Qm ∩Qs|
|Qs|
To evaluate privacy, we use SimAttack [162] in order to match queries with user profiles (see Section 5.1.1).
Then, we calculate the overall re-identification success rate according to Equation (5.1), i.e., the propor-
tion of queries for which the user profile is successfully re-identified with respect to all queries in the
testing set. Naturally, the lower the re-identification success rate is, the better is the privacy level.
By design, Cyclosa returns to users the same results associated to their search query as if no privacy-
protection mechanism were employed. However, other proposals such as X-Search and PEAS include an
obfuscation scheme that impacts these results by adding some noise to what is returned by search engines.
Because of this, we evaluate the capacity of such approaches of returning results related to the initial
query. To achieve that, we measure accuracy in terms of precision and recall according to Equation (5.2),
i.e., by comparing results returned by direct requests to search engines and those resulted from using
privacy-preserving strategies.
To evaluate the behaviour of Cyclosa from a systems perspective, we measure the end-to-end delays and
throughput versus latency. Besides, we observe the impact of the amount of fake queries on latency and
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of Cyclosa’s privacy level with other approaches (k = 7 when they employ obfus-
cation).
Tor TrackMeNot GooPIR PEAS X-Search Cyclosa
0
20
40
60
80
100
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Precision Recall
Figure 5.9: Accuracy of results returned by Cyclosa and alternatives (k = 3 when obfuscation is employed).
Cyclosa’s ability to avoid being blocked by search engine’s anti-bot prevention mechanisms in comparison
to X-Search.
Evaluation
We first evaluate the capacity of Cyclosa to protect user privacy by measuring its robustness against an
adversary conducting a re-identification attack. Figure 5.8 shows re-identification rates for Cyclosa, Tor,
TrackMeNot, GooPIR, PEAS, and X-Search with k = 7.
Without query obfuscation (i.e., Tor), an adversary is sure that every query has been issued by a user.
Consequently, the challenge in this case consists of mapping each query to user profiles built from previ-
ously collected user information. Our results show that an adversary is able to re-affiliate around 36% of
the new queries to their correct original users. Interesting enough, the re-identification rate for Tor is the
same of PEAS, X-Search and Cyclosa with k = 0 (not shown in the plot).
Without unlinkability (i.e., TrackMeNot and GooPIR), the adversary needs to distinguish real queries from
the fake ones. Results show that a large proportion of real queries are identified: 45% and 50% for
TrackMeNot and GooPIR, respectively. This high re-identification rate is mainly caused by the fake query
generation process, which uses RSS feeds. When sources for fakes are far from the users’ interests, the
adversary can easily dissociate them.
Combining query obfuscation and unlinkability drastically drops re-identification rates. Indeed, the ad-
versary’s challenge becomes harder. It consists of retrieving both the user’s identity and identifying real
queries among fake ones. By using real past queries as fake ones, X-Search and Cyclosa provide lower
re-identification rates than PEAS, which uses a graph of co-occurrence of terms built from past queries.
That is, terms that happen to be associated more often in real queries will compose the fake query along
with the one issued by the user.
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Figure 5.10: Actual number of fake queries in Cyclosa.
Table 5.1: Detection of semantically sensitive queries.
Semantic tool Precision Recall
WordNet 0.53 0.83
LDA 0.84 0.89
WordNet + LDA 0.86 0.85
Moreover, Cyclosa slightly reduces this re-identification rate in comparison to X-Search from 6% to 4%.
This difference comes from the obfuscation scheme adopted by them. For X-Search, the adversary receives
a group of k + 1 queries and has to identify the real one in this group. In Cyclosa, however, the adversary
receives individual queries from different proxies and has to decide whether it is real or fake. Due to the
increased amount of confusion it creates, the re-identification becomes harder.
Next, we evaluate Cyclosa’s accuracy, i.e., its ability to return the same answers from the search engine
as the ones resulted from unprotected direct queries. Figure 5.9 shows the obtained accuracy in terms
of correctness and completeness of answers returned by Cyclosa and alternatives, with k = 3 when query
obfuscation is used. There are two sets of solutions. Cyclosa and TrackMeNot provide perfect accuracy as
they differentially handle real and fake queries’ responses, while Tor achieves the same because it does
not employ obfuscation. The other solutions provide lower accuracy because, to some extent, they are not
able to distinguish between answers of fake and real queries. Precision for GooPIR, PEAS and X-Search
reaches 65% for a recall of 70%, when k = 3 and decrease for larger values of k.
Cyclosa dynamically and adaptively protects queries according to their sensitivity by adjusting the amount
of noise. Figure 5.10 shows the CDF of the number of fake queries induced by Cyclosa in our testing set
when the maximum value for k is 7. Results show that 25% of queries do not need obfuscation, and 50%
of them use less than 3 fake queries. The sharp increase for k = 7 corresponds to requests identified as
highly sensitive in the semantic-based assessment, and consequently scaled to the maximum protection
level. They amount to 35% of our testing set. In contrast, X-Search would have generated this maximum
number of fake queries for all queries.
As previously defined, the sensitivity of a query is evaluated in two dimensions: linkability to its issuer’s
profile and as to whether it belongs to user-defined sensitive topics. This detection is based on both
WordNet libraries and a trained LDA statistical model. To evaluate their influence on the results’ quality,
we ran them individually and combined while obtaining precision and recall when detecting whether
queries belonged to the sensitive topic related to sexuality. Table 5.1 shows the results. Overall, most of
queries are detected, with a recall between 83% for WordNet and 89% for LDA. Precision varies from 53%
(WordNet) to 86% (WordNet + LDA). In our experiments, combining WordNet and LDA provides the best
trade-off between correctness and completeness.
To analyse Cyclosa’s performance, we start by showing in Figure 5.11 the observed end-to-end latency
in comparison to X-Search and Tor, including the time it takes to the search engine for processing the
requests. We further include the measurements achieved without any protection by directly contacting
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of end-to-end delays for 200 queries, k = 3.
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Figure 5.12: Cyclosa: Impact of k on latency.
the search engine. As expected, Tor is the slowest, with a median latency of 62 s. Both Cyclosa and X-
Search allow for sub-second delays for the large majority of the queries, with medians of 0.88 s and 0.58 s,
respectively.
In Figure 5.12, we explore the impact of changing the number of fake queries. Even in the worst case
(k = 7), the system still returns the results to clients in less than 1.5 s, with median latency at 1.2 s, which
still allows for a usable web browsing experience.
We also evaluate the capacity of a Cyclosa node to sustain high rates of requests in comparison to X-
Search. Figure 5.13 presents the results. We submit requests at increasingly high constant rates and
measure the latency of a reply from the next hop (the X-Search proxy or a Cyclosa relay), but without
actually submitting the requests to the search engine. Cyclosa is able to handle very high request rates
with sub-seconds response delays. In our evaluation, we achieved 40.000 req/s with 0.23 s median response
time while X-Search starts straggling at 30.000 req/s.
Such rates, although possible, cannot be observed in practice without being immediately blocked by a
search engine’s malicious user detection system. In our experiments with Google search engine, this
happened very soon. Moreover, users submit searches at rates that are orders of magnitude slower: the
100 most active users from the AOL dataset perform queries at a rate of 31.23 req/h. Considering the same
queries, X-Search induces 10.500 req/h among real and fake ones when k = 3. Therefore, it is eventually
blocked by the search engine. Cyclosa follows a more practical approach by spreading the load among
the nodes with up to 94 req/h per node when k = 3, as shown in the simulation-based results presented
in Figure 5.14, where X-Search’s curve is split by the blocking threshold after only 5 s of the testing set
execution.
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Figure 5.13: Throughput vs. latency of Cyclosa and X-Search.
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Figure 5.14: Query protection vs. users blocked by search engine.
Our results show that Cyclosa efficiently detects sensitive queries while limiting the number of overpro-
tected requests which are not sensitive. We also show that it provides slightly better privacy protection
than state-of-the-art solutions and drastically reduces the end-to-end latency without impact on accuracy.
Particularly, Cyclosa:
(i) resists re-identification attacks better than alternatives with a low re-identification rate of 4%;
(ii) enables sub-second response times, which is on average 13× faster than using Tor;
(iii) can sustain throughputs higher than 40.000 req/s, enabling parallel users to securely browse the
search engine; and
(iv) fairly balances the load between the participating nodes enabling all users to securely query the
search engine without reaching its rate limitation.
5.3 Summary
Major service providers track user behaviour, which is a serious privacy threat in today’s Internet. As
one of the most widely used online services, search engines handle queries that may reveal sensitive
information about individual users, such as sexual orientation, religion or political preferences. Existing
solutions for enabling users to access Web search engines in a privacy-preserving manner do not tolerate
strong adversaries or have poor performance. In this chapter, we explored the usage of TEEs to improve
the capabilities of current solutions both in terms of privacy assurances and performance.
First, we proposed a novel architecture for privacy-preserving Web search which relies on SGX to support
stronger adversarial models. X-Search (Section 5.1.1) operates as a proxy which stores and leverages user
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past queries within a protected SGX enclave and generates obfuscated queries on the user’s behalf. It
does so by aggregating random past queries in such a way that the search engine is not able to distin-
guish which one is the original query, yet providing relevant results back to the user. Upon receiving a
response from the search engine, X-Search filters results so that only those related to the initial query are
forwarded.
We implemented a working prototype and evaluated it both analytically and experimentally using real-
world datasets. Our observations indicated that X-Search can indeed provide accurate results without
disclosing personal information about individuals. Most importantly, X-Search did so with a throughput im-
provement that reached orders of magnitude when compared to its predecessors, i.e., PEAS and Tor.
The centralised nature of X-Search imposes some constraints though. The most notable being the easiness
with which search engines could block requests originating from X-Search proxies as part of anti-bot mech-
anisms. To tackle that, we proposed Cyclosa (Section 5.2.1), a decentralised, private and accurate Web
search solution that protects users against the risk of re-identification. It provides adaptive protection to
different query sensitivity levels by combining the analysis of linkability to its issuer’s profile and query
semantic.
Cyclosa follows a fully decentralised architecture for higher scalability, and is based on SGX for preventing
data leakage by relay nodes in its distributed setup. At the same time, Cyclosa reaches perfect accuracy
by leveraging distinct paths for real and fake queries employed as obfuscation. In contrast to X-Search,
it therefore obviates the need for finer grained filtering of results returned by search engines. Our im-
plementation, evaluation and comparison to alternatives showed that Cyclosa is the most robust system
against user re-identification and provided accurate responses to Web searches in an efficient and scalable
way.
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Conclusion
Designing secure distributed systems is complex. Their dispersed nature multiplies the number of attack
vectors. Apart from that, with the growth of cloud computing such systems tend to be at least partially
deployed in shared infrastructures. This brings additional risks that stem from providers, their personnel
or co-located tenants. Existing countermeasures are either infeasible due to computational complexity
or fail at protecting running code and data from powerful adversaries like the operating system (OS).
Because of that, the design of secure systems can greatly benefit from trusted execution environments
(TEEs).
In this thesis, we have proposed several distributed architectures that leverage TEEs. We started in
Chapter 3 with systems that are likely to be deployed in cloud environments. For each of them, we
isolate the minimum processing unit that handles sensitive data and put that component inside the trusted
environment. In Section 3.1.1 that is done with the matcher component of a content-based routing (CBR)
middleware. In this way, sensitive information within subscriptions and publications is safely matched
inside enclaves before the publication payload is forwarded towards matching subscribers. We compare
this approach with a software-only scheme with equivalent guarantees and reach better performances by
one order of magnitude.
As for the lightweight MapReduce (Section 3.2.2) and SecureStreams (Section 3.2.3), we isolate the Lua
scripting language’s interpreter within enclaves. In such manner, encrypted code and data may enter
the trusted environment, be deciphered and computed upon in plaintext form. Encrypted results are
provided back to be handled by the underlying untrusted framework until reaching their final destination.
This framework is what discerns each of the two systems. MapReduce runs atop of secure content-based
routing (SCBR) for code and data dissemination and has distinct behaviour based on each phase of the
MapReduce execution flow. SecureStreams, in turn, has a second Lua virtual machine (VM) running in
untrusted mode for the execution of a distributed reactive programming pipeline. With all these systems
we were able to observe performance losses due to software guard extensions (SGX), which are mostly
influenced by memory usage.
In Chapter 4, we adopted a different design strategy. Instead of selecting subcomponents of frameworks
to be placed inside secure enclaves, we take advantage of the isolation property they provide to design
more efficient cryptographic protocols for group data sharing. The core mechanism relies on the genera-
tion of a master key in the secure environment where it is safely kept. Based on this premise, we can make
use of simple and efficient cryptographic constructs, and occasionally simplify computationally complex
phases in legacy protocols.
That is what we did both in IBBE-SGX (Section 4.1.1) and A-Sky (Section 4.2.1). IBBE-SGX simplifies
the encryption step of an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme. Using the IBBE public
key for such operation has quadratic complexity in the number of users in a group, while an equivalent
formula that uses components of the master key makes the same with linear complexity. Since the master
key is securely kept in the enclave, we are able to use the latter approach. This suffices to make the
IBBE practical for demanding applications and to reap benefits such as considerably smaller ciphertexts
and no need for public key infrastructure (PKI). We then tackled anonymity in group settings with A-
Sky. To guarantee the anonymity, A-Sky uses a similar approach to GNU privacy guard (GPG) but using
symmetric cryptography instead of asymmetric cryptography. This is possible because keys are maintained
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by the trusted environment. Like IBBE-SGX, the advantages come both in performance improvements and
shorter ciphertexts.
Chapter 5 brought the attention to users and showed how systems that rely on TEEs can protect their
privacy against established service providers. TEEs help shielding user queries that cross by relays be-
fore reaching the provider’s premises. Our first proposal, X-Search (Section 5.1.1), act as an intermediary
between users and the Web search engine by proxying their requests, so that the provider cannot directly
tell the user identity derived from the requester’s Internet protocol (IP) address (unlinkability). Besides,
it stores past user queries to obfuscate the requests by sending compound requests, so that the provider
cannot tell the difference between a real query and a fake one (indistinguishability). With this approach,
we offer better resistance against re-identification attacks while achieving better performance than al-
ternatives.
Being a centralised system, X-Search does not scale. Because of that, we propose Cyclosa (Section 5.2.1),
a peer-to-peer (P2P) network of users who are Web search clients and relays at the same time. These
users, who have SGX-capable machines, issue queries intermediated by the Cyclosa enclave, which selects
random peers to forward real and fake requests through distinct paths. Thanks to this, Cyclosa shows
perfect accuracy of results as it just discards the ones coming from fake queries. Moreover, it adapts
their number based on the real request’s sensitivity, thus not overprotecting non-sensitive queries and
generating less traffic. All combined, our evaluation shows that Cyclosa—the last of our contributions—
achieves good performance while being scalable and delivering accurate results.
Looking back at our objectives enlisted in Section 1.1 in conjunction with the contributions of this work,
we are able to draw some conclusions.
• How can TEEs help to achieve security and privacy in distributed systems?
TEEs provide hardware isolation to applications. SGX does that by means of memory confidentiality
and integrity guarantees of a running process’ partition. The subcomponents of a system that handle
sensitive data are good candidates to be part of this trusted partition that is able to crunch plaintext
data.
We show that for SCBR (matcher), SecureStreams and Lightweight MapReduce (Lua interpreter),
IBBE-SGX and A-Sky (cryptographic operations), X-Search and Cyclosa (storage or forwarding of
queries). The respective sensitive data consisted of publications and subscriptions (SCBR), code and
processing data (SecureStreams and Lightweight MapReduce), keys (IBBE-SGX and A-Sky), and user
queries (X-Search and Cyclosa). Whenever these data leave the enclave, they must be encrypted to
be handled by untrusted code.
• What are the drawbacks?
Since the OS is not trusted in the SGX threat model, enclaves cannot perform system calls. Because
of that, running legacy applications in SGX enclaves might require considerable effort, which tends
to be proportional to the amount of OS services those applications use. Although some runtime
frameworks aiming to help with that were proposed (Section 2.2.6), we decided to design our systems
from scratch in order to have control over the partitioning between trusted/untrusted code and to
keep a minimised trusted computing base (TCB).
Because of the need to track the integrity of memory pages, SGX has memory limitations (Sec-
tion 2.2.1). There are two thresholds that once surpassed bring along performance overheads: the
last level cache (LLC) and the enclave page cache (EPC) limits. We saw these drawbacks in SCBR
both for oversubscribing the processor’s cache (Figure 3.5) and the SGX protected memory (Fig-
ure 3.6) . In the Lightweight MapReduce we observed an increase in cache misses as the size of
input data grows (Figure 3.14). In the other systems, we measured overall overheads of SGX in
terms of latency and throughput for each solution.
• What benefits may come from using TEEs?
The ability to securely process sensitive data in plaintext is key to achieve performance gains by
replacing complex cryptographic constructs. We showed this for SCBR versus asymmetric scalar-
product preserving encryption (ASPE), IBBE-SGX versus IBBE and A-Sky versus pretty good privacy
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(PGP). All of them achieved better performances by at least one order of magnitude in comparison
to the equivalent cryptographic scheme with no TEE. Additionally, both IBBE-SGX and A-Sky were
able to produce a lot less metadata, entailing even further benefits in storage and network usage.
To possibly reduce infrastructure costs, the simple isolation of code and data enables the offload-
ing of processing to untrusted environments, as we showed with the Lightweight MapReduce and
SecureStreams. With Cyclosa and X-Search such isolation was used to guard users’ sensitive data
in order to protect their privacy. That was possible because the TEE assurances allow users to
trust relays in order to obfuscate and convey their queries, i.e., the X-Search proxy or the Cyclosa’s
client-side P2P network.
6.1 The road ahead
There are a number of interesting avenues for future work. Specific to our contributions, there are a
few improvements that could be done. As we built a set of academic prototypes, many enhancements are
required before turning them into production systems. We briefly comment on potential future work for
each of our proposals.
Although subscriptions and publications are encrypted in SCBR, they are not integrity protected and
could be replayed without detection. This could be solved by the addition of message authentication codes
(MACs) and sequential numbers to each message. Additionally, in order to reduce enclave transitions,
SCBR could benefit from processing publication batches instead of individual ones. The source code of
SCBR is publicly available [11].
The Lua interpreter that runs inside the enclave in the Lightweight MapReduce and SecureStreams could
be improved to provide additional security guarantees. It could, for instance, check the scripts for memory
violations and other malicious behaviour. Just like SCBR, messages are not integrity- and replay-protected.
The source code of both Lightweight MapReduce and SecureStreams is publicly available [13, 15].
IBBE-SGX could benefit from dynamically adapting the partition sizes based on the undergoing workload in
order to balance speed optimisation of both administrator- and user-performed operations. For availability
and fault tolerance, both IBBE-SGX and A-Sky would benefit from a distributed set of administrators. Some
sort of distributed locking would have to be employed. Additionally, the possibility of auditing membership
operations could be put in place with secure logs, possibly implemented with blockchains. The source code
of A-Sky is publicly available [19].
X-Search and Cyclosa were implemented to work with a single search engine: Bing and Google, respect-
ively. A more generic solution could be built by supporting more providers. Cyclosa’s peer-to-peer network
was implemented with a library that only supports local area networks. Obviously, real deployments should
instead support world-wide deployments. Besides, both X-Search and Cyclosa would benefit from different
browser integrations.
More generally, some security aspects could be further considered. In general, our prototypes did not im-
plement attestation and key provisioning. When shared keys were not generated in enclaves, we assumed
they were correctly provisioned, i.e., after attestation (see Section 2.2.3). Key management systems are
subject of active research, including involving SGX [253, 254].
Guaranteeing that a piece of persistent data is the most recent one is not an easy task, since stale data that
is correctly encrypted and signed may be replayed by attackers. The enclaves in SCBR, A-Sky and X-Search
persistently store active subscriptions, keys & membership information and user queries, respectively.
They all would benefit from effective rollback prevention. Intel currently provides persistent monotonic
counters for that, but they are known to be slow and vulnerable (see Section 2.2.5).
All in all, we believe that TEE came to stay and further research will certainly help to advance this exciting
area. In this respect, the first commercially available machines with support for SGX2 were recently
released. They have larger EPC, allow dynamic loading of memory pages and permit executions in release
mode without keys provisioned by Intel. With regard to attacks, side channels will continue to be a hot
topic for a while. We also believe that more applications that use TEEs will keep appearing, with special
highlight to the domain of blockchains [255] and secure computing maketplaces [256].
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